Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the permissible scope of these protective frisks. An officer stopped Tanner Russell for violating several minor traffic laws. The officer recognized Russell from a previous encounter where Russell had told officers he was not armed, when in fact he had a small gun in his pocket. Fearing for his safety, the officer frisked Russell for weapons and felt a small box in Russell's pants pocket. The officer removed the box, opened it, and found a syringe filled with methamphetamine. The State charged Russell with possession of a controlled substance; the syringe was the only evidence against him. Russell moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was unlawful, and the trial court granted his motion and dismissed the case. The trial court found that although the initial stop was justified, the frisk was not because the stop occurred in a well-lit area and Russell did not verbally threaten the officer, nor did he make any threatening gestures or movements. The court also found that even if the frisk was justified, the search of the container was not because it posed no threat once it was in the control of the officer. The Supreme Court held that the initial protective frisk was justified to protect officer safety, but the warrantless search of the container was not because it exceeded the permissible scope of a protective frisk. View "Washington v. Russell" on Justia Law

The estate of Etsuko Futagi Toland appealed a Court of Appeals decision upholding summary judgment that denied registration of a Japanese divorce decree awarding Etsuko Toland a monetary award against her former husband, Peter Paul Toland. The question to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying recognition of the divorce decree under comity principles because Paul was not given notice of a Japanese guardianship proceeding involving the couple's daughter. The Washington Court reversed: the 2008 guardianship had no effect on Paul's legal obligations under the 2006 divorce decree. The divorce decree was valid, and whether it should have been recognized as a matter of comity did not depend on whether Paul had notice of the guardianship proceeding. The Washington Court held that the trial court abused its discretion, and remanded this case back to the trial court for registration of the divorce decree. View "In re Estate of Toland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sione Lui was charged with second degree murder. This case presented the issue of when the confrontation clause requires testimony from laboratory analysts who conduct tests on evidence. DNA test results were admitted into evidence at Petitioner's trial, and he challenged that admission as violation of his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that based on the trial court record, there was no violation of Petitioner's rights under the confrontation clause when DNA test results and temperature readings taken from the victim's body were admitted. However, Petitioner's confrontation rights were violated by the admission of the victim's postmortem toxicology results and several statements from the autopsy report. The Court deemed those admissions harmless. View "Washington v. Lui" on Justia Law

William France was convicted of five counts of felony harassment and one count of witness intimidation for making multiple harassing calls to his former attorneys. The jury was instructed consistent with the pattern jury instructions on witness intimidation. There was no evidence presented that France, who was in jail when he made the calls, intended immediately to use force against any person present at the time of the charged conduct. France contended under the law of the case doctrine, his felony harassment convictions should have been dismissed. The State argued that the instructions, taken as a whole, accurately informed the jury of the elements of felony harassment and that it presented sufficient evidence to sustain France's convictions. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, and affirmed the trial court. View "Washington v. France" on Justia Law

The Certified Professional Guardianship Board (Board) has petitioned the Supreme Court to suspend guardian Lori Petersen for actions stemming from her guardianship of D.S. and J.S. Petersen has been a certified professional guardian since 2001. She owned and operated Empire Care and Guardianship, a large agency serving over 60 wards. From December 2009 until April 2010, the Board received a number of grievances and complaints regarding Petersen's treatment of three wards who were all, at one point, housed at Peterson Place, an adult family home. Petersen contended that suspension was improper and suggested:(1) the Board ran afoul of separation of powers principles; (2) violated the appearance of fairness doctrine; (3) impermissibly lowered the evidentiary standard; and (4) failed to consider the proportionality of the sanction. The Supreme Court agreed with Petersen as to her last contention: "She has questioned, albeit obliquely, the proportionality of the sanction, and so the Board should have considered the sanction's magnitude relative to those imposed in other cases. Accordingly, we remand to the Board to conduct a consistency analysis pursuant to its internal regulations" and the Court's opinion. View "In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen" on Justia Law

Expedia (and several other hotel booking websites, collectively, "Petitioners") has been subject to approximately 80 underlying lawsuits by states, counties, and municipalities (collectively, taxing authorities) for purportedly failing to collect the right amount of local occupancy taxes from its hotel customers. Expedia tendered most of the suits to its insurer, Zurich, although some were tendered late. Zurich refused to defend Expedia on a number of grounds, including late tender and that the underlying suits may be excluded from the policies' coverage. The trial court declined to make a determination of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia, instead ordering discovery that Expedia claimed was prejudicial to the underlying actions. Petitioners sought adjudication of their summary judgment motion concerning their respective insurers' duty to defend them in cases brought by local taxing authorities. They further requested a stay of discovery in the coverage action that could prejudice them in the underlying litigation. Upon review of the matter, the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by delaying adjudication of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine Zurich's duty to defend Expedia in each of the 54 underlying cases subject to Expedia's motion. The trial court was furthermore ordered to stay discovery in the coverage action until it could make a factual determination as to which parts of discovery are potentially prejudicial to Expedia in the underlying actions. View "Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Amy Westman (Buecking) filed for legal separation from Tim Buecking. Over a year later, she filed an amended petition for dissolution of marriage. The decree was entered 8 days too soon. Mr. Buecking appealed, raising for the first time on appeal his claim that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it entered the decree before the 90-day period had elapsed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory 90-day period commences when the petition for dissolution is filed, not when a petition for legal separation (if any) is filed. Furthermore, the Court held in this case the error of duration was a legal error but not an error involving subject matter jurisdiction that could be raised at any time. View "In Re Marriage of Buecking" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the proper scope of the effective law enforcement exemption of the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. The Seattle Police Department (SPD) used this exemption to justify withholding documents regarding the investigation of an altercation between petitioner Evan Sargent and an SPD officer. Sargent raised several challenges to the Court of Appeals decision which held that the exemption applied categorically to an investigation file where the prosecutor has declined to file charges and has referred the case back to the SPD for follow-up investigation and to information contained in an internal investigation file. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the exemption does not apply categorically to the requested criminal investigation information or to the requested internal investigation information. Further, although the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the exemption does not apply categorically to witness identification, it held that remand on this issue was not warranted. The Court also agreed with the Court of Appeals that the SPD properly withheld Sargent's nonconviction information under the Washington State Criminal Records Privacy Act (CRPA), and that the Court of Appeals correctly remanded for reconsideration of penalties. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty. View "Sargent v. Seattle Police Dep't" on Justia Law

The State brought a paternity action in 2008 to establish the parentage of C.M.F. Respondent Jonathan Fairfax was adjudicated C.M.F.'s father. Petitioner Amanda Simpson was designated custodian. Fairfax petitioned the family court to establish a parenting plan for C.M.F. Trial began on two years later. After Mr. Fairfax completed his case, Simpson moved the court to dismiss the petition under CR 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Fairfax had filed the wrong petition and failed to establish that there was adequate cause to hold a modification hearing. The court denied the motion, finding that the parentage order was not a custody decree and that Simpson's motion was untimely. Simpson presented her case, and the court created a final parenting plan that had C.M.F. residing with Fairfax for the majority of the time and designated Fairfax the "custodian of the child solely for purposes of all other state and federal statutes…" Simpson appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Because the superior court previously entered a parentage order that qualified as a custody decree, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Parentage of C.M.F." on Justia Law

In 2010, two Fare Enforcement Officers entered a train car at the Rainier Beach station and instructed all passengers to present proof of fare. When FEO Willet asked fifteen-year-old K.L.B. and his two companions to present proof of fare payment, they gave him their bus transfers. FEO Willet informed them that while bus transfers used to be valid on the light-rail, they were no longer accepted. The three young males were instructed by FEO Willet to exit the train at the next station. The FEOs asked the three males for identification once they exited the train. All three were either unable or unwilling to provide identification. K.L.B. was temporarily detained at the Othello station. The King County Sheriff's Office was called to assist in identifying K.L.B. and his companions so they could potentially be cited for fare evasion. Deputy Adams then asked K.L.B. to identify one of his male companions. He responded that he did not know his companion's full name and that he: knew him only as '"Marty."' Deputy Adams returned to the station and used a computer database to identify "Marty." There was an assault warrant out for "Marty's" arrest. K.L.B. was charged with two counts of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant under RCW 9A.76. 175. K.L.B. was found guilty of making a false statement to FEO Willet (count II). He was found not guilty of making a false statement to Deputy Adams (count I). K.L.B. appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. K.L.B. argued that a Sound Transit FEO was not a "public servant" as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(23). He also argued that the definition of "public servant" was unconstitutionally vague and that to convict a person of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, the State must prove that the defendant knew the statement was made to a public servant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that under the statute, FEO Willet was a public servant at the time K.L.B. made the false statement. The Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, because FEOs are not government employees, are not officers of government, and do not perform a governmental function, they are not "public servants" as defined by the statute. View "Washington v. K.L.B." on Justia Law