Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner David Brown appealed a Court of Appeals holding that venue for this sexual harassment suit was proper in Clark County. Respondents Robin Eubanks and Erin Gray alleged Brown engaged in sexual harassment against then from September 2007 to July 2010 while Brown was a deputy prosecuting attorney in the Klickitat County Prosecuting Attorney's Office. Eubanks mistakenly believed that RCW 36.01.050 allowed for venue in any neighboring county, rather than the two nearest judicial districts. Upon realizing it was only the two nearest judicial districts, Eubanks moved to transfer venue to an appropriate county, Clark County Superior Court. Brown responded, claiming that under RCW 4.12.020(2), only Klickitat County Superior Court was an appropriate venue for the claims. However, his response did not request a change of venue to Klickitat County Superior Court or ask the Benton County Superior Court to deny the transfer of venue to Clark County Superior Court. Benton County Superior Court granted the motion to transfer venue to Clark County Superior Court. After the change of venue to Clark County Superior Court, Brown moved for a dismissal or a change of venue to Klickitat County Superior Court based on RCW 4.12.025(1) and RCW 4.12.020(2). He argued that venue was proper in Klickitat County Superior Court because he resided there and, alternatively, because the alleged tortious acts occurred in virtue of his public office and took place there. Clark County Superior Court denied Brown's motion to dismiss or motion to change venue on both grounds. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Brown argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that RCW 4.12.020(2) required that suits against public officers for acts done "in virtue of his or her office" proceed in the county where the acts occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed venue was proper in Clark County because the Court held that the acts alleged in this complaint were not "in virtue of" Brown's public office under RCW 4.14.020(2). View "Eubanks v. Brown" on Justia Law

Christiana Anaya suffered from uncontrolled diabetes, which left her susceptible to serious infections. She went to the Toppenish Community Hospital with a urinary tract infection. Blood test results revealed Ms. Anaya had a yeast infection. The lab called Ms. Anaya's primary care facility (the Yakima Valley Farm Workers Clinic) where Respondent Dr. Mark Sauerwein was covering for Ms. Anaya's usual provider. Sauerwein was concerned about the lab results. Due to the serious nature of a blood infection, the doctor decided that if Ms. Anaya was feeling ill, she should come in immediately for treatment. If she was feeling better, it was more likely that the test result was a false positive, a common occurrence in microbiology labs. Dr. Sauerwein used the complete clinical picture available to him to conclude that the lab result was a false positive resulting from contamination but had the nurse contact Mrs. Anaya to move her next appointment up to the following week. Dr. Sauerwein did not tell Mrs. Anaya about the test result. The lab positively identified candida glabrata as the yeast in Ms. Anaya's blood. An infection of glabrata in the blood is serious. Lab microbiologists entered this information into Ms. Anaya's medical record but did not notify Dr. Sauerwein, the Clinic, or anyone else about the positive test result. Before Ms. Anaya's next visit to the Clinic, her condition worsened. Ms. Anaya went to Yakima Memorial Hospital where she was prescribed amphotericin B, which is highly toxic to the kidneys. Given the compromised state of Ms. Anaya's kidneys from her diabetes, a health care provider would not normally prescribe amphotericin B until positively identifying glabrata. Unfortunately, the amphotericin B treatment came too late to stop the infection from spreading to the internal organs. Ms. Anaya died at age 32 of cardiac arrest, deprivation of oxygen to the brain, and fungal sepsis; all stemming from type II diabetes mellitus. Mr. Anaya Gomez, as personal representative of Ms. Anaya's estate, filed suit against Dr. Sauerwein and the Clinic for malpractice. Three weeks before the jury trial, the estate moved to add a claim for failure to obtain informed consent. At the close of Mr. Anaya's case, the defense moved for judgment as a matter of law on the informed consent claim. The trial judge granted the motion and dismissed the informed consent claim, arguing that case law precluded the claim in misdiagnosis cases. The jury then found Dr. Sauerwein did not breach any duty owed to Ms. Anaya. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when a health care provider rules out a particular diagnosis based on the patient's clinical condition-including test results, medical history, presentation upon physical examination, and any other circumstances surrounding the patient's condition that are available to the provider the provider may not be liable for informed consent claims arising from the ruled out diagnosis. The Court affirmed the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gomez v. Sauerwein" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether law enforcement officers must expressly advise a person of his or her right to refuse entry into a home (provide "Ferrier") warnings-when the officers seek to execute an arrest warrant. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that sheriffs deputies unlawfully entered Petitioner Dara Ruem's mobile home in an attempt to execute an arrest warrant for Ruem's brother, Chantha. The deputies lacked probable cause to believe Chantha was present, and Ruem revoked his initial consent to the entry. Thus, the evidence recovered from the search of the home was illegally obtained and unlawfully admitted. The Court held that Ferrier warnings were not required in this instance, though any consent obtained must be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.View "Washington v. Ruem" on Justia Law

B.M.H.'s natural father died six months before he was born. His mother's former boyfriend Michael Holt, was present at B.M.H.'s birth and, shortly afterward, married his mother. Mr. Holt petitioned for third party custody, or alternatively, an adjudication of de facto parentage. The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether, under "In re Parentage of MF.," (228 P.3d 1270 (2010)), no former stepparent could bring a de facto parentage petition. Another issue that arose from this case was whether there was adequate cause to support Mr. Holt's nonparental custody petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Mr. Holt did not meet the high burden imposed on those seeking third party custody. However, the Court found he was entitled to maintain his de facto parentage action. View "In re Custody of B.M.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner Albert Boogaard argued that the comprehensive marine liability insurance policy he purchased from International Marine Underwriters (IMU) for his general partnership, ABCD Marine, covered bodily injuries he suffered while working as an independent contractor for Northland Services Inc. (NSI). Specifically, petitioner claimed that even as a general partner he qualified and was covered as a third party under the "insured contract" provision of the policy. IMU contended that as a general partner and insured, Boogaard was not a third party under the insured contract provision. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of IMU. As a general partner, Boogaard did not qualify as a third party under the "insured contract" provision in accordance with Washington partnership law. View "Int'l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC" on Justia Law

After an alternate was substituted for a juror, the trial court told the reconstituted jury that the remaining original jurors should bring the alternate "up to speed" as to what had already occurred and deliberate from there. The defendant claimed error for the first time on appeal because the jury was not instructed to begin deliberations anew. The Court of Appeals concluded the claimed error was a violation of CrR 6.5 that could be raised for the first time on appeal, then reversed the trial court judgment because the rights to jury impartiality and unanimity were violated. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the error was only a rule violation that did not constitute manifest constitutional error that could be raised for the first time under RAP 2.5(a)(3). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, although for different reasons. "It is unnecessary to address CrR 6.5 because the trial court's affirmative instruction to the reconstituted jury violated the right to a unanimous jury verdict regardless of any violation of CrR 6.5." View "Washington v. Lamar" on Justia Law

KOMO-TV news reporter Tracv Vedder made three unsuccessful public records requests to the Seattle Police Department (SPD) relating to "dash-cam" videos taken by SPD officers. The Supreme Court concluded that two of the requests should have been granted. The Court found that the SPD complied with the Public Records Act when it declined Vedder's request for officer log sheets, but failed to comply when it failed to produce a list of retained videos. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Fisher Broadcasting. v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the proper assignment of the burden of proof at a pretrial competency hearing following treatment designed to restore competency. The trial court placed the burden on respondent Blayne Coley to prove his incompetence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the burden rested with the State to prove restoration of competency and that the trial court's mistake created structural error. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that the relevant statute, interpreted by its language, the context of the provision, the statutory scheme as a whole, and related provisions, placed the burden on the party contesting competency where, after an evaluation ordered under RCW 10.77.060, the individual has been evaluated as competent. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to rule on Coley's requests to proceed prose pending a competency determination, and that Coley's request after he was deemed competent to stand trial, and therefore eligible for self-representation, was equivocal. View "Washington v. Coley" on Justia Law

Robert Campbell quit his job as a school teacher in anticipation of accompanying his wife to Finland on her Fulbright grant. Campbell applied for unemployment benefits for the months between his resignation in June 2010 and his family's planned departure in February 2011. His request was denied because the Department of Employment Security determined that Campbell did not qualify for benefits as claimed under RCW 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii), known as the "quit to follow" provision. On appeal, the superior court reversed, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the agency action. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that Campbell's resignation from his job seven months before the planned relocation was not reasonable as contemplated by the statute. View "Campbell v. Dep't of Emp't Sec." on Justia Law

Appellants James Kumar, Ranveer Singh, Asegedew Gefe, and Abbas Kosymov brought a class action lawsuit against their employer, Gate Gourmet Inc., alleging two common law torts and two violations of Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The lawsuit stemmed from Gate Gourmet's employee meal policy, which barred employees from bringing in their own food for lunch (for security reasons), leaving only employer-provided food for the employees to eat. According to plaintiffs, the policy forced them to work without food or eat food that violated their religious beliefs. The meals ostensibly consist of one vegetarian and one meat-based main dish. The employees alleged that Gate Gourmet used animal by-products in the "vegetarian" option, and despite switching to turkey for a meat-based option, the company reverted to using a beef/pork mixture in violation of others' religious dietary restrictions. The complaint, therefore, alleged that Gate Gourmet deceived "putative class members [to] unknowingly eat[ing] food forbidden by their beliefs," and that class members "have faced the choice of eating food forbidden by their sincerely held beliefs or not eating. Those that did consume meals, they argued, suffered offensive touching due to their contact with food prohibited by their beliefs, and suffered distress as a result." The trial court granted in full Gate Gourmet's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that the WLAD contained no requirement that employers make reasonable accommodations for their employees' religious practices. The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review and reversed. The Court held that the WLAD created a cause of action for failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious practices. With regard to plaintiffs' tort claims, the Court found the trial court dismissed them at the pleading stage, and the tort claims went without analysis. "In light of this fact and in light of Washington's relatively liberal standard for stating a cognizable claim," the Court remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc." on Justia Law