Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Jeramie Owens and a friend visited a car dealership in Mount Vernon after seeing a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) Beetle with a high performance engine, roof rack and surfboard on top. They took the car on a test ride but left without purchasing the car or leaving their names. The next day, a salesman opened the dealership and discovered that the same 1967 VW Beetle that respondent test drove the day before had been stolen, and one of the dealer's keys was missing. The next business day, respondent registered a 1971 VW Beetle, the registration for which had expired in 1993. In response to a listing on Craig's List, Craig Sauvageau purchased the 1971 Beetle from respondent. Claiming that he had lost the title respondent provided Sauvageau an affidavit in lieu of title. Savageau took the car to his mechanic to have it inspected, and the mechanic discovered that the VIN registered by respondent a few days prior appeared to be brand new with reinstalled rivets. Savageau called police to report the car as potentially stolen. Police discovered the confidential VIN matched that of the stolen 1967 VW from the dealership. Respondent would later be charged with first degree taking a motor vehicle without permission, first degree trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle and bail jumping. A jury convicted respondent on all charges but taking a motor vehicle without permission. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved whether whether RCW 9A.82.050(1) described alternative means of committing first degree trafficking in stolen property, and if so, whether substantial evidence supported each of the alternative means in this case. The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.82.050 described eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the conviction, and held that RCW 9A.82.050 described only two alternative means, and in this case, each was supported by sufficient evidence.View "Washington v. Owens" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues.View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

In this case, Gary Walston was exposed to asbestos while working at The Boeing Company and was later diagnosed with mesothelioma. The Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Boeing was immune from suit because Walston had not raised a material question of fact as to whether Boeing had actual knowledge that injury was certain to occur. The Supreme Court agreed after its review of the matter: Walston has not made such a showing, and therefore, he was limited to the recovery provided by the IIA' s workers' compensation system. View "Walston v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Kathryn Scrivener sued Clark College, claiming that age was the reason it did not hire her for a tenure track teaching position. She was 55 years old at the time, squarely within the 40- to 70-year-old age range protected by the Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The candidates ultimately picked for the positions were both under the age of 40. The trial court granted summary judgment in Clark College's favor, finding that Scrivener failed to prove that the college's stated reason for its decision was a pretext. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the standard must meet to overcome summary judgment: Employees may satisfy the pretext prong of the "McDonnell Douglas" framework by offering sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either: (1) that the employer's articulated reason for its action is pretextual; or (2) that, although the employer's stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the employer. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment. Scrivener created a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether age was a substantial factor motivating Clark College's decision to hire younger candidates. View "Scrivener v. Clark College" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The issue centered on whether Washington law recognized a cause of action for monetary damages where a plaintiff alleges violations of the deeds of trust act (DTA), chapter 61.24 RCW, but no foreclosure sale has been completed. The Supreme Court was also asked to articulate the principles that would apply to such a claim under the DTA and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW. The Court held that the DTA does not create an independent cause of action for monetary damages based on alleged violations of its provisions where no foreclosure sale has been completed. The answer to the first certified question was no-at least not pursuant to the DT A itself. Furthermore, the Court found that under appropriate factual circumstances, DTA violations may be actionable under the CPA, even where no foreclosure sale has been completed. The answer to the second certified question was that the same principles that govern CPA claims generally apply to CPA claims based on alleged DTA violations. View "Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether ERISA preempted claims made under two Washington state laws designed to ensure that workers on public projects are paid for their work: chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW. When the Washington Supreme Court previously addressed this issue in 1994 and 2000, it held that ERISA preempted such claims. As a result of this conflict between Washington's rule and the rule followed by federal courts, the outcome of this type of case in Washington was entirely dependent on whether the lawsuit was filed in federal or state court. This has led to forum shopping, and created inconsistent and unjust results for parties in Washington. In light of the national shift in ERISA preemption jurisprudence and the persuasive reasoning underlying that shift, the Washington Court, through this opinion, joined courts across the country and held that this type of state law was not preempted by ERISA.View "W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. Pac. Nw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law

In 1993 Petitioner Garth Snively pled guilty to a single count of indecent liberties and two counts of first degree child molestation. Relying on the plea agreement, the trial court imposed two years of community placement on each conviction. But community placement was not authorized for indecent liberties at that time. Snively did not appeal, making the judgment and sentence final when it was filed in the trial court. In 2003 the State relied on the 1993 convictions in filing a petition alleging that Snively was a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment. In 2006 a jury found Snively to be a sexually violent predator, resulting in his civil commitment. In 2010 Snively filed a personal restraint petition in the Court of Appeals, challenging the commitment by way of collaterally attacking his 1993 convictions. He claimed specifically that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas due to the erroneous community placement term. The Court of Appeals allowed Garth Snively to withdraw his plea of guilty to indecent liberties because of a facially invalid sentence. Because Snively's sole remedy for the sentencing error was correction of the judgment and sentence, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals as to that issue. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Snively" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Yates Jr. agreed to plead guilty to thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder in exchange for a 408-year prison sentence. Yates sought to withdraw those guilty pleas, claiming that he should technically have been sentenced to 408 years with a possible extension to life in prison rather than a determinate 408-year sentence. Because he did not show that he was prejudiced by this difference, the Supreme Court dismissed his personal restraint petition.View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

The State charged Joseph McEnroe and Michele Anderson with aggravated first degree murder and sought the death sentence for each of them. Roughly five and a half years after the State filed its notices of intent to seek the death penalty, the trial court ruled that the absence of "'sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency"' was an essential element of the crime of capital murder in Washington and that the State had allege the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances in the charging information. The trial court gave the State two weeks to amend each charging information to allege insufficient mitigating circumstances; if the State failed do to so, the court would entertain a defense motion to dismiss the State's notices of intent to seek the death penalty. The State appealed that order. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to compel the State to amend each information or face dismissal of the notice of special sentencing proceeding. The notice of special sentencing proceeding afforded the defendants constitutionally and statutorily adequate notice that the State intended to prove the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. View "Washington v. McEnroe" on Justia Law

When Rachel Anderson (formerly Rachel Rodgers) was six years old, a horse kicked her in the face and she sustained serious injuries. Her many fractures and lacerations required multiple surgeries and she suffered severe cognitive and emotional trauma. Rachel's family hired respondent Richard McMenamin to pursue a personal injury action against the owner of the horse. In 1997, the Superior Court approved a personal injury settlement of $3 00,000.00 and the creation of the "Rachel Marguerite Rodgers Trust." McMenamin hired respondent attorney William Dussault to draw up the trust agreement. After attorney's fees and other costs, a net amount of$187,160.66 entered the trust. Respondent Wells Fargo Bank, NA served as trustee. The agreement also created a trust advisory committee (T AC) composed of petitioner's mother, Andrea Davey (formerly Andrea Rodgers) and McMenamin, were tasked with making distribution decisions for Rachel's benefit. Rachel later took issue with how her trust has been administered, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and legal malpractice. Rachel questioned several purchases with trust money that she said were never used for her benefit - a vehicle, computers and software and a house (which was purchased in the name of her mother's boyfriend). Furthermore, Rachel questioned the trustee and legal fees that were charged to the trust as excessive and at above market rates. Rachel sued her mother, McMenamin, Wells Fargo, and Dussault, alleging breach of fiduciary duties and malpractice. Motions for summary judgment were filed by Dussault, McMenamin, and Wells Fargo. The court granted their motion. The superior court then dismissed all of Rachel's remaining claims, including claims against her mother. Rachel appealed as to McMenamin, Dussault, and Wells Fargo, but chose not to appeal her claim against Andrea. The appellate court affirmed. At issue for the Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court's approval of annual accountings of Rachel's trust under the Trustees Accounting Act (TAA), chapter 11.106 RCW, barred this suit, which was timely under the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), chapter 11.96A RCW. The Supreme Court found that because Rachel was not represented by a guardian ad litem when the court approved the trust's annual accountings, she did not have notice of these proceedings and accordingly could bring a breach of trust action under TEDRA. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, vacated its award of attorney's fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. Dussault" on Justia Law