Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Phillip Garcia Jr. appealed his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the first degree. He argued that that the evidence was insufficient to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury, that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of an adverse witness, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior crime of dishonesty, and that the prosecutor incorrectly defined "burglary" during closing arguments. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed petitioner's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree because there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. The Court reversed the conviction for burglary in the second degree because of prejudicial trial error. But the Court affirmed his conviction for criminal trespass in the first degree because the errors petitioner claimed were harmless. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The State prosecuted petitioner David Gower for sex crimes against his 17-year-old stepdaughter S.E.H. In accordance with ER 404(b) and RCW 10.58.090, the State offered evidence that petitioner had committed other similar crimes against two other alleged juvenile victims, C.M. (his biological daughter) and J.K. (another stepdaughter). In a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of that evidence, the trial court ruled it was all inadmissible under ER 404(b). But the trial court acknowledged that admissibility of that evidence under RCW 10.58.090 was a separate question and concluded that although the evidence of other sex offenses was inadmissible under ER 404(b), the evidence of the prior crimes relating to C.M. was admissible under RCW 10.58.090. In 2009, between the statute's enactment arid subsequent invalidation in 2012, the trial court admitted evidence of petitioner's prior sex offenses against him at trial. He was ultimately convicted. Because that evidence was improperly admitted and considered by the trial judge in finding petitioner guilty, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Gower" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a secretly recorded conversation between defendant William Kipp and his brother-in-law in violation of Washington's privacy act. Kipp was convicted of two counts of rape of a child and one count of child molestation in the second degree. Before trial, Kipp moved to suppress the recording, relying on the privacy act. The trial court ruled that the recording was not a private conversation and, therefore, not subject to suppression. A jury found Kipp guilty and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of the privacy act, when facts are undisputed, the question of whether a particular communication is private is a matter of law reviewed de novo. In this case, Kipp's conversation with his brother-in-law was private and therefore should have been suppressed. View "Washington v. Kipp" on Justia Law

The certified questions in this case centered on whether, the exemption of nonprofit religious organizations from the definition of "employer" under Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), violates article I, section 11 or article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. Larry Ockletree sued his former employer, Franciscan Health System (PHS), challenging the termination of his employment after he had a stroke. Ockletree, who is African-American, claimed that his termination was the result of illegal discrimination on the basis of race and disability. FHS removed the suit to federal court and moved to dismiss Ockletree's claims. FHS argued that it was exempt from WLAD as a nonprofit religious organization. Ockletree challenged the validity of the religious employer exemption under the state and federal constitutions. The district court certified questions to this court asking whether the religious employer exemption violated Washington's article I, section 11 establishment clause or its article I, section 12 privileges and immunities clause. The Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative. View "Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys." on Justia Law

Desperate to save his home from foreclosure, Lawrence Jametsky sought help securing a loan. Through a series of connections, he was introduced to mortgage broker Matthew Flynn. Flynn made Jametsky an offer for a $100,000 loan that would cover Jametsky's debts, save his house, and allow him to regain financial solvency. Instead of receiving a loan, Jametsky deeded his house to Rodney Olsen for $100,000 and entered into an 18-month lease with a buy-back option. After J ametsky realized what had happened months after the fact, he sought relief under the distressed property conveyances act (DPCA), among other things. His suit was dismissed at summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Jametsky's property was not distressed at the time of the sale because no certificate of delinquency had been issued by King County. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: a property can be distressed under RCW 61.34.020(2)(a) before a certificate of delinquency is issued and instruct the trial court to consider a variety of factors in making this factual determination. View "Jametsky v. Olsen" on Justia Law

At his arraignment in August 2012, Petitioner Peter Barton pleaded not guilty to a charge of rape of a child in the first degree. The court set bail at $250,000. The prosecutor asked for a condition requiring 10 percent of the amount to be deposited in cash with the registry of the court. Barton objected to the cash-only bail, and the trial court delayed consideration of the request. At a hearing the next day, the State asked the court to increase Barton's bail to $1,000,000 and direct that if Barton "should post bond that 10 percent of that be in cash." The judge entered an order setting bail at $500,000 and stating that Barton was required to execute a "bond with [sic] depositing 10% cash in the registry of the court." The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on article I, section 20 of the Washington State Constitution and its mandate that criminal defendants "shall be bailable by sufficient sureties." Peter Barton's bail invoked Criminal Rule (CrR) 3.2(b)(4). Barton claims the trial court's order violated his guaranty to bail by sufficient sureties. The Supreme Court held that article I, section 20 meant a defendant must be allowed the option to secure bail via a surety, as distinct from cash or other security. To the extent the trial court's order disallowed this possibility, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Barton" on Justia Law

Russell Homan was convicted of child luring. On appeal, Homan argued that his conviction violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the evidence was insufficient for conviction and that RCW 9A.40.090 (the Washington luring statute) was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to insufficiency of evidence. The State appealed the reversal, and the Supreme Court granted review on the sufficiency of evidence issue. The Court declined to rule on the overbreadth issue because it would benefit from additional briefing and argument. The Court found sufficient evidence to find that Homan lured a minor and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the overbreadth issue. View "Washington v. Homan" on Justia Law

Homer Gibson applied to Kittitas County for a conditional use permit (CUP) that would allow him to conduct rock crushing and other gravel and cement production related activities on his agricultural-zoned property. Kittitas gave notice that it would hold a public hearing on the CUP. Ellensburg Cement Products, Inc. objected to the CUP application and appealed Kittitas's SEPA Determination of Non-Significance (DNS) under the county's administrative appeal procedures. Kittitas first considered the SEPA appeal in a "closed record" hearing, and upheld the DNS. It then held an "open record" public hearing on the CUP, and granted Gibson's application over Ellensburg Cement's objections. Ellensburg Cement appealed both decisions to the superior court, which affirmed, and then to the Court of Appeals, which reversed. The Court of Appeals held that Kittitas was statutorily required to hold an "open record hearing" on the appeal of the SEP A DNS and that rock crushing was not a permissible conditional use under Kittitas's relevant zoning regulations. After its review, the Supreme Court found no error with the appellate court's decision and affirmed. View "Ellensburg Cement Prods., Inc. v. Kittitas County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on proceedings to determine the fair value of shares in a closely held corporation. The primary question presented was whether the respondents, shareholders who disagreed with the corporation's estimate of that fair value, presented sufficient evidence to defeat the corporation's motion for summary judgment. Secondarily, the Court was asked to decide whether the trial court properly awarded attorney and expert fees to the corporation. After review, the Supreme Court held that respondents did not provide sufficient evidence to defeat the corporation's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court held respondents did not act in a manner that justified the trial court's award of fees to the corporation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals was reversed as to the summary judgment issue and affirmed as to the fees. View "SentinelC3 v. Hunt" on Justia Law

In this case and its companion, LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC,(No. 88132-4), the central issues on appeal arose from a joint venture agreement regarding a debt collection business. The debt collection business operated according to the terms of the joint venture agreement, as originally proposed, from approximately winter 2005 through summer 2007. In this opinion, the issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of equitable indemnification (known as the "ABC Rule") to hold that the legal malpractice plaintiffs here suffered no compensable damages as a matter of law and that summary judgment dismissal was appropriate. "Where the only damages claimed by a legal malpractice plaintiff are attorney fees incurred in a separate litigation and the only legal basis on which plaintiff asserts those fees are compensable is the ABC Rule, then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment dismissal if the ABC Rule does not apply to the undisputed facts as a matter of law." That was the situation presented in this case, and as such, affirmed the trial court. View "LK Operating, LLC v. Collection Grp., LLC" on Justia Law