Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

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William Smith claimed that the trial court violated his public trial right when courtroom limitations led to holding "sidebar" conferences in a hallway outside the courtroom on the record with counsel present. Smith argued that these sidebars were courtroom closured, and because the trial court did not perform a "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)) analysis, he asked the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. "Sidebars are not subject to the public trial right under the experience and logic test because they have not historically been open to the public and because allowing public access would play no positive role in the proceeding. Although the practice of holding sidebars in a hallway outside the courtroom is unusual, the form of these hallway conferences was consistent with the role traditionally filled by sidebars and so they do not implicate the public trial right." View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Slert was tried and convicted three times for the murder of John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed. In his third trial, prospective jurors were given a questionnaire designed to determine if any of them had heard about the two prior trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether a pre-voir-dire in-chambers discussion of their answers and the dismissal of four prospective jurors for outside knowledge of the case violated the open public trials provisions of the Washington State Constitution. The Court found no reversible error. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the portion of jury selection in which the court excuses jurors for hardship is a proceeding to which the public trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals concluded that it is, and that Joseph Njonge's public trial right was violated when the trial court purportedly excluded observers during hardship excusals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial without reaching Njonge's other assignments of error, including claims that the trial court improperly excluded a family member of the victim (who was also a witness) and members of the press from portions of voir dire. Based on its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not close proceedings in violation of Njonge's public trial right. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for review of Njonge's additional assignments of error. View "Washington v. Njonge" on Justia Law

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In the unrelated trials of Henry Grisby III and Gregory Shearer, the trial judges questioned a juror in private without making a finding that specific circumstances warranted closing the questioning to the public. This was a violation of both Grisby's and Shearer's right to a public trial. The State asks the Washington Supreme Court to overrule two key holdings from two 2012 cases on public trial rights. First, the State asked that we overrule the holding that a defendant's failure to object to a closure at trial does not constitute a waiver of his or her public trial rights. Second, the State asked the Court to overrule the holding that public trial rights violations are structural error and thus prejudice is presumed when a public trial rights violation is shown. The Court overruled its precedent only when it has been shown to be incorrect and harmful, and in this case, the State did not make such a showing. Therefore, the Court applied the holdings from those 2012 cases here and found that the public trial rights of both Shearer and Grisby were violated when a portion of juror questioning was closed to the public without a finding that specific circumstances warranted the closure. View "Washington v. Shearer" on Justia Law

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In consolidated criminal cases, the issue common to both was whether a defendant could waive his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 and/or article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. In "State v. Frawley" the Court of Appeals reversed Brian Frawley's conviction for first degree felony murder because the trial court closed the courtroom without performing a "Bone-Club" analysis. In "State v. Applegate," the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's determination of aggravating factors supporting Ronald Applegate's exceptional sentence for his 2005 conviction for rape of a child because the defendant waived his public trial right. In both cases, because the State did not establish waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed Frawley and reversed Applegate. View "Washington v. Frawley" on Justia Law

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Anthony Koss was convicted of first degree burglary. Before jury deliberations, the judge and counsel met in chambers. Immediately afterwards, the judge stated in open court that she had given counsel the jury instructions and had made a requested change in one instruction. Koss therefore inferred, and the State agreed that it was an in-chambers instructions conference. Koss challenged that procedure for the first time on appeal. Recent controlling precedent of the Supreme Court held that he could raise this constitutional claim for the first time on appeal and that the trial court must address several factors on the record before closing a proceeding to which the constitutional right to a public trial attaches. But recent precedent also held that the constitutional right to a public trial did not extend to a preliminary instructions conference. In addition to the jury instruction conference, Koss argued that the trial judge received and answered two questions, in writing, during deliberations, in another closed court proceeding. But the transcript, clerk's papers, and docket did not reveal any such proceeding, open or closed. Recent controlling precedent reaffirmed a long-standing rule that the appellant bore the burden of providing a record showing that the supposedly unconstitutional event occurred. The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that recent controlling precedent. View "Washington v. Koss" on Justia Law

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In this class action case, a jury found that the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in its contracts with individual providers who live with the DSHS clients for whom they provide care. The jury found that the providers incurred over $57 million in damages, and the judge awarded an additional $38 million in interest. The DSHS clients who lived with their providers also filed a class action suit, but the judge did not allow them to recover any damages. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict for the providers, the judge's decision to disallow the clients from recovering damages, and the dismissal of the providers' wage claims, because all complied with Washington law. However, the Court reversed the judge's award of prejudgment interest because the damages could not be determined with certainty. View "Rekhter v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs." on Justia Law

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Richard Sweat received an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) as part of a domestic violence conviction. He believed the trial court erred and argued that the catchall definition of "victim" in RCW 9.94A.030 must be used in interpreting RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i), precluding the application of the aggravating factor when the pattern of abuse was not perpetrated against the victim or victims of the currently charged offense. The Supreme Court disagreed with that reasoning and affirmed. View "Washington v. Sweat" on Justia Law

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About 25 years ago, petitioners Russell McNeil and Herbert Rice Jr. were tried as adults and convicted of aggravated first degree murder for crimes committed while the petitioners were both a little over 17 years old. They were each given the mandatory minimum sentence for that crime-life in prison without the possibility of early release. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. (2012)). Relying on "Miller," petitioners sought relief from their sentences on collateral review through personal restraint petitions (PRPs). While the PRPs were pending before the Washington Supreme Court, the legislature passed and the governor signed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064, "the Miller fix." The State filed a motion to dismiss the PRPs, arguing the Miller fix made it impossible for petitioners to meet their threshold burden of showing they had suffered actual and substantial prejudice based on a constitutional error. The Washington Court denied the State's motion and deny the PRPs. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of McNeil" on Justia Law