Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Ronald Mendes was "compelled" to waive his constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own criminal case after the trial court refused to rule on whether the evidence presented during the State's case in chief entitled Mendes to a self-defense instruction. Mendes challenged his conviction for felony murder based on allegations that he shot and killed Danny Saylor after an altercation at Saylor's home. At trial, Mendes's theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense after Saylor came at him with a baseball bat. After the State rested, Mendes's counsel asked the court to make a preliminary ruling on whether enough evidence had been presented through the State's witnesses to warrant a self-defense instruction. The State objected, and the trial court declined to rule on Mendes's request. Mendes then testified on his own behalf. Mendes was convicted of felony murder. On appeal, Mendes argued that the trial court improperly compelled him to testify when it declined to rule on whether the State's evidence alone entitled him to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that Mendes was not entitled to an advisory ruling on jury instructions before the close of all the evidence and that Mendes's decision to testify was voluntary and tactical. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Washington v. Mendes" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the "vested rights doctrine" applied to permit applications filed under plans and regulations that were later found to be noncompliant with the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). In 2006, BSRE Point Wells LP asked Snohomish County to amend its comprehensive plan and zoning regulations to allow for a mixed use/urban center designation and redevelopment of the Point Wells site. BSRE wanted to redevelop the property by adding over 3,000 housing units and over 100,000 square feet of commercial and retail space. The petitioners, Town of Woodway and Save Richmond Beach Inc., opposed the project. They argued that the area lacked the infrastructure needed to support an urban center, namely sufficient roads and public transit. These nearby communities did not want to "bear the burden of providing urban services to the site." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the vested rights doctrine did apply to the permit applications filed in this case: local land use plans and development regulations enacted under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, are presumed valid upon adoption. Should a valid plan or regulation later be found to violate SEPA, the exclusive remedies provided by the GMA affect only future applications for development-not development rights that have already vested. In this case, BSRE Point Wells LP (BSRE) submitted complete applications for development permits before the local land use ordinances were found to be noncompliant with SEPA. BSRE's rights vested when it submitted its applications. A later finding of noncompliance did not affect BSRE's already vested rights. View "Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County" on Justia Law

Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

William Smith claimed that the trial court violated his public trial right when courtroom limitations led to holding "sidebar" conferences in a hallway outside the courtroom on the record with counsel present. Smith argued that these sidebars were courtroom closured, and because the trial court did not perform a "Washington v. Bone-Club," (906 P.2d 325 (1995)) analysis, he asked the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction and grant a new trial. "Sidebars are not subject to the public trial right under the experience and logic test because they have not historically been open to the public and because allowing public access would play no positive role in the proceeding. Although the practice of holding sidebars in a hallway outside the courtroom is unusual, the form of these hallway conferences was consistent with the role traditionally filled by sidebars and so they do not implicate the public trial right." View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was tried and convicted three times for the murder of John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed. In his third trial, prospective jurors were given a questionnaire designed to determine if any of them had heard about the two prior trials. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether a pre-voir-dire in-chambers discussion of their answers and the dismissal of four prospective jurors for outside knowledge of the case violated the open public trials provisions of the Washington State Constitution. The Court found no reversible error. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the portion of jury selection in which the court excuses jurors for hardship is a proceeding to which the public trial right attaches. The Court of Appeals concluded that it is, and that Joseph Njonge's public trial right was violated when the trial court purportedly excluded observers during hardship excusals. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial without reaching Njonge's other assignments of error, including claims that the trial court improperly excluded a family member of the victim (who was also a witness) and members of the press from portions of voir dire. Based on its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not close proceedings in violation of Njonge's public trial right. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for review of Njonge's additional assignments of error. View "Washington v. Njonge" on Justia Law

In the unrelated trials of Henry Grisby III and Gregory Shearer, the trial judges questioned a juror in private without making a finding that specific circumstances warranted closing the questioning to the public. This was a violation of both Grisby's and Shearer's right to a public trial. The State asks the Washington Supreme Court to overrule two key holdings from two 2012 cases on public trial rights. First, the State asked that we overrule the holding that a defendant's failure to object to a closure at trial does not constitute a waiver of his or her public trial rights. Second, the State asked the Court to overrule the holding that public trial rights violations are structural error and thus prejudice is presumed when a public trial rights violation is shown. The Court overruled its precedent only when it has been shown to be incorrect and harmful, and in this case, the State did not make such a showing. Therefore, the Court applied the holdings from those 2012 cases here and found that the public trial rights of both Shearer and Grisby were violated when a portion of juror questioning was closed to the public without a finding that specific circumstances warranted the closure. View "Washington v. Shearer" on Justia Law

In consolidated criminal cases, the issue common to both was whether a defendant could waive his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 and/or article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. In "State v. Frawley" the Court of Appeals reversed Brian Frawley's conviction for first degree felony murder because the trial court closed the courtroom without performing a "Bone-Club" analysis. In "State v. Applegate," the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's determination of aggravating factors supporting Ronald Applegate's exceptional sentence for his 2005 conviction for rape of a child because the defendant waived his public trial right. In both cases, because the State did not establish waiver, the Supreme Court affirmed Frawley and reversed Applegate. View "Washington v. Frawley" on Justia Law

Anthony Koss was convicted of first degree burglary. Before jury deliberations, the judge and counsel met in chambers. Immediately afterwards, the judge stated in open court that she had given counsel the jury instructions and had made a requested change in one instruction. Koss therefore inferred, and the State agreed that it was an in-chambers instructions conference. Koss challenged that procedure for the first time on appeal. Recent controlling precedent of the Supreme Court held that he could raise this constitutional claim for the first time on appeal and that the trial court must address several factors on the record before closing a proceeding to which the constitutional right to a public trial attaches. But recent precedent also held that the constitutional right to a public trial did not extend to a preliminary instructions conference. In addition to the jury instruction conference, Koss argued that the trial judge received and answered two questions, in writing, during deliberations, in another closed court proceeding. But the transcript, clerk's papers, and docket did not reveal any such proceeding, open or closed. Recent controlling precedent reaffirmed a long-standing rule that the appellant bore the burden of providing a record showing that the supposedly unconstitutional event occurred. The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that recent controlling precedent. View "Washington v. Koss" on Justia Law

In this class action case, a jury found that the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) violated the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in its contracts with individual providers who live with the DSHS clients for whom they provide care. The jury found that the providers incurred over $57 million in damages, and the judge awarded an additional $38 million in interest. The DSHS clients who lived with their providers also filed a class action suit, but the judge did not allow them to recover any damages. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict for the providers, the judge's decision to disallow the clients from recovering damages, and the dismissal of the providers' wage claims, because all complied with Washington law. However, the Court reversed the judge's award of prejudgment interest because the damages could not be determined with certainty. View "Rekhter v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs." on Justia Law