Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case is the triggering event for the statute of limitations on childhood sexual abuse actions. Timothy Jones’ estate (Estate) brought negligence and wrongful death claims against the State of Washington. Timothy was born to Jaqueline Jones in 1990. In 2003, Jacqueline lost her home to foreclosure, and Timothy moved in with Price Nick Miller Jr., a family friend. A month later, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) was alerted that Miller was paying too much attention to children who were not his own. After investigating the report, DCYF removed Timothy from Miller’s home based on this inappropriate behavior. In November 2003, Timothy was placed in foster care and DCYF filed a dependency petition. Timothy’s dependency case was dismissed in 2006. Later that year, Timothy told a counselor that Miller had abused him sexually, physically, and emotionally from 1998 to 2006. In 2008, Miller pleaded guilty to second degree child rape connected to his abuse of Timothy and second degree child molestation related to another child. In 2007 or 2008, Jacqueline sued Miller on Timothy’s behalf. The attorney did not advise Timothy or his mother that there may be a lawsuit against the State or that the State may be liable for allowing Miller’s abuse to occur. Sometime in mid-2017, and prompted by a news story about childhood sexual abuse, Timothy and a romantic parter Jimmy Acevedo discussed whether Timothy may have a claim against the State. Acevedo recommended that Timothy consult a lawyer. In fall 2017, Timothy contacted a firm that began investigating Timothy’s case. In June 2018, Timothy committed suicide. Jacqueline was appointed personal representative of Timothy’s estate and filed claims for negligence, negligent investigation, and wrongful death against the State. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the statute of limitations for negligence claims begins when a victim recognizes the causal connection between the intentional abuse and their injuries. The court granted summary judgment for the State and dismissed the Estate’s claims as time barred. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding no evidence was presented that Timothy made the causal connection between that alleged act and his injuries until August or September 2017, and the Estate filed its claims on March 12, 2020, within RCW 4.16.340(1)(c)’s three-year time period. View "Wolf v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this action, the Wahkiakum School District (WSD) alleged the State of Washington “fail[ed] to amply fund the [WSD]’s needed facilities [and] infrastructure.” WSD argued that this failure violated the Washington Constitution, article IX, section 1. The complaint explained the impact of this lack of ample funding for facilities and infrastructure: “The [WSD] is a poor, rural school district located along the banks of the Columbia River. It has less than 500 students. Approximately 57% of its students are low income. It has less than 3500 registered voters. And the per capita income of its voters is approximately $29,000.” Specifically, the WSD requested that the State pay the cost of rebuilding its elementary, middle, and high schools; it estimated more than $50 million in construction costs. The State moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim (CR 12(b)(6)) and for lack of jurisdiction (CR 12(b)(1)). In support of its motion, the State argued, “[F]unding for school construction and other capital expenditures is governed by entirely different constitutional and statutory provisions that primarily look to local school districts themselves, with the State providing funding assistance. As such, WSD fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted . . . .” It also argued that the court could not award monetary damages because the legislature has not created a private right of action and monetary damages would violate separation of powers principles. The WSD conceded that it failed to file a tort claim form and thus that its claim for monetary damages was barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the constitution did not include capital construction costs within the category of “education” costs for which the State alone must make “ample provision.” The Court thus affirmed the trial court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss. View "Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Washington" on Justia Law

Dahndre Westwood entered A.B.’s house around 4:30 a.m. A.B. saw Westwood standing in her hallway and holding a knife in his hand. Westwood told her to get undressed and threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate. A.B. screamed for help and pleaded for her life; she clawed at Westwood and knocked the knife out of his hand. During the struggle, Westwood nicked A.B. with the knife, leaving a scar on her cheek. Westwood choked and suffocated A.B. to muffle her screams for help and hit her repeatedly on the head. Several cars passed A.B.’s house while this transpired, and the headlights shone in the window. Westwood stopped his assault after the second or third set of headlights passed. He threatened A.B. that if she told anyone about the assault he would come back to kill her. Westwood then ran into the living room and out the front door. A.B. called 911 and was taken to the hospital by first responders shortly after. A jury convicted Westwood of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and burglary in the first degree. At sentencing, Westwood argued that his convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct for scoring purposes. The State disagreed and asked the court to apply the analysis from Washington v. Chenoweth, 370 P.3d 6 (2016). The trial court determined that the three convictions did not constitute the same criminal conduct because each of the crimes required a different statutory intent. Westwood appealed, arguing that Washington v. Dunaway, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987) controlled. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct under the analysis of Dunaway. Some lower courts found conflict between the analysis in Dunaway and that in Chenoweth. The Washington Supreme Court took the opportunity to provide guidance on the relationship between these cases and found no conflict existed. Here, the objective statutory intent analysis was the proper test. The Court affirmed the sentencing court’s decision and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Westwood" on Justia Law

U.S. Bank National Association foreclosed on property owned by real estate company Dalton M, LLC. The bank did not have the right to do that: Dalton M actually owned the property outright, not subject to any lien. Dalton M ended up suing U.S. Bank to quiet title and for damages for slander of title. Dalton M prevailed at trial on both of those claims. The trial court also awarded substantial fees to Dalton M based on the slander of title claim. The Court of Appeals reversed on that claim, holding that Dalton M had failed to prove its “pending sale” element, which wiped out the sole basis for the trial court's fee award. Instead, the Court of Appeals awarded fees to Dalton M on an entirely new theory that no party had pleaded or argued to the trial court and that the trial court had never considered: the theory that U.S. Bank had engaged in extensive prelitigation bad faith conduct not amounting to violation or contempt of any court order or ruling, and that this provided a new equitable exception to Washington’s general rule that each party must bear their own costs of suit. The Washington Supreme Court determined the appellate court's decision violated both the Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAPs) and Washington controlling precedent. The Court of Appeals violated these rules: it sua sponte raised a new issue that was more like an unpleaded claim, that new issue was distinct from issues or theories raised before, resolution of that new issue was not necessary to resolve the questions presented about the claims actually pleaded, and resolution of that new issue depended on facts that the parties never had a chance to develop at trial. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ award of attorney fees. View "Dalton M, LLC v. N. Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner the Freedom Foundation requested the identities and workplace contact information for Washington state public employees. To prevent disclosure of this information, affected employees sought declaratory and injunctive relief through the Washington State Federation of State Employees and other labor unions (Unions). The Unions alleged their members, who were victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse, stalking, and harassment, possessed a constitutional liberty interest in personal security that the government would violate by releasing the requested information. The courts below agreed. On appeal, the Foundation argued no such fundamental right existed, the Unions lacked standing, and the Unions failed to bring justiciable claims. During the course of this case, the Washington State Legislature enacted a law exempting the requested information from disclosure under the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56 RCW. The Washington Supreme Court held the Unions had standing and brought justiciable claims on behalf of their members. However, the Unions did not demonstrate particularized harm to affected public employees; therefore, they did not satisfy the PRA injunction standard. The Court thus affirmed the Court of Appeals on these grounds. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling on declaratory relief because this matter could be resolved on nonconstitutional grounds. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the superior court to apply the new statutory exemption. View "Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., Council 28, v. State" on Justia Law

The United States District Court certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court, asking whether a violation of Washington’s animal protection laws could establish a claim for a public nuisance, absent an indication that the legislature so intended and absent a showing that the violation interfered with the use and enjoyment of property or was injurious to public health and safety. The case was brought by the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) against the Olympic Game Farm Inc. (OGF). ALDF argued OGF violated Washington’s wildlife laws, animal cruelty laws, and both the Washington and federal Endangered Species Act of 1973, thus creating a public nuisance. OGF argued ALDF had no valid legal claim for public nuisance because ALDF did not demonstrate any wildlife statutes have been violated. Even if ALDF could prove such a violation, the Washington Supreme Court determined the state legislature has not named such violations a nuisance nor has ALDF demonstrated that a property interference or threat to public health and safety has occurred. Based on Washington case law and statutory definitions of public nuisance, and the lack of any indication in case law or statute that violation of animal protection laws has been declared a nuisance, the Supreme Court answered the federal court's certified question in the negative. View "Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Olympic Game Farm, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent Peter Ansell was serving an indeterminate life sentence in community custody. The Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board (ISRB) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision invalidating certain community custody conditions. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the conditions relating to sexually explicit materials, dating, and relationships were not unconstitutionally vague. However, the Court determined the ISRB exceeded its authority in imposing the cannabis condition, to which the ISRB conceded was not related to Ansell’s crimes. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an invitee, was allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos on the defendant landowner’s property. The landowner, petitioner ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Mobil), requested a jury instruction to limit its potential liability for injuries caused by “known or obvious” dangers pursuant to § 343A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (Am. L. Inst. 1965). The trial court declined to give the § 343A instruction, and the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Mobil argued that the jury should have been instructed on both §§ 343 and 343A of the Restatement as a matter of law. According to Mobil, an instruction on § 343A was necessary to make the jury instructions complete and to allow Mobil to argue its theory of the case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: “it is well established that the issuance of jury instructions is ‘within the trial court’s discretion’ and that instructions on ‘a party’s theory of the case’ are not ‘required’ unless they are supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” View "Wright v. 3M Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Paul Rivers, a Black man, was convicted on two criminal charges in King County, Washington by a jury drawn from a panel that lacked any Black potential jurors. Rivers argued this venire, as well as certain aspects of the King County jury selection system that produced this venire, violated his state and federal fair cross section rights. “No one in this case disputes that jury diversity is lacking in Washington and that more can and must be done to promote juror diversity statewide.” Because Rivers did not show that the Washington Constitution required the heightened test he proposed for assessing fair cross section claims, the Court analyzed his claim using the existing Sixth Amendment framework, and that Rivers’ venire and King County’s jury selection system satisfied constitutional minimums. The case was remanded for resentencing, because the Court found Rivers was entitled to the benefit of RCW 9.94A.647, which no longer allowed a persistent offender life sentence based on prior second-degree robbery convictions. View "Washington v. Rivers" on Justia Law

In 1993, respondents Brock and Diane Maslonka purchased land bordering the Pend Oreille River. A dam had been constructed on the river in 1955. The previous owners informed the Maslonkas that the land occasionally flooded. In 2016, the Maslonka sued the Pend Oreille Public Utility District (PUD), alleging its operation of the dam entitled them to damages based on inverse condemnation, trespass, nuisance and negligence. The trial court found the subsequent purchaser rule barred the inverse condemnation claim, and the PUD established a prescriptive easement barring the trespass and nuisance claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the PUD could not benefit from the subsequent purchaser rule because it failed to prove its conduct constituted a taking prior ro the Maslonkas’ purchase. The Washington Supreme Court held that an inverse condemnation claimant must show the subsequent purchaser rule does not bar their suit. Further, an inverse condemnation claimant barred by the subsequent purchaser rule has no viable tort claim if the tort is based ont he’s same government conduct. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to reinstate its summary judgment orders. View "Maslonka v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County" on Justia Law