Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In August 2007, Winnie Lyons signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust encumbering her real property in Burien. The property served as Lyons' primary residence and was also where she operated an adult family home (AFH). Wells Fargo Bank NA was the lender and beneficiary; Northwest Trustee Services LLC (NWTS) was the trustee. In October 2009, an employee of Wells Fargo executed a beneficiary declaration identifying Wells Fargo as trustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006. In June 2010, another beneficiary declaration was executed by an employee of Wells Fargo naming Wells Fargo Bank as the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation evidencing the above-referenced loan "or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said obligation." In 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. While Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee's sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold. Wells Fargo told Lyons' attorney that the modification had been approved, the terms of which were that Lyons had to pay $10,000 by a set deadline. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. Lyons made the payment as requested, however, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons' loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan (to be effective May 1, 2012). NWTS received notice of the sale and service release; Lyons received notice of this sale. Lyons' attorney was informed that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, Lyons had received a loan modification, so she was no longer in default. Lyons' attorney again called NWTS to inform them of the loan modification and the sale of the loan. A NWTS employee informed her that Carrington had directed NWTS to continue with the foreclosure sale as scheduled. Lyons' attorney called Carrington and an employee indicated that Carrington did not show the property in foreclosure status. Another employee further indicated that Carrington had not told NWTS to go forward with the sale. Lyons' attorney then sent a cease and desist letter to NWTS and Carrington. Lyons' attorney followed up with NWTS; NWTS acknowledged receipt and informed her the sale was still on but that the matter had been referred to an attorney. Lyons' attorney again spoke with NWTS' attorney, who refused to discontinue the sale. Lyons' attorney filed the complaint. NWTS then executed and recorded a notice of discontinuance of the trustee's sale. Lyons alleged that this situation the foreclosure sale created had serious emotional and economic impacts on her. In addition to the sense of humiliation Lyons felt, Lyons alleged she lost business as a result of the foreclosure process. Lyons asserted that she experienced constant nausea from the stress and continuously worried about losing her business and the subsequent homelessness of herself, her son, and the elderly clients she cared for. NWTS moved for summary judgment. After argument, the court granted the motion for summary judgment as to all claims against NWTS. Subsequently, Lyons and the remaining defendants (Stanwich, Carrington, and Wells Fargo) entered a stipulated order of dismissal. Lyons' motion for reconsideration of the order of summary judgment was denied. We granted Lyons' petition for direct review. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the alleged violations of the deed of trust act (DTA) and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but the Court reversed and remanded as to Lyons' Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. View "Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2010, Christian Williams stole several items from the home of his childhood friend and former housemate, Bo Larsen. When Larsen confronted Williams about the stolen items, Williams admitted his involvement and returned most items, though some had already been used as collateral for a pawn shop loan. A jury convicted Williams of residential burglary and trafficking in stolen property in the first degree. At issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether sentencing courts have discretion to count prior convictions separately under the burglary antimerger statute notwithstanding a finding that they encompass the same criminal conduct under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). The Court of Appeals held they do not. Agreeing with the appellate court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a portion of the wages paid to plaintiff Shaun LaCoursiere was rebated to his employer or its agent in violation of Washington's wage rebate act. LaCoursiere's employer, CamWest Development Inc., paid LaCoursiere three discretionary bonuses during the course of his employment. Pursuant to his employment agreement, a portion of LaCoursiere's bonus money was directly invested in a related company, CamWest Managers LLC. When CamWest terminated LaCoursiere's employment before the investment fully vested, LaCoursiere lost a portion of his investment in the LLC. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of LaCoursiere's claim. Even though the bonuses constituted "wages," there was no rebate of those wages because LaCoursiere's unvested interest reverted to the LLC and not to CamWest. View "LaCoursiere v. CamWest Development, Inc." on Justia Law

The State charged defendant with second and third degree assault, as well as first degree unlawful possession of a firearm based on multiple juvenile convictions for robbery that rendered him ineligible to possess a firearm. On the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that they had agreed to stipulate that defendant had been convicted of a "serious offense." Defense counsel indicated he did not want the jury to hear about the underlying convictions but informed the court that defendant disagreed with the stipulation. Both the defense attorney and the trial judge discussed the matter and agreed that stipulating to an element was a tactical decision that did not require the defendant's consent. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether an attorney can stipulate to an element of a charged crime over his client's express objection and whether, in this case, any error was waived by defendant. An ancillary issues was whether defense counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals, in a two to one opinion, affirmed the defendant's convictions for assault in the second degree with a firearm enhancement and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. The Supreme Court reversed as to the unlawful possession of a firearm conviction and affirmed as to the assault conviction. View "Washington v. Humphries" on Justia Law

In December 1995, Teresa Schmidt slipped and fell while visiting a Tacoma grocery store. She retained Timothy Coogan to represent her in a claim against the store. Just days before the statute of limitations ran, Coogan filed a complaint naming the wrong defendant. He subsequently filed two amended complaints, but the trial court dismissed the case as barred by the statute of limitations. Schmidt filed a complaint against Coogan, asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. The case went to trial in November 2003, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt and granted recovery for past economic and noneconomic damages. The trial court granted a new trial on the issue of damages only, finding that Coogan was denied a fair trial: Schmidt's counsel gave an improper closing argument, and the damages were so excessive as to unmistakably indicate that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a new trial. In 2010, Schmidt moved for leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for outrage/reckless infliction of emotional distress, alleging that Coogan harassed, intimidated, and belittled her when she raised the problem of the statute of limitations before it expired. In the 2003 trial, the jury was instructed to determine general damages arising out of Coogan's conduct and malpractice. In the second trial, however, Coogan challenged the availability of general damages in legal malpractice cases. Because her counsel could not find settled authority either affirming or denying the availability of emotional distress damages in Washington, Schmidt sought to add a claim that encompassed the damages. The trial court denied Schmidt's motion to amend. Schmidt also filed a motion for summary judgment on the availability of general damages and a motion in limine. The court denied both motions. After Schmidt rested her case in the damages-only trial, Coogan moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that collectibility was an essential element of legal malpractice and that Schmidt presented no evidence that a judgment against Grocery Outlet would have been collectible. The court denied the motion, and the jury again returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt. Coogan appealed the jury verdict, and Schmidt cross appealed on the ground that general damages are available in attorney malpractice claims and that the trial court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that collectibility was an essential component of damages that Schmidt failed to prove, and it reversed the trial court's denial of Coogan's motion. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Supreme Court: (1) whether the elements of legal malpractice include the collectibility of an underlying judgment; and (2) whether emotional distress damages are available in legal malpractice cases. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment, holding that the uncollectibility of an underlying judgment is an affirmative defense to legal malpractice that defendant-attorneys must plead and prove. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court properly denied emotional distress damages because Coogan's actions were not particularly egregious, nor was the subject matter personal. View "Schmidt v. Coogan" on Justia Law

In 1989, the Washington Legislature mandated coverage for neurodevelopmental therapies (neurodevelopmental therapies or NOT) (speech, occupational, and physical therapy) in employer-sponsored group plans for children under age seven (RCW 48.44.450). In 2005, the legislature enacted the mental health parity act, which mandated coverage for "mental health services" (RCW 48.44.341). The two named plaintiffs in this case, O.S.T. and L.H. were young children diagnosed with some form of neurodevelopmental issues. Both plaintiffs at some point were insured under health policies issued by Regence BlueShield that contained blanket exclusions for neurodevelopmental therapies. Regence BlueShield did not cover O.S.T.'s therapies, so O.S.T.'s parents paid for the services. It was unclear whether Regence BlueShield denied any of L.H.'s claims. Plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint, alleging breach of contract; declaratory relief; violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 RCW; and seeking injunctive relief. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs in late 2012, holding that "any provisions contained in Regence BlueShield policies issued and delivered to Plaintiffs O.S.T. and L.H. on or after January 1, 2008 that exclude coverage of neurodevelopmental therapies regardless of medical necessity are declared invalid, void and unenforceable by Defendant and its agents." The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review, and the Supreme Court accepted transfer. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the statutes did not conflict, and that neurodevelopmental therapies could constitute "mental health services" if the therapies are medically necessary to treat a mental disorder identified in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th rev. ed. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR). Therefore, the blanket exclusions of neurodevelopmental therapies in the plaintiffs' health contracts were void and unenforceable. View "O.S.T. v. Regence BlueShield" on Justia Law

In 2009, Kristine Failla, a Washington resident and experienced salesperson, was looking for a job she could perform from her Gig Harbor home. She e-mailed Kenneth Schutz looking for such a position. Schutz was the founder and chief executive officer (CEO) of FixtureOne Corporation, which sells fixtures, casework, and displays for use in retail stores. Both FixtureOne and Schutz are based in Pennsylvania, and at the time of Failla's email, FixtureOne had no physical presence or customers in Washington. FixtureOne hired Failla as an account executive. In December 2010, Failla requested a promotion and a raise. Schutz agreed and promoted her to FixtureOne's vice president of sales, increased her yearly salary. Although there were outstanding commissions owed, Failla accepted the promotion and salary increase based on the assurances that the commissions would be paid. Schutz provided a draft employment agreement for Failla to sign in connection with the promotion. Among other things, the agreement contained a provision that it would be interpreted in accordance with Pennsylvania law. Failla proposed revisions to the agreement, but for reasons unknown neither Failla nor Schutz ever signed it. Failla continued working for FixtureOne from her Washington home until May 2011. She received regular paychecks, and the only issue in this case was the sales commissions owed to her that were not paid. In May 2011, Schutz emailed Failla to tell her that FixtureOne was "clos[ing] its doors" and ended her employment the following day. He assured Failla that FixtureOne would "pay your commissions and expenses asap in the next several weeks." For two months following her termination, Schutz returned Failla's requests for payment with various explanations as to why the commissions remained unpaid. Schutz eventually advised Failla that she would not receive a commission check and for the first time disputed whether such commissions were even owed. Failla filed suit against FixtureOne and Schutz for the wilfull withholding of wages, including an allegation that Schutz was individually liable under Washington's wage laws. Failla served Schutz in Pennsylvania but was unable to serve FixtureOne. Consequently the suit proceeded against Schutz alone. Failla and Schutz cross moved for summary judgment. Schutz argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because he did not have the requisite minimum contacts with the state, and even if Washington could exercise jurisdiction over him, there were genuine issues of material fact preventing the entry of summary judgment. The trial court concluded it had personal jurisdiction and denied Schutz's summary judgment motion. The court granted summary judgment to Failla, awarding double damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Washington's long-arm statute did not reach Schutz because the employment relationship between Failla and FixtureOne was inadequate to confer jurisdiction over Schutz. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, and reversed. View "Failla v. FixtureOne Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, the legislature amended the Estate and Transfer Tax Act in response to the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "In re Estate of Bracken," 290 P.3d 99 (2012), in which the Court narrowly construed the term "transfer." The amendment allowed the Department of Revenue (DOR) to tax qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) as part of a surviving spouse's estate. A QTIP trust is created by a deceased spouse and gives the surviving spouse a life interest in the income or use of trust property. In consolidated cases, the estates of Hambleton and Macbride challenged the amendment on a variety of grounds. The Supreme Court rejected the Estates' challenges, reversed summary judgment in In re Estate of Hambleton, and affirmed the summary judgment in In re Estate of Macbride. View "In re Estate of Hambleton" on Justia Law

Ignacio Encarnacion and Norma Karla Farias were sued for unlawful detainer even though they had a valid lease and did nothing to warrant eviction. The case settled. They moved to amend the Superior Court Management Information System (SCOMIS) indices to replace their full names with their initials in order to hide the fact that they were defendants to the unlawful detainer action. Encarnacion and Farias argued that even though the unlawful detainer action was meritless, they could not obtain sufficient rental housing after prospective landlords learned that they had an unlawful detainer action filed against them. The superior court granted their motion and ordered that the indices be changed to show only their initials. The King County Superior Court Office of Judicial Administration objected and appealed the order. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed: "[a]lthough we sympathize with Encarnacion and Farias, and other renters in similar situations . . .[t]he public's interest in the open administration of justice prohibits the redaction of the indices in this case." View "Hundtofte v. Encarnacion" on Justia Law

While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Petitioner participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argued that he was entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Medina" on Justia Law