Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

ln consolidated cases, petitioners brought an untimely challenge to San Juan County's issuance of a garage-addition building permit. Petitioners did not receive notice of the permit application and grant until the administrative appeals period had expired. Thus, petitioners claim that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, required them to appeal a decision without actual or constructive notice of it. Acknowledging a strong public policy supporting administrative deadlines, the Supreme Court found: (1) petitioners were required to exhaust available administrative remedies to obtain a land use decision; (2) there were no equitable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement; (3) the plain language of LUPA says as much; and (4) there was no due process violation because petitioner had no constitutionally protected property interest in the denial of his neighbor's land-use permit. View "Durland v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the city of Lakewood's explanation for redacting driver's license numbers from records produced for David Koenig was inadequate and, if so, whether Koenig was entitled to attorney fees. In October 2007, Koenig requested three sets of records from the city :(1) records about the arrest and prosecution of a Lakewood police detective in January 2005 for patronizing a prostitute; (2) records about a November 2006 auto accident in the city of Fife, where a Fife police officer struck a pedestrian with his patrol car and the Lakewood Police Department assisted with the investigation; and (3) records about Tacoma police officer Michael Justice's 1998 arrest and subsequent prosecution on fourth degree assault charges. In November 2007, the city advised Koenig by letter that responsive records were available for review and pickup. The city redacted, among other things, driver's license numbers from various types of documents it produced. The city justified the redaction of driver's license numbers by citation to certain statutes. Koenig questioned the city's reliance on the statutes it cited, asking the city to specify which exemption it claimed under RCW 42.56.240 and to clarify whether the it was also claiming driver's license numbers were exempt under the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (FDPPA). The city supplemented its earlier citations to the pertinent statutes. Thereafter, the city warned Koenig that it was "prepared to prosecute a declaratory judgment action decreeing that it fully complied with" Koenig's requests. Koenig filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the city had not met its burden. Furthermore, he argued he was entitled to attorney fees for the violation of the statute's brief explanation requirement, regardless of whether the numbers were ruled exempt. The Supreme Court held that the city's response was inadequate and Koenig was entitled to fees. View "City of Lakewood v. Koenig" on Justia Law

John Jones, III was convicted in 2008 for second degree assault. At his first sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence of several California convictions, including one count of murder with a firearm, two counts of attempted murder with a firearm, and one count of assault with a firearm. The trial court calculated Jones's offender score as 6 by including the murder and attempted murder convictions, and sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated his sentence because the trial court had failed to perform a comparability analysis of his California convictions. On remand for resentencing, the State supplemented the record, over Jones's objection, with new evidence of Jones's murder and attempted murder convictions and an additional drug conviction. After performing a comparability analysis on these convictions, the trial court recalculated Jones's offender score as 7 (now with the additional drug conviction). The court again sentenced Jones to an exceptional sentence of 120 months. Jones appealed again. The Court of Appeals vacated his sentence, this time because the State failed to establish Jones's convictions by a preponderance of the evidence when it presented a copy of a probation report, which the State had represented to the court as being a plea colloquy. At the third sentencing hearing, at issue here, the State offered an uncertified copy of a California plea colloquy in order to establish Jones's prior convictions. It also moved for a short continuance to obtain a certified copy. The trial court, however, denied the motion, concluding that a trial court could not permit the State to supplement the record on resentencing. Without the California convictions, Jones's offender score was calculated as 1 and he was sentenced to an exceptional sentence of 60 months. A few days later, the State filed a certified copy of the plea transcript that allegedly established the comparability of the California convictions. The State appealed. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals adhered to the "no second chance" rule. The issue on appeal in this case centered whether a trial court must give effect to the provision in RCW 9.94A.530(2) that permits both parties to present additional relevant evidence of criminal history at resentencing following remand from appeal or collateral attack. The Supreme Court held that because the "no second chance" rule was based on judicial economy, not due process, the legislature was within its authority to alter the Court's rule and that the statutory remand provision controlled. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ignacio Cobos represented himself at his sentencing hearing and objected to the State's calculation of his offender score. The trial judge sentenced Cobos with the offender score asserted by the State without holding an evidentiary hearing because Cobos's former counsel had agreed to the score prior to being discharged. The Court of Appeals found the sentencing court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, remanded for resentencing, and concluded that both sides could introduce supplemental evidence of the proper score on remand. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Cobos argued the State was barred from offering new evidence on remand under the common law "no second chance" rule. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Cobos" on Justia Law

The State charged Daniel Gunderson with felony domestic violence after violating a September 2010 court order relating back to an altercation between himself and Christina Moore, his ex-girlfriend. At trial, Moore testified that no assault occurred. Although she had not made any prior statement about the incident, nor an inconsistent statement, the State sought to introduce evidence of Gunderson's prior domestic violence against her to impeach her. The trial judge admitted this evidence over Gunderson's ER 404(b) objection. Gunderson argued on appeal that the trial court should have excluded evidence of his prior bad acts under ER 404(b). The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Washington v. Gunderson" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, Charles Spencer and George Livingston formed a partnership to develop and sell property in rural Lincoln County near the confluence of Lake Roosevelt and the Spokane River. Over the next 20 years, the partnership and its successors built the Deer Meadows Golf Course Complex (including a golf course, restaurant, hotel, store, and club), platted several nearby parcels of property into subdivisions, and sold lots to private land owners for homes and vacation properties. A plat identifying the golf course was recorded. A local newspaper quoted Spencer as saying he built the golf course complex "so it would help sell the residential lots around here," and the lots were advertised accordingly. Ownership of the unsold lots and the golf course changed forms and hands over time. After Spencer passed away and after most of the lots were sold, Livingston closed down the golf course complex and began the process of platting the course into new residential lots. Many of those who had bought homes in the various subdivisions developed by Spencer and Livingston believed they had been promised that the golf course complex would remain a permanent fixture of their community, and relied on that promise when they made the decision to purchase their respective homes. Some of those homeowners formed the Riverview Community Group, which filed this lawsuit seeking to bar the defendants from selling off the former golf course as individual homes. Riverview sought to impose an equitable servitude on the golf course property that would limit its use to a golf course or, if that was untenable, for other equitable relief. It also sought injunctive relief. The trial judge issued a memorandum decision granting the Livingstons' motion under CR 12(b )(7) for failure to join indispensable parties. The following month, the trial court issued an order stating that "the legal issue of whether an equitable servitude can be created by implication is a question of first impression in the State of Washington" and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants to expedite review. The Court of Appeals largely reversed the trial court's legal rulings, finding that Riverview had organizational standing and the individual property owners were not essential parties, and concluding that Washington recognized equitable covenants. However, it affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that it would be "irrational to require the defendants to rebuild and operate a failing business." The Washington Supreme Court granted Riverview's petition for review, affirming most of the Court of Appeals' legal rulings but finding dismissal was based on facts not found in the record. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Riverview Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sonia Graciano was injured after she was hit by a car driven by Saul Ayala. Ayala was insured by defendant California Automobile Insurance Company (CAIC). Three weeks after Graciano's attorney first contacted CAIC regarding the accident, Graciano misidentified both the driver and the applicable insurance policy. CAIC investigated the accident, identified the applicable policy and the correct driver, and offered to settle Graciano's claim with a "full policy limits offer." Graciano did not accept CAIC's full policy limits offer and, in this suit, alleged CAIC and its parent and affiliated companies acted in bad faith, based on an alleged "wrongful failure to settle." Graciano argued CAIC could have and should have earlier discovered the facts, and should have made the full policy limits offer more quickly. The jury found in favor of Graciano and this appeal followed. CAIC argued that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence to support the verdict that CAIC acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to settle Graciano's claim against Saul. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the judgment. View "Washington v. Graham" on Justia Law

On methamphetamine, petitioner Jason Graham went on a shooting spree. He used an AK-47 to fire at six different police officers during a foot chase through downtown Spokane. He was eventually convicted by jury of 10 offenses, including "6 serious violent offenses" for sentencing purposes. He received an aggregate sentence of 1,225 months. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Supreme Court granted review to reconsider the firearm enhancements under the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in light of "Washington v. Williams-Walker," (225 P.3d 913 (2010)). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a sentencing court could impose an exceptional sentence downward if the judge found the multiple offense policy resulted in a presumptive sentence that was clearly excessive. Reading the plain language of the SRA, the Supreme Court concluded the sentencing court has such discretion. View "Washington v. Berg" on Justia Law

After Theresa Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Karlin Townsend, a process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Townsend's father at his home. But Townsend did not live at her father's home. Townsend's father later handed the summons and complaint directly to Townsend within the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed for lack of service, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding no error with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scanlan v. Townsend" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether it violates due process to assign a defendant the burden of proving consent as a defense to a charge of rape by forcible compulsion. Following a bench trial, the juvenile court found W.R. committed rape in the second degree. The event in question was a sexual encounter between W.R. and J.P. that occurred while J.P. was visiting her aunt, who resided with W.R. and his sister. Both W.R. and J.P. were minors at the time. Throughout the police investigation, W.R. consistently denied ever having sexual intercourse with J.P. Shortly before trial, he admitted that they had engaged in sexual intercourse, but defended it as consensual. The court did not find W.R.'s and his sister's testimony to be credible, noting W.R.'s evasive responses to questions and inconsistent story, and his sister's uncorroborated story and "cavalier demeanor" at trial. The court found J.F.'s testimony to be credible, and concluded W.R. committed rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The court explained that the State had proved rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt and that W.R. had failed to prove the defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. W.R. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erred in allocating to him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was consensual. The Washington Supreme Court held in "Washington v. Camara," (and reaffirmed in Washington v. Gregory," that notwithstanding the "conceptual overlap" between consent and forcible compulsion, the defendant may be tasked with proving consent by a preponderance of the evidence. More recently than Camara and Gregory, the Court was asked to consider this issue again, but declined to reach it, instead resolving the case on Sixth Amendment grounds. Three justices would have reached the issue and overruled Camara and Gregory. With this case, the Supreme Court embraced that approach and rejected the due process precedent set in Camara and Gregory as both incorrect and harmful. The Court reversed W .R.'s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. W.R." on Justia Law