Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Dante McWilliams received the exceptional sentence of 120 months of confinement and 18 months of community custody, which, in the aggregate, exceeded the statutory maximum for his offense. McWilliams pled guilty to a 2009 second degree assault. At sentencing, he had an offender score of7, which resulted in a standard sentencing range of 43 to 57 months of confinement. The statutory maximum sentence of confinement for second degree assault is 120 months. The plea agreement entered into by the parties recommended an exceptional sentence of confinement of 120 months-the statutory maximum-along with 18 months of community custody .. The trial court imposed this sentence as stipulated in the agreement. At that time, McWilliams did not appeal. More than one year passed after entry of judgment. McWilliams then filed this personal restraint petition directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that his judgment and sentence was facially invalid under RCW 9.94A.701(9). The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the appropriate remedy was a notation in the judgment and sentence that explicitly states that the total term of confinement and community custody actually served may not exceed the statutory maximum. View "In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams" on Justia Law

In two separate King County Superior Court cases, petitioner Adonijah Sykes was charged with three violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. Sykes successfully petitioned to participate in the King County adult drug diversion court and entered drug diversion court waivers and agreements with the State. Sykes participated in the drug diversion court program for over a year but had difficulties complying with its requirements. The State eventually moved to terminate her from the program. Sykes then moved to rescind the drug diversion court waivers and agreements and to vacate the orders granting her petitions to participate, arguing that King County's practice of holding closed "staffings" prior to holding open review hearings violated article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. Sykes argued the closed staffings tainted all procedures that followed, so she should have been allowed to restore her full trial rights to the underlying charges, and defend her cases as though she had never participated in drug diversion court. The State agreed that closed staffings violated article I, section 10 and chose not to assert invited error in order to have the underlying issue resolved on its merits. The drug diversion court denied Sykes' motions, holding that presumptively closed adult drug court staffings did not violate article I, section 10. The court did not reach the merits of the State's motion to terminate. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded Article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution did not require adult drug court staffings to be presumptively open. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Washington State Patrol Trooper Chris Stone saw a truck, driven by defendant Ryan Quaale speed by in a 25-mile per hour zone on a residential street. Trooper Stone activated the lights on his patrol car and attempted to pull the truck over. Quaale turned off his truck's headlights and accelerated. Trooper Stone pursued. Quaale lost control, overshot a corner, skidding into a homeowner's yard before he regained control and sped away for several more blocks. After Trooper Stone activated his siren, Quaale pulled the truck over and stopped. Quaale exited his truck but did not attempt to flee on foot. As a part of standard pursuit protocol, Trooper Stone ordered Quaale to the ground and handcuffed him. As he approached Quaale, Trooper Stone smelled a strong odor of "intoxicants" on Quaale's breath. Trooper Stone then performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on Quaale. During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale's eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, reckless driving, and attempting to elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was tried twice. Quaale was charged with attempting to elude a police vehicle and with felony DUI. At trial, Trooper Stone testified that he had "no doubt" that the defendant was impaired based solely on the HGN test. In closing, the State argued that the odor of intoxicants and Quaale's erratic driving supported its theory of driving while impaired by alcohol, but the State primarily relied on the HGN test. The State also remarked on Quaale's revoked license during closing in violation of the court's ruling. The jury found Quaale guilty of DUI. On appeal, Quaale argued that the trooper's testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trooper's testimony was an improper opinion on guilt. View "Washington v. Quaale" on Justia Law

In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued their neighbors, arguing, among other things, that the noise, smoke, fumes, and traffic associated with a small motor repair shop was in effect a nuisance in fact and that their neighbors are subject to nuisance per se liability because the business lacked required permits. The trial judge entered detailed findings of fact on the plaintiffs' nuisance in fact claims; found that the alleged noise, smoke, fumes, and traffic related to the business did not injure the plaintiffs' property, unreasonably detract from the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property, or cause cognizable damages; and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding the trial court erred by not deciding whether the business was required to obtain any more permits. Finding that the plaintiffs did not establish that the business was a nuisance per se, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Moore v. Steve's Outboard Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ronald Speight filed a timely personal restraint petition, claiming for the first time on collateral review that his right to a public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, was violated when the trial court decided motions in limine and individually questioned potential jurors in chambers. Consistent with its holding in "In re Personal Restraint of Coggin," the Supreme Court held that a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Speight could not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Speight" on Justia Law

In this case and in "In re Personal Restraint of Speight,"prospective jurors were questioned in chambers without the trial court engaging in the analysis required by "Washington v. Bone-Club." After his convictions were affirmed on appeal, petitioner William Coggin brought this personal restraint petition, claiming the private questioning of jurors constituted a closure and raising the issue of whether actual and substantial prejudice must be shown from a public trial right violation in order to obtain relief by personal restraint petition. After review, the Supreme Court held that while Coggin's public trial rights were violated, a petitioner claiming a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and substantial prejudice. Coggin did not show actual and substantial prejudice arising from the closure; therefore, his petition was denied. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Coggin" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-patient presented expert testimony in this medical malpractice case establishing that following the patient's heart surgery, the surgeons in charge of the patient's postoperative recovery failed to meet their standard of care, which required appropriately monitoring the patient for "compartment syndrome," a known possible complication following such surgery, and also failed to direct members of the hospital's care team treating the patient during his recovery to so monitor. The jury found for plaintiff but the trial court overturned the verdict, reasoning that plaintiff failed to prove that the standard of care had been breached by any one individual member of the hospital's team. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, reasoning that because plaintiff failed to prove negligence by a particular individual, "[he] failed to prove the standard of care for the relevant 'health care provider."' The primary issue in this medical malpractice case is whether the trial court properly granted the defendant hospital's postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. Considering the inferences and the evidence presented in plaintiff's favor, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff met his burden under chapter 7.70 RCW to show that identified health care providers employed by the hospital failed to meet the applicable standard of care in monitoring his postoperation recovery for compartment syndrome, resulting in the untimely diagnosis of that syndrome and proximately causing injury to plaintiff by failure to timely treat that complication. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to reinstate the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. View "Grove v. Peacehealth St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law

ln consolidated cases, petitioners brought an untimely challenge to San Juan County's issuance of a garage-addition building permit. Petitioners did not receive notice of the permit application and grant until the administrative appeals period had expired. Thus, petitioners claim that the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, required them to appeal a decision without actual or constructive notice of it. Acknowledging a strong public policy supporting administrative deadlines, the Supreme Court found: (1) petitioners were required to exhaust available administrative remedies to obtain a land use decision; (2) there were no equitable exceptions to the exhaustion requirement; (3) the plain language of LUPA says as much; and (4) there was no due process violation because petitioner had no constitutionally protected property interest in the denial of his neighbor's land-use permit. View "Durland v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the city of Lakewood's explanation for redacting driver's license numbers from records produced for David Koenig was inadequate and, if so, whether Koenig was entitled to attorney fees. In October 2007, Koenig requested three sets of records from the city :(1) records about the arrest and prosecution of a Lakewood police detective in January 2005 for patronizing a prostitute; (2) records about a November 2006 auto accident in the city of Fife, where a Fife police officer struck a pedestrian with his patrol car and the Lakewood Police Department assisted with the investigation; and (3) records about Tacoma police officer Michael Justice's 1998 arrest and subsequent prosecution on fourth degree assault charges. In November 2007, the city advised Koenig by letter that responsive records were available for review and pickup. The city redacted, among other things, driver's license numbers from various types of documents it produced. The city justified the redaction of driver's license numbers by citation to certain statutes. Koenig questioned the city's reliance on the statutes it cited, asking the city to specify which exemption it claimed under RCW 42.56.240 and to clarify whether the it was also claiming driver's license numbers were exempt under the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (FDPPA). The city supplemented its earlier citations to the pertinent statutes. Thereafter, the city warned Koenig that it was "prepared to prosecute a declaratory judgment action decreeing that it fully complied with" Koenig's requests. Koenig filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing the city had not met its burden. Furthermore, he argued he was entitled to attorney fees for the violation of the statute's brief explanation requirement, regardless of whether the numbers were ruled exempt. The Supreme Court held that the city's response was inadequate and Koenig was entitled to fees. View "City of Lakewood v. Koenig" on Justia Law