Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners William Ralph and William Forth et al. (Forth) appealed the dismissal of their separate actions against the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources, Weyerhaeuser Company, and Green Diamond Resource Company (collectively DNR). They sought monetary damages for the flooding of real property located in Lewis County. At issue was the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, in the context of the applicable statutory authority that actions "for any injuries to real property" "shall be commenced" in the county in which the property is located, RCW 4.12.010(1). Case law from the 1940s and 1950s held that RCW 4.12.010 was jurisdictional, so that an improperly commenced action must be dismissed if filed in a superior court outside the local county. More recently, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted similar (but not identical) statutes to prescribe only venue in light of article IV, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution, which grants universal original subject matter jurisdiction to the superior courts. In dicta in "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington," (268 P.3d 892 (2011)), the Court suggested that it might reconsider earlier precedent. By its opinion in this case, the Court reconsidered that earlier precedent, and held that RCW 4.12.010 related to venue, not jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's holding in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ralph v. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

The issue central to this appeal centered on the filing of a type of report about a juvenile offender: whether a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) evaluation should be filed in the official juvenile court file and therefore be open to the public. The legislature has explicitly defined the contents of the official juvenile court file as "the petition or information, motions, memorandums, briefs, findings of the court, and court orders." Since the SSODA evaluation does not fit within any of these categories, the Supreme Court held that it was not a part of the official juvenile court file. Consequently, it was subject to the general rule that all juvenile records not in the official juvenile court file must be kept confidential. View "Washington v. A.G.S." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a potential obstacle to public access constituted a courtroom closure: a sign that listed the courthouse hours. After a jury trial in Yakima County Superior Court, defendant Joey Andy was convicted of first degree burglary and second degree assault. He appealed, arguing that his right to a public trial right was violated when proceedings on some days continued after 4:00 p.m., despite a new 4:00 p.m. closing time for the courthouse. Pursuant to RAP 9.11, Andy moved to remand the case to the superior court to take "additional evidence to determine whether the courthouse doors were locked at 4 p.m. on the dates of the trial ... and if so, whether that closure barred entry to the ongoing courtroom proceedings." After review of the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded that at all times during Andy's trial proceedings, the door to the courthouse was unlocked and no member of the public was deterred from attending the proceedings by the sign. Therefore, the Court concluded that the sign did not constitute a courtroom closure and Andy's public trial right was not violated. View "Washington v. Andy" on Justia Law

Donald Martin was killed by a machine at a paper plant. His widow Nina Martin tried to sue the company that installed the machine, but that company no longer existed. Martin had difficulty discerning which company was responsible for the installation company's liability because the merger and acquisition history of the installation company was complicated. Because of that complicated history, Martin sued the incorrect company and did not realize who the responsible party was until after the statute of limitations period expired. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Martin met the requirements of the rule that allowed such plaintiffs to add the correct defendant after the statute of limitations period expired, and whether her inability to identify the correct defendant was due to inexcusable neglect. The Court held that it was not: the record did not show that the proper defendant's identity was easily ascertainable by Martin during the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Martin v. Dematic" on Justia Law

In 2009, Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood police officers. Clemmons contacted petitioners Eddie Davis and Letrecia Nelson shortly after the shootings. Based on their actions following that contact, petitioners were convicted of rendering criminal assistance and possessing a firearm. A divided Washington Supreme Court would have held that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Davis' and Nelson's convictions for possession of a stolen firearm, and Davis' conviction for second degree unlawful possession of that firearm, but this was not the decision of the Court. The Court did hold that the aggravating factor found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(r) could not justify an exceptional sentence for rendering criminal assistance as a matter of law. The result of three opinions of the Court for this case was to reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dante McWilliams received the exceptional sentence of 120 months of confinement and 18 months of community custody, which, in the aggregate, exceeded the statutory maximum for his offense. McWilliams pled guilty to a 2009 second degree assault. At sentencing, he had an offender score of7, which resulted in a standard sentencing range of 43 to 57 months of confinement. The statutory maximum sentence of confinement for second degree assault is 120 months. The plea agreement entered into by the parties recommended an exceptional sentence of confinement of 120 months-the statutory maximum-along with 18 months of community custody .. The trial court imposed this sentence as stipulated in the agreement. At that time, McWilliams did not appeal. More than one year passed after entry of judgment. McWilliams then filed this personal restraint petition directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that his judgment and sentence was facially invalid under RCW 9.94A.701(9). The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the appropriate remedy was a notation in the judgment and sentence that explicitly states that the total term of confinement and community custody actually served may not exceed the statutory maximum. View "In re Pers. Restraint of McWilliams" on Justia Law

In two separate King County Superior Court cases, petitioner Adonijah Sykes was charged with three violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. Sykes successfully petitioned to participate in the King County adult drug diversion court and entered drug diversion court waivers and agreements with the State. Sykes participated in the drug diversion court program for over a year but had difficulties complying with its requirements. The State eventually moved to terminate her from the program. Sykes then moved to rescind the drug diversion court waivers and agreements and to vacate the orders granting her petitions to participate, arguing that King County's practice of holding closed "staffings" prior to holding open review hearings violated article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. Sykes argued the closed staffings tainted all procedures that followed, so she should have been allowed to restore her full trial rights to the underlying charges, and defend her cases as though she had never participated in drug diversion court. The State agreed that closed staffings violated article I, section 10 and chose not to assert invited error in order to have the underlying issue resolved on its merits. The drug diversion court denied Sykes' motions, holding that presumptively closed adult drug court staffings did not violate article I, section 10. The court did not reach the merits of the State's motion to terminate. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded Article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution did not require adult drug court staffings to be presumptively open. The case was therefore remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Washington State Patrol Trooper Chris Stone saw a truck, driven by defendant Ryan Quaale speed by in a 25-mile per hour zone on a residential street. Trooper Stone activated the lights on his patrol car and attempted to pull the truck over. Quaale turned off his truck's headlights and accelerated. Trooper Stone pursued. Quaale lost control, overshot a corner, skidding into a homeowner's yard before he regained control and sped away for several more blocks. After Trooper Stone activated his siren, Quaale pulled the truck over and stopped. Quaale exited his truck but did not attempt to flee on foot. As a part of standard pursuit protocol, Trooper Stone ordered Quaale to the ground and handcuffed him. As he approached Quaale, Trooper Stone smelled a strong odor of "intoxicants" on Quaale's breath. Trooper Stone then performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test on Quaale. During the HGN test, Trooper Stone observed Quaale's eyes bounce and have difficulty tracking the stimulus. Trooper Stone placed Quaale under arrest for DUI, reckless driving, and attempting to elude. At the station, Trooper Stone informed Quaale of the implied consent warnings for a breath test. Quaale refused to take the test. Quaale was tried twice. Quaale was charged with attempting to elude a police vehicle and with felony DUI. At trial, Trooper Stone testified that he had "no doubt" that the defendant was impaired based solely on the HGN test. In closing, the State argued that the odor of intoxicants and Quaale's erratic driving supported its theory of driving while impaired by alcohol, but the State primarily relied on the HGN test. The State also remarked on Quaale's revoked license during closing in violation of the court's ruling. The jury found Quaale guilty of DUI. On appeal, Quaale argued that the trooper's testimony amounted to an improper opinion on guilt. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trooper's testimony was an improper opinion on guilt. View "Washington v. Quaale" on Justia Law

In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued their neighbors, arguing, among other things, that the noise, smoke, fumes, and traffic associated with a small motor repair shop was in effect a nuisance in fact and that their neighbors are subject to nuisance per se liability because the business lacked required permits. The trial judge entered detailed findings of fact on the plaintiffs' nuisance in fact claims; found that the alleged noise, smoke, fumes, and traffic related to the business did not injure the plaintiffs' property, unreasonably detract from the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their property, or cause cognizable damages; and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, concluding the trial court erred by not deciding whether the business was required to obtain any more permits. Finding that the plaintiffs did not establish that the business was a nuisance per se, the Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment. View "Moore v. Steve's Outboard Serv." on Justia Law