Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the Washington legislature enacted a new guardianship statute, chapter 13.36 RCW, to create permanency for children in foster care through the dismissal of dependency and the appointment of a guardian. The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) petitioned for an order appointing a guardian for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute, and the children's mother, T.P. DSHS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A.W. and M.W based on the former RCW 13.34.030(5)(c) (2003), which stated that the child "[h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development." In December 2009, T .P. agreed to the dependency. In March 2010, the court approved transitioning the children to T.P.'s home contingent on T.P.' s compliance with court ordered services and a DSHS safety plan that continued until the guardianship. In December 2010, the transition to T.P.'s home was terminated. The trial court found that based on T.P.'s substance abuse, poor judgment, incarcerations, chaotic lifestyle, failure to remedy parental deficiencies, and the length of time of this case, there was little likelihood that conditions could be remedied such that the children could be returned to T.P. in the near future. The trial court entered findings and conclusions and an order appointing guardians for A.W. and M.W. pursuant to the new statute. T.P. appealed, arguing that: (1) establishing a guardianship under the new statute using the preponderance of the evidence standard was unconstitutional because it violated due process; and (2) even if preponderance of the evidence was the correct standard, the trial court's factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. After review, the Supreme Court found that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfied due process, and that the trial court's record supported the trial court's decision to appoint guardians. View "In re Welfare of A.W." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Washington Supreme Court found that the State Legislature's 2003 amendments to the state's water law were facially constitutional. In this case, Appellants Scott Cornelius, Palouse Water Conservation Network, and Sierra Club Palouse Group (collectively Cornelius) brought an as-applied constitutional claim (among other claims) against Washington State University (WSU), the Department of Ecology, and the Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB). Upon further review, the Supreme Court found that the amendments were applied constitutionally, and found appellants' other claims unavailing. View "Cornelius v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the City of Bothell assumed responsibility for maintaining a drainage pipe installed in a residential subdivision in Snohomish County. The subdivision, Crystal Ridge, was developed from two residential plats that the County approved in 1997. The area was incorporated into the City in 1992. One of the plats contained a drainage easement within a tract owned by the Crystal Ridge Homeowners Association. The plat dedicated the drainage easement to the County. The City argued that the disputed drainage pipe was outside the scope of the drainage easement that the City inherited from Snohomish County. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the only reasonable interpretation of the Crystal Ridge plat is that Snohomish County (and therefore the City) assumed responsibility for maintaining the drainage pipe. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. View "Crystal Ridge Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Bothell" on Justia Law

In the late 1980s, Alan Meirhofer was charged with several counts of brutally raping children, along with charges of burglary and kidnapping. Meirhofer was implicated in several more child rapes. As Meirhofer finished serving his criminal sentence, the State brought SVP commitment proceedings against him under the sexually violent predator (SVP) act, chapter 71.09 RCW, in 2000. He sought a full evidentiary proceeding on whether he still met the statutory and constitutional criteria for SVP commitment. Before holding such a full evidentiary proceeding, the SVP act directs trial courts to hold an initial show cause hearing to determine whether the State has presented prima facie evidence that continued commitment is justified or the detainee has presented prima facie evidence that his or her condition has "so changed" as to warrant a new evidentiary proceeding. The trial court found the State had made its showing and Meirhofer had not. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer" on Justia Law

The State charged Larry Hayes with one count of leading organized crime and one count of identity theft in the first degree, among several other charges. The State alleged that Hayes was involved in a complex identity theft scheme that used stolen credit card information, including information stolen from a hair salon's customer receipts, to manufacture false identification devices and credit cards. These in turn would be used to make purchases and rent vehicles, usually from out of state, with those rental vehicles sold for cash. The State also alleged that each count (except for a drug charge) was subject to the sentence aggravators for being a major economic offense. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether a trial court may impose an exceptional sentence on a defendant under the major economic offense sentence aggravators found in RCW 9.94A.535(3)(d)(i) and (iii) when that defendant's conviction was based on accomplice liability. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals's decision that the trial court improperly applied the sentence aggravators to Hayes. View "Washington v. Hayes" on Justia Law

This case arose from a longstanding issue between Public Utility District No. 1 of Okanogan County (PUD) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) over the installation of an electrical transmission line through school lands managed by DNR in the Methow Valley. At issue was whether PUD was statutorily authorized to condemn a right of way through school trust lands for the construction of a transmission corridor and, if so, whether the particular school lands were nonetheless exempt from condemnation as a result of their trust status as school lands or their then-present use for cattle grazing. The trial court and Court of Appeals concluded that PUD is statutorily authorized to condemn school lands and that the particular school lands at issue are subject to condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Okanogan County v. Washington" on Justia Law

WestNET was a multiagency, multijurisdictional drug task force formed by an "Interlocal Drug Task Force Agreement" executed in June 2009 among several Washington State municipalities and the federal Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS). The Agreement at issue here explicitly provided that because WestNET "does and must operate confidentially and without public input," "[t]he parties do not intend to create through, this Agreement, a separate legal entity subject to suit." In 2010, petitioner John Worthington filed a public records request that WestNET disclose records related to a raid of his residence four years earlier, which he alleged was conducted by the WestNET drug task force. WestNET did not respond, and instead, the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office made some initial disclosures. The sheriffs office did not indicate why it responded instead of WestNET. Dissatisfied with the response, Worthington sued for relief under the Public Records Act, serving the complaint on the address shared by the Kitsap County Sheriffs Office and the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office. However, the complaint named WestNET as the only defendant. Because the trial court granted the defendant's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was a narrower procedural issue: can the parties to an inter local agreement establish, as a matter of law, that their own task forces do not exist for the purpose of the PRA? The Court held that the ICA did not provide the contributing agencies with such an unqualified power. In concluding that the terms of the agreement alone conclusively established WestNET's capacity for suit, the trial court deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to present evidence in support of his argument that WestNET's actual operational structure subjects it to the PRA's purview. That approach is inconsistent with our general approach to PRA issues and the ICA itself. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further factual determination proceedings. View "Worthington v. WestNET" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-retired justices Robert Utter and Faith Ireland sued the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW), alleging that BIAW violated Washington's Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), chapter 42.17 A RCW, in part by failing to register as a political committee during the 2007-2008 campaign season. The trial court granted BIAW' s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case on the ground that there was no material factual dispute and BIAW was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but it denied BIAW's request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, stating in dicta that there was an issue of fact as to whether BIAW met the statutory definition of a "political committee," but held only that the plaintiffs' case did not meet the procedural prerequisites to filing a citizen suit. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court's denial of BIAW's request for attorney fees. Plaintiffs petitioned the Washington Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) plaintiffs' suit was not procedurally barred under Washington's citizen suit provision; and (2) plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact about whether BIAW met the statutory definition of a "political committee." View "Utter v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Wash." on Justia Law

Odies Walker was convicted as an accomplice to first degree murder, first degree assault, first degree robbery, solicitation, and conspiracy. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether those convictions should have been reversed in light of a Power Point presentation the prosecuting attorney used during closing argument. That presentation repeatedly expressed the prosecutor's personal opinion on guilt (over 100 of its approximately 250 slides were headed with the words "DEFENDANT WALKER GUILTY OF PREMEDITATED MURDER," and one slide showed Walker's booking photograph altered with the words "GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT," which were superimposed over his face in bold red letters). The prosecutor also appealed to passion and prejudice by juxtaposing photographs of the victim with photographs of Walker and his family, some altered with the addition of inflammatory captions and superimposed text. While the prosecutor was entitled to draw the jury's attention to admitted evidence, those slides, as presented, served no legitimate purpose. "Their prejudicial effect could not have been cured by a timely objection, and we cannot conclude with any confidence that Walker's convictions were the result of a fair trial." The Court reversed Walker's convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 2011, Michael Henne, a Yakima police officer, filed an employment-related lawsuit against his employer, the city of Yakima. Several other officers had filed complaints about Henne's behavior, resulting in internal investigations of Henne. Henne's lawsuit alleged that those other officers' complaints lodged against him formed a pattern of harassment and retaliation that amounted to a hostile workplace. He sued Yakima for negligent hiring, training, and supervision of its employees, which, he asserted, perpetuated a hostile work environment and entitled him to damages. Yakima responded to Henne's complaint not with an answer but with a motion to strike under RCW 4.24.525, the 2010 anti-SLAPP statute. Yakima's motion asserted that because Henne's claims were based on coworker complaints and the city's resulting internal investigations, a new, broader anti-SLAPP statute applied to those claims. In other words, Yakima claimed the protection of the anti-SLAPP suit law because it received controversial communications from others; Yakima made no communications of its own. The Supreme Court held that a governmental entity like Yakima cannot take advantage of the anti-SLAPP statutes at least where, as here, the challenged lawsuit is not based on the government's own communicative activity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision to dismiss as moot Yakima's appeal of the trial court's decision to deny Yakima's anti-SLAPP motion. Instead, the Court held that the case was ripe for review and reinstated the trial court's decision to deny Yakima's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Henne v. City of Yakima" on Justia Law