Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The question centered on Washington's homestead exemption law, chapter 6.13 RCW, and whether it applied extraterritorially to real property located in other states. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: Washington's homestead exemption law did not apply to real property outside of Washington. View "In re Bankr. Pet. of Wieber" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that two groups of defendants, (1) Premera, Premera Blue Cross, and Life Wise Health Plan of Washington (collectively Premera) and (2) the Washington Alliance for Healthcare Insurance Trust and its trustee, F. Bentley Lovejoy (collectively WAHIT), colluded and made false and misleading representations to the plaintiffs that induced the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance policies under false pretenses. Plaintiff-policyholders claimed that Premera and WAHIT violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The plaintiffs requested only two specific forms of damages: (1) for the "unfair business practices and excessive overcharges for premiums," the plaintiffs requested "the sum of the excess premiums paid to the defendants;" and (2) "[i]f the surplus is excessive and unreasonable," the plaintiffs asserted that "the amount of the excess surplus should be refunded to the subscribers who have paid the high premiums causing the excess." On Premera and WAHIT's motion, the trial court dismissed the Policyholders' suit in its entirety based on the filed rate, primary jurisdiction, and exhaustion of remedies doctrines. Specifically, the trial court dismissed all claims of class B (small group) and class C (individuals) pursuant to CR 12(b )( 6) and dismissed all claims of class A (large group) on summary judgment under CR 56. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in relation to certain of the Policyholders' CPA claims. Because awarding the specific damages requested by the plaintiffs would require a court to inappropriately substitute its judgment for that of the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera" on Justia Law

This case involved two public school employees who were on paid administrative leave while their employer investigated allegations of misconduct. The substance behind those allegations was not in the trial court record, but the District's investigations were then-ongoing and entering their fourth year. In the spring of 2012, two media outlets submitted public records requests to the District. One request sought the "administrative leave letter given to Anthony Predisik, a Shadle Park High School counselor." The other request asked for "information on all district employees currently on paid/non-paid administrative leave." The requests returned three public records relevant to this dispute. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether public records that revealed these investigations are occurring, but do not describe the allegations being investigated, implicated the employees' privacy rights under the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW. The Court held they did not. Because no exemption applies to withhold the records from public inspection, the Court reversed and remanded with instructions to order the records at issue disclosed in their entirety without redaction. View "Predisik v. Spokane Sch. Dist. No. 81" on Justia Law

Matthew Bruch was convicted of two counts of second degree child molestation and two counts of third degree rape of a child. The trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 116 months of confinement and ordered community custody for a period of "at least 4 months, plus all accrued earned early release time at the time of release." Bruch appealed his sentence, arguing that the court-imposed term of community custody was indeterminate and may exceed the statutory requirement of three years of community custody required under RCW 9.94A.701(1). The Court of Appeals rejected Bruch's challenge, as did the Supreme Court: (1) the total sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum, consistent with RCW 9.94A.701(9); . there was no need for the trial court to amend Bruch's sentence to limit community custody to a maximum of three years, "[t]he statutes must be read together to assure that the trial court's intended sentence-a total term of 120 months-is not undermined by giving effect to the DOC's authority to transfer earned early release into community custody." View "Washington v. Bruch" on Justia Law

Howard Shale was an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. He had family in the Quinault Indian Nation as well. In 1997, Shale was convicted under federal law of raping a child under 12. After Shale was released from prison, he moved to Seattle and registered as a sex offender with the King County sheriff. In 2012, a Jefferson County sheriffs detective began investigating whether Shale had moved to her county without reregistering as a sex offender. At least two officers assisted the detective in her investigation; a Jefferson County sheriffs deputy and a Quinault tribal police officer. Taken together, police reports suggested Shale was dividing his time between the two family homes. Based on the detective's report, the Jefferson County prosecutor charged Shale with failure to register with the county sheriff as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Washington State had the power to prosecute an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation living on the Quinault Indian Nation's reservation for failing to register with the county sheriff as a sex offender. The Court found the State indeed had that power. View "Washington v. Shale" on Justia Law

Petitioners Nicholas Blazina and Mauricio Paige-Colter were ordered to pay discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). The trial court record in each petitioner's case did not reflect that the trial judges considered either party's ability to pay before imposing the LFOs. Neither petitioner objected at the time. For the first time on appeal, however, both argued that the judges in their respective cases should have made an inquiry into their ability to pay, and that failing to make this inquiry warranted resentencing. The Court of Appeals declined to reach the issue because both petitioners failed to object at sentencing, and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Petitioners appealed the Court of Appeals' and trial courts' rulings to the Supreme Court, and in each case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals did not err in declining to reach the merits. However, exercising its own discretion, the Supreme Court reached the merits and held that the trial court had a statutory obligation to make an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before the imposition of LFOs. The cases were remanded for the trial courts to make these inquiries. View "Washington v. Blazina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phyllis Paetsch was referred to Spokane Dermatology Clinic for Botox injections to smooth facial wrinkles. Paetsch had never heard of the clinic, had never been there before, and was not aware of the staff or medical reputation of the clinic. She made an appointment for treatment and was told that her appointment would be with Dan Rhoads. Spokane Dermatology Clinic is a professional services company owned solely by Dr. William Werschler. The clinic also employed another doctor as a dermatologist and three certified physician's assistants (PA-Cs), one of which was Dan Rhoads. Paetsch completed some medical history and patient profile forms, signed them, then was escorted to her appointment room. She was told "the doctor" would be in soon. Shortly thereafter, a man in scrubs entered and introduced himself as "Dan." Rhoads injected Paetsch with both Botox and Restylane. He injected Restylane into Paetsch's forehead, not knowing that the federal Food and Drug Administration did not approve the use of Restylane in the forehead as it increased the risk of necrosis. While initially pleased with the results, Paetsch later developed a headache, the symptoms of which worsened. Rhoads misdiagnosed her condition as an infection and prescribed antibiotics and anti-inflammatories to control it. These treatments were ineffective, and Paetsch's condition continued to deteriorate. Paetsch sought treatment from her primary care provider. The clinic properly diagnosed the condition as necrosis caused by the use of Restylane in the forehead; the Restylane had expanded throughout the forehead, cutting off the only flow of blood to the skin. This diagnosis was too late to treat the condition, and the provider could only scrape the dead tissue from Paetsch's face. The necrosis resulted in deep, permanent scarring to Paetsch's forehead. Paetsch filed suit against Spokane Dermatology Clinic and against Dr. Werschler personally for the failure to obtain her informed consent to treatment and for medical malpractice by Dr. Werschler and Dan Rhoads. At trial, Paetsch presented evidence that Dr. Werschler presented himself as her doctor through the use of consent forms, that he owed her a duty of care, and that he breached that duty. Paetsch also presented evidence that as a PA-C, Rhoads was an agent of the physician and that Dr. Werschler's failure to adequately supervise Rhoads breached the standard of care. After the close of evidence, the trial court granted Dr. Werschler's motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Dr. Werschler from personal liability on the ground that no jury could find that he breached a duty to Paetsch under the evidence. Following this motion, Spokane Dermatology Clinic was the only remaining named defendant. Despite dismissing Dr. Werschler personally, the court instructed the jury that the clinic could be held liable for Dr. Werschler's medical negligence, as he was an employee of Spokane Dermatology Clinic. The jury was never told that Dr. Werschler was dismissed as a defendant, and the majority of the jury instructions remained unchanged. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the jury instructions allowed Paetsch to argue her theory of the case and the jury found that the defendant was not negligent. View "Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, PS" on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Washington Supreme Court regarding the scope of landowners' or possessors' responsibility for harm that results when strangers commit criminal acts against invitees on business premises under Washington law. In 2005, Dominick Maldonado walked into the Tacoma Mall and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, injuring seven people. At the time of the shooting, there were four unarmed security guards on duty and no security cameras. While the mall had an intercom system, it was inaudible and inaccessible on weekends, and the security guards were never trained to use it. Brendan McKown was one of the people injured, and brought a negligence action against the mall's lawdowner/possessor of the mall, landlord to the businesses in the mall, Simon Property Group, Inc. In his complaint, McKown alleged that Simon failed to exercise reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable criminal harm. After removing the case to federal district court, Simon moved for summary judgment, arguing Maldonado's acts were unforeseeable, and any negligence on Simon's part was not a proximate cause of McKown's injuries. The trial court denied Simon's motion, then on reconsideration, the trial court vacated its holding and granted the motion. On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged it was bound to follow this court's interpretation of Washington law but expressed uncertainty as to the scope of a landowner's duty to protect business invitees from the criminal acts of third persons. In answering the Ninth Circuit's questions, the Washington Supreme Court held that when a duty is premised on evidence of prior similar acts, a landowner or possessor owes a duty to protect business invitees from third party criminal conduct when such conduct is foreseeable based on past experience of prior similar acts. The prior acts of violence on the business premises must have been sufficiently similar in nature and location to the criminal act that injured the plaintiff, sufficiently close in time to the act in question, and sufficiently numerous to have put the business on notice that such an act was likely to occur. Based on the limited focus of the questions and the briefing, the Court did not decide the circumstances under which a duty would arise when the duty is based solely on the business's place or character. View "McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, teenager Philip Johnson called his close friend (and fellow Hilltop Crips gang member) defendant-respondent Marsele Henderson to say he was going to a party at a Boys and Girls Club. Henderson advised Johnson not to go because the club was too close to a rival gang's territory. Johnson went to the party, where he was shot. Henderson learned of the shooting and went to the hospital with his friends, including Koloneus D'Orman McClarron, to check on Johnson. Johnson died shortly thereafter at the hospital, although McClarron and Henderson testified that they did not learn of his death at the hospital. One of the disputed-facts in this case was how many people were in the area in front of the house prior to shots being fired, because whether a person shot into a crowd of people or whether they shot toward an area with very few people might have determined the nature of the crime. Witness testimony on this point varied significantly. Witnesses testified that either McClarron or Henderson pulled a gun and fired six shots toward the house from the street. McClarron testified that Henderson fired the shots, but Henderson testified that it was McClarron who did it. Neither could give an explanation as to why the other person fired the gun. Four people testified that the shooter yelled something related to the Hilltop Crips at the time of the shooting. Witnesses were divided about whether the shooter looked like Henderson or McClarron. prosecutors charged Henderson with first degree murder by extreme indifference. At trial, Henderson asked that the jury be instructed on the lesser included charge of first degree manslaughter. Initially, the State agreed, acknowledging that the definitions of first degree murder by extreme indifference and first degree manslaughter are "very close" and that there is "hardly a difference." The State later changed its position based on two Court of Appeals cases from 1998 and 1999: "Washington v. Pettus," (951 P.2d 284 (1998)), and "Washington v. Pastrana," (972 P.2d 557 (1999)). In both of those cases, the Court of Appeals held that the defendants were not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter because the defendants' actions were much more than merely reckless. The Supreme Court later narrowed the definition of reckless in the context of manslaughter in "Washington v. Gamble," (114 P.3d 646 (2005)), to specifically mean a disregard of a substantial risk of homicide. Defendant's trial counsel did not bring "Gamble" to the attention of the trial court, and as a result, the trial court agreed with the State that "Pettus" and "Pastrana" were controlling and refused to instruct on manslaughter. The jury convicted Henderson of first degree murder by extreme indifference. Henderson appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed Henderson's conviction, holding that he was entitled to the instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed Henderson's conviction. View "Washington v. Henderson" on Justia Law