Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits (labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs) that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae contended the anti-SLAPP statute's burden of proof, stay of discovery, and statutory penalties are unconstitutional on several grounds. They contended some or all of these provisions violated the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution; the Washington separation of powers doctrine under "Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PS"(216 P.3d 374 (2009)); the Washington right of access to courts under Putman; the petition clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the vagueness doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute violated the right of trial by jury, but did not resolve how these other constitutional limits may have applied to the anti-SLAPP statute's provisions: "The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW 4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen's constitutional rights of expression and petition-by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." View "Davis v. Cox" on Justia Law

Linda Darkenwald worked as a dental hygienist in the office of Dr. Gordon Yamaguchi from 1985 to 2010. Initially, Darkenwald worked one day a week, but she increased this to two days a week and then four days a week. In 1998, she suffered a neck and back injury. Darkenwald received worker's compensation benefits after the Department of Labor and Industries found that she had a permanent impairment. Despite her injury, Darkenwald continued to work three to four days a week until 2006. From that point on, Darkenwald worked only on Mondays and Wednesdays, for a total of 14 to 17 hours per week. In 2010, Dr. Yamaguchi added another dentist to his practice, and asked Darkenwald to return to working three days a week. In the alternative, he offered her a position as an on-call or substitute hygienist. Darkenwald found neither of these alternatives acceptable and thus interpreted Dr. Yamaguchi's request as a termination of her employment. Darkenwald believed she had been fired, while Dr. Yamaguchi believed that she had quit. Darkenwald appealed the Washington Employment Security Department's denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The issue her case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a desire to work only part time constituted a good cause reason for leaving work, thus permitting an individual who left work for that reason to collect unemployment benefits. The Court found that Darkenwald relied on a statute that did not apply to her and would not give her good cause to leave work even if it were applicable. Furthermore, the Employment Security Act (Act), Title 50 RCW, listed good-cause reasons for voluntarily leaving work and states that this list is exclusive; a desire to perform only part-time wor View "Darkenwald v. Emp't Sec. Dep't" on Justia Law

Under the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA), chapter 69.51A RCW, qualifying patients could participate in "collective gardens" to pool resources and grow medical marijuana for their own use. However, MUCA granted cities and towns the power to zone the "production, processing, or dispensing" of medical marijuana. Given this law, the city of Kent enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited collective gardens within its city limits. The issue for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether MUCA preempted the Ordinance. The Court held that it did not and affirm the Court of Appeals: the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the city of Kent's zoning authority recognized in RCW 69.51A.l40(1) because the Ordinance merely regulated land use activity. View "Cannabis Action Council v. City of Kent" on Justia Law

The issue common to these consolidated cases centered on whether the totality of circumstances in each case provided law enforcement with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a Terry stop. Both cases involved the stop of a defendant after the defendant entered a high-crime apartment complex and visited an apartment occupied by a suspected drug dealer. However, other circumstances distinguished the cases and lead to different results. Because the circumstances included a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the Supreme Court affirmed in "Washington v. Fuentes." Finding that there were insufficient facts to give rise to an individualized suspicion, the Court reversed in "Washington v. Sandoz." View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Glasmann asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the holdings of "Washington v. Daniels," (156 P.3d 905 (2007) (Daniels I), adhered to on recons., 200 P .3d 711 (2009) (Daniels II)). The Daniels case law established that if (1) the State charges a person with greater and lesser offenses and the jury is unable to agree regarding the greater offense but finds the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and (2) the defendant's conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal, then the State may retry the defendant for the greater offense without violating double jeopardy. Glasmann asked the Washington Court to reconsider the Daniels decision in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach to the subject. "We will overturn our precedent only when someone shows that it is incorrect and harmful. Since Glasmann has not made that showing regarding the Daniels decisions, we see no reason to overturn them." View "Washington v. Glasmann" on Justia Law

Ryan Peeler was serving a prison sentence on a Snohomish County charge at the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) when he requested a final disposition of an untried charge in Skagit County. By the time that the Skagit County prosecutor received Peeler's final disposition request, however, the Department of Corrections (DOC) had transported him to the King County jail to await trial on unrelated charges. Peeler was not returned to WCC until well after the Skagit County prosecutor received his request. The State failed to bring Peeler to trial in Skagit County within 120 days of receiving his final disposition request. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that even though Peeler was physically located in King County when the State received his final disposition request, his request was valid and the State failed to meet the 120-day deadline to bring him to trial in Skagit County. View "Washington v. Peeler" on Justia Law

As applied to Washington, the holding in "Padilla v. Kentucky," (559 U.S. 356 (2010) was an affirmation of the duty to provide effective assistance of counsel, which included the duty to reasonably research and apply relevant statutes. However, language in certain Washington appellate cases made it appear that this rule did not apply to RCW 10.40.200. "Padilla" superseded those cases, significantly changing state law. Muhammadou Jagana raised a claim that would have been rejected before "Padilla" based on those superseded appellate cases. The Washington Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Jagana's personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. However, Yung-Cheng Tsai's claim was available before "Padilla," and Tsai did in fact raise his claim with the assistance of an attorney in 2008. That motion was denied based on an issue of law not affected by Padilla, and Tsai did not appeal. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' order dismissing Tsai's PRP. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of Yung-Cheng Tsai" on Justia Law

William Reis was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance after a search of his home produced evidence of a marijuana grow operation. Reis moved to suppress the results of the search on the ground that the search warrant was invalid, arguing that the 2011 amendments to the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA) decriminalized the possession of cannabis for medical use. The trial court denied Reis's motion to suppress, and the Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the plain language of MUCA, supported by the context in which the language appeared, the overall statutory scheme, and the legislative intent as captured in the governor's veto message, did not support the conclusion that the medical use of marijuana was not a crime. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for trial. View "Washington v. Reis" on Justia Law

Toby Erhart's judgment and sentence on multiple counts of first degree child rape and incest became final on direct appeal in 2008. During Erhart's trial, the court interviewed several prospective jurors privately in chambers without first conducting the courtroom closure analysis required by "Washington v. Bone-Club." The jury found Erhart guilty of multiple sex offenses, and the trial court imposed an exceptional sentence. Erhart did not raise a public trial issue on direct appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but reversed the exceptional sentence and remanded for resentencing. In 2010 Erhart filed a personal restraint petition challenging his convictions, arguing for the first time that his constitutional right to a public trial was violated. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as untimely. The Supreme Court granted discretionary review. Finding that Erhart filed his personal restraint petition more than one year after his judgment and sentence became final, the petition was indeed untimely, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Erhart" on Justia Law

After his 18th birthday, Robert Wheeler was charged with, and pled guilty to, first degree child rape and first degree child molestation for offenses he committed when he was 13 or 14 years old that came to light when he was 17 and a half. His convictions had been final since 2006. The Court of Appeals held that the validity of Wheeler's guilty plea was not an appealable issue because the trial court did not independently review and rule on it; rejected Wheeler's claim of ineffective assistance, reasoning that counsel was not obligated to advance an argument that was unlikely to succeed; and dismissed Wheeler's personal restraint petition as untimely. Wheeler contended on appeal that the Washington Supreme Court had the authority to, and should have, revisited his previously rejected claim that his plea was involuntary because he was misinformed of the maximum sentences for his crimes. He also challenged his convictions as the product of unconstitutional preaccusatorial delay and sought to avoid the time bar for collateral attack by claiming he had newly discovered evidence that the State delayed filing charges until Wheeler aged out of juvenile court. The Supreme Court rejected Wheeler's arguments, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wheeler" on Justia Law