Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In January 2008, S.J.C. pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation for offenses he committed at age 13. At S.J.C.'s disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered two years of community supervision and imposed other conditions such as regular school attendance, sexual deviancy treatment, and payment of a victim penalty assessment. After completing all of his conditions, in December 2011, S.J.C. moved to vacate his adjudication and seal his juvenile record under former RCW 13.50.050. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution required the court to apply the "Ishikawa" factors when a former juvenile offender has satisfied the statutory requirements of former RCW 13.50.050 (2011) to seal his or her juvenile court record. "Based on experience and logic," the Court affirmed the juvenile court's holding that it did not. Because it was undisputed that S.J.C. met all the statutory requirements, the Court affirmed the juvenile court's order sealing his juvenile court record. View "Washington v. S.J.C." on Justia Law

Leroy Jones was convicted of second degree assault for his role in a street fight involving five people. In a motion for a new trial made shortly after the verdict and before appeal, he asserted that his trial lawyer failed to interview and call certain eyewitnesses who were clearly identified in discovery that the State provided. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was clear that defense trial counsel's failure to interview three previously identified and easily accessible eyewitnesses before trial constituted deficient performance. "This deficiency also caused prejudice: it deprived Jones of the opportunity to develop a theory of the case that Jones was the victim rather than the aggressor, and it deprived him of neutral bystander eyewitness testimony in support of that theory." On this ground, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court. With regard to arguments made about the sentence he received, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in calculating defendant's sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Frederick Hardtke was charged with two counts of second degree rape, one count of second degree assault, two counts of fourth degree assault, and malicious mischief. All were alleged to be acts of domestic violence that took place while Hardtke claimed he was blacked out from alcohol abuse. At his arraignment, the trial court imposed conditions of release, including that Hardtke not consume alcohol, pay a performance bond, and wear an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet while awaiting trial. Hardtke objected multiple times to paying for the cost of the bracelet, but he wore the bracelet as a condition of his release. Hardtke eventually pleaded guilty to amended charges, and as part of his sentence he was ordered to reimburse the county for the cost of the alcohol monitoring. He appealed, challenging only the imposition of this cost. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that under the facts of this case, the costs for an electronic alcohol monitoring bracelet fit under the statutory meaning of "pretrial supervision." Because the trial court imposed nearly $4,000 in monitoring costs, the reversed and remanded for imposition of costs consistent with the statute. View "Washington v. Hardtke" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Barry appealed his conviction on two counts of child molestation, claiming that the trial court's instruction in response to a jury question violated his Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The jury asked the court whether it may consider "observations of the defendant's actions-demeanor during the court case" as "evidence." In response, the trial court instructed the jury that "[e]vidence includes what you witness in the courtroom." All parties agreed that the record contains no references whatsoever to Barry's in-court demeanor and so the Supreme Court had no way of determining what aspects of Barry's "demeanor" drew the jury's attention and whether the jury's observations were favorable or unfavorable to Barry. Therefore, after review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's instruction did not amount to constitutional error. The Court instead applied the nonconstitutional error standard and affirmed. View "Washington v. Barry" on Justia Law

The State charged Christopher Maynard in juvenile court with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old. Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. The court, however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Maynard received ineffective assistance of counsel which then deprived him the benefit of the opportunity to accept a plea deal. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' order with regard to remanding of the case to the adult trial court and instead, directed the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. View "Washington v. Maynard" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits (labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs) that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae contended the anti-SLAPP statute's burden of proof, stay of discovery, and statutory penalties are unconstitutional on several grounds. They contended some or all of these provisions violated the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution; the Washington separation of powers doctrine under "Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PS"(216 P.3d 374 (2009)); the Washington right of access to courts under Putman; the petition clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the vagueness doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute violated the right of trial by jury, but did not resolve how these other constitutional limits may have applied to the anti-SLAPP statute's provisions: "The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW 4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen's constitutional rights of expression and petition-by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." View "Davis v. Cox" on Justia Law

Linda Darkenwald worked as a dental hygienist in the office of Dr. Gordon Yamaguchi from 1985 to 2010. Initially, Darkenwald worked one day a week, but she increased this to two days a week and then four days a week. In 1998, she suffered a neck and back injury. Darkenwald received worker's compensation benefits after the Department of Labor and Industries found that she had a permanent impairment. Despite her injury, Darkenwald continued to work three to four days a week until 2006. From that point on, Darkenwald worked only on Mondays and Wednesdays, for a total of 14 to 17 hours per week. In 2010, Dr. Yamaguchi added another dentist to his practice, and asked Darkenwald to return to working three days a week. In the alternative, he offered her a position as an on-call or substitute hygienist. Darkenwald found neither of these alternatives acceptable and thus interpreted Dr. Yamaguchi's request as a termination of her employment. Darkenwald believed she had been fired, while Dr. Yamaguchi believed that she had quit. Darkenwald appealed the Washington Employment Security Department's denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The issue her case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a desire to work only part time constituted a good cause reason for leaving work, thus permitting an individual who left work for that reason to collect unemployment benefits. The Court found that Darkenwald relied on a statute that did not apply to her and would not give her good cause to leave work even if it were applicable. Furthermore, the Employment Security Act (Act), Title 50 RCW, listed good-cause reasons for voluntarily leaving work and states that this list is exclusive; a desire to perform only part-time wor View "Darkenwald v. Emp't Sec. Dep't" on Justia Law

Under the Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act (MUCA), chapter 69.51A RCW, qualifying patients could participate in "collective gardens" to pool resources and grow medical marijuana for their own use. However, MUCA granted cities and towns the power to zone the "production, processing, or dispensing" of medical marijuana. Given this law, the city of Kent enacted a zoning ordinance that prohibited collective gardens within its city limits. The issue for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether MUCA preempted the Ordinance. The Court held that it did not and affirm the Court of Appeals: the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the city of Kent's zoning authority recognized in RCW 69.51A.l40(1) because the Ordinance merely regulated land use activity. View "Cannabis Action Council v. City of Kent" on Justia Law

The issue common to these consolidated cases centered on whether the totality of circumstances in each case provided law enforcement with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a Terry stop. Both cases involved the stop of a defendant after the defendant entered a high-crime apartment complex and visited an apartment occupied by a suspected drug dealer. However, other circumstances distinguished the cases and lead to different results. Because the circumstances included a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the Supreme Court affirmed in "Washington v. Fuentes." Finding that there were insufficient facts to give rise to an individualized suspicion, the Court reversed in "Washington v. Sandoz." View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Defendant Edward Glasmann asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the holdings of "Washington v. Daniels," (156 P.3d 905 (2007) (Daniels I), adhered to on recons., 200 P .3d 711 (2009) (Daniels II)). The Daniels case law established that if (1) the State charges a person with greater and lesser offenses and the jury is unable to agree regarding the greater offense but finds the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and (2) the defendant's conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal, then the State may retry the defendant for the greater offense without violating double jeopardy. Glasmann asked the Washington Court to reconsider the Daniels decision in light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' approach to the subject. "We will overturn our precedent only when someone shows that it is incorrect and harmful. Since Glasmann has not made that showing regarding the Daniels decisions, we see no reason to overturn them." View "Washington v. Glasmann" on Justia Law