Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Robert Yates Jr. of two counts of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced him to death. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2007. Yates filed this personal restraint petition, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. The Court found that personal restraint petitions must be filed within one year of a judgment and sentence becoming final (with certain exceptions). Yates filed his personal restraint petition seven years after his judgment and sentence became final. Since his petition did not meet any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year filing requirement, the Supreme Court dismissed it as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

Petitioner Chadwick Kalebaugh appealed his first degree child molestation conviction and claimed reversible error based on the trial judge's misstatements regarding the meaning of "reasonable doubt" in his preliminary remarks to the jury venire. Petitioner did not object, and raised the issue for the first time on appeal. The Supreme Court, in its review of the matter, reached the unpreserved error because it was a manifest constitutional error under RAP 2.5(a)(3). However, the Court affirmed because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Washington v. Kalebaugh" on Justia Law

The Washington State Hospital Association, a health care advocacy group, challenged Rule WAC 246-310-010(54), arguing, among other things, that the State Department of Health exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule. The Rule was made with regard to the "certificate of need" program, and in response to the Governor's mandate to "consider how the structure of affiliations, corporate restructuring, mergers, and other arrangements among health care facilities results in outcomes similar to the traditional methods of sales, purchasing, and leasing of hospitals, particularly when control of part or all of an existing hospital changes from one party to another." The trial court found that the department exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Rule and invalidated it on that basis without reaching the Association's other arguments. The Department appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded that the Rule was indeed invalid because it interpreted terms in RCW 70.38.105(4)(b) in a manner too broad to be consistent with the statute. View "Wash. State Hosp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Cates was convicted by jury on two counts of first degree rape of a child, and two counts of first degree child molestation. He was given a standard-range sentence for each conviction, all to run concurrently, resulting in 25 years of total confinement. He was further sentenced to three years of community custody upon his release and prohibited from contacting the victim. The prosecutor proposed a community custody condition that would have prohibited Cates from possessing or maintaining access to a computer without explicit authorization from his community corrections officer (CCO). Instead of the prosecutor's recommended condition, the trial court entered a modified condition providing, "You must consent to [Department of Corrections] home visits to monitor your compliance with supervision. Home visits include access for the purposes of visual inspection of all areas of the residence in which you live or have exclusive/joint control/access, to also include computers which you have access to." The Court of Appeals affirmed Cates' convictions and sentence in an unpublished opinion. Cates petitioned for the Supreme Court's review only as to the validity of the community custody provision requiring him to consent to home visits. Cates argued this condition violated article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. After careful consideration of the trial court record and petitioner's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that petitioner's challenge was not yet ripe for review. View "Washington v. Cates" on Justia Law

Respondent Brian Brush was convicted of first degree murder for killing his ex-fiancee. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence based on the jury's finding that the murder was an aggravated domestic violence offense. Brush appealed the domestic violence finding on two grounds: (1) a jury instruction defining "prolonged period of time" in the context of the domestic violence aggravating factor violated the constitutional rule against judges commenting on the evidence; and (2) the admission of certain heresay statements made by the victim's daughter during the sentencing phase of trial. With regard to respondent's first contention, the Supreme Court agreed that the instruction defining "prolonged period of time" essentially resolved a factual question for the jury and thereby constituted an improper comment on the evidence. With regard to respondent's second contention, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the victim's daughter to testify because her testimony related to an incident where Brush stalked her and her mother. The Court reversed Brush's exceptional sentence and remanded to the trial court with instructions that, if requested, it could impanel a jury to consider evidence of a prolonged pattern of abuse. View "Washington v. Brush" on Justia Law

This case began as a call for police assistance to E.J.J. 's house to help with his intoxicated, out-of-control sister, R.J. (a juvenile at the time). The police responded and began their intervention by escorting R.J. out of the house 10 to 15 feet away from the front door, where the officers attempted to calm her down. E.J.J. grew concerned when he saw an officer reach for what he perceived to be a nightstick. E.J.J. exited the house and stood on the porch, telling the officers that R.J. was his sister and that they should not use the nightstick. The officers advised him that they were in the middle of their investigation and instructed him multiple times to leave the scene and return to the house. Initially, E.J.J. did not comply. When he did return to the home, he stood in an open doorway and continued his verbal interaction with the officers. The officers directed E.J.J. multiple times to close the solid wood door and to withdraw further into the home, but E.J.J. refused, stating that he wanted to make sure that R.J. was not harmed. E.J.J. continued to stand behind a closed wrought iron door. Multiple times, an officer reached into the home to close the solid door. E.J.J. would immediately reopen it. At this point, E.J.J. was irate, yelling profanities and calling the officers abusive names. An officer warned E.J.J. that he could be arrested for obstruction. After E.J.J. continued to reopen the solid door, an officer put him under arrest for obstruction of a law enforcement officer. E.J.J. challenged the obstruction statute as unconstitutional as applied to his behavior. "While E.J.J. 's words may have been disrespectful, discourteous, and annoying, they are nonetheless constitutionally protected." The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and dismissed the case. View "Washington v. E.J.J." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The issue centered on how the term "collapse" was interpreted under Washington law in an insurance policy that insured "accidental direct physical loss involving collapse," subject to the policy's terms, conditions, exclusions and other provisions, but did not define "collapse" except to state that "collapse [did] not include settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion." The Washington Court concluded that in the insurance contract, "collapse" means "substantial impairment of structural integrity." "Substantial impairment of structural integrity" means substantial impairment of the structural integrity of a building or part of a building that renders such building or part of a building unfit for its function or unsafe and, under the clear language of the insurance policy here, must be more than mere settling, cracking, shrinkage, bulging, or expansion. View "Queen Anne Park Homeowners Ass'n v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved statutory interpretation of Washington's recreational land use statute, RCW 4.24.210. Plaintiff Steven Jewels sued the city of Bellingham for negligence following an injury he sustained when he was thrown from his bicycle after hitting an obstacle in a city-maintained park. Under the statute, landowners who open their property for recreational use free of charge are immune from liability when visitors injure themselves. This immunity did not apply, however, "for injuries sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted." The trial court dismissed plaintiff's claims on summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted the statute by concluding that the plaintiff had to show the city of Bellingham knew the condition was dangerous. However, the record supported the trial court's conclusion that the condition in this case was obvious (that is, not latent). Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Jewels v. City Of Bellingham" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on plaintiffs' claims under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and Planning Enabling Act (PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, were properly dismissed as time barred. The trial court granted defendant-Skamania County's summary judgment motion on each of the plaintiffs' claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the GMA and PEA claims, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained as to: (1) whether Skamania County actually completed periodic review on August 2, 2005, which Skamania County argues triggered the clock for the GMA claim; and (2) the date on which the inconsistency, if any, arose between the unmapped classification and the conservancy designation, which would have triggered the clock for the PEA claim. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in part, holding that both claims were timely because: (1) inaction generally does not trigger the GMA 60-day appeal period; and (2) in this case, no actionable inconsistency existed between a 1986 ordinance and the "2007 Comprehensive Plan" (2007 Plan) until August 2012. Because further factual development was unnecessary to address the time bar issue, The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County" on Justia Law

This case arose from an interest arbitration award that retroactively increased employee health care premiums for a period when there was no enforceable collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Superior Court struck a portion of the award that granted the retroactive increase, ruling that the award: (1) was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the due process clause; (2) violated Washington's wage rebate act (WRA); and (3) was arbitrary and capricious. Kitsap County appealed this ruling and the Washington Supreme Court granted direct review. Finding the arbitration award proper, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Kitsap County Deputy Sheriffs' Guild v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law