Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Frederick Russell was arrested in 2001 for drinking and driving, which lead to a crash, killing two passengers and seriously injuring three others. He posted bail, but failed to appear at a pretrial hearing. He was eventually captured in Ireland and extradited back to the United States to stand trial. On each of the first two days of jury selection in this case, the trial judge, the attorneys, and petitioner held work sessions to review juror questionnaires and to separate the hardship juror requests from the others. These work sessions occurred in the jury room, rather than in the courtroom, and the trial court did not conduct a "Bone-Club" analysis on the record before holding the work sessions. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review involved the question of whether reviewing jury questionnaires for hardship implicated the public trial right. Russell argued that the work sessions violated the public trial right guaranteed by article I, sections 10 and 22 of the state constitution and that his convictions should have therefore been reversed. The Court of Appeals rejected that contention, as did the Supreme Court. View "Washington v. Russell" on Justia Law

Rocio Trujillo's home loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the home. She defaulted, and Northwest Trustee Services Inc. (NWTS), the successor trustee, sent a notice of default and scheduled a trustee's sale of her property. NWTS had a beneficiary declaration from Wells Fargo Bank. RCW 61.24.030(7)(a) (part of the Deeds of Trust Act) required that a trustee not initiate such a nonjudicial foreclosure without "proof that the beneficiary [of the deed of trust] is the owner of any promissory note ... secured by the deed of trust," and must include "[a] declaration by the beneficiary made under the penalty of perjury stating that the beneficiary is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust shall be sufficient proof as required under this subsection." NTWS' declaration did not contain that specific statutory language. Instead, it stated under penalty of perjury, "Wells Fargo Bank, NA is the actual holder of the promissory note . . . or has requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce said [note]" (This declaration language differed from the language of RCW 61.24.030(7)(a), by adding the "or" alternative). Following the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Lyons v. U.S. Bank National Ass 'n," (336 P.3d 1142 (2014)), the Court held in this case that a trustee could not rely on a beneficiary declaration containing such ambiguous alternative language. The Court found that Trujillo alleged facts sufficient to show that NWTS breached the DTA and also to show that that breach could support the elements of a Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim. However, her allegations did not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or criminal profiteering. The Court therefore reversed in part and remanded for trial. View "Trujillo v. Nw. Tr. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Sean O'Dell was convicted of second degree rape of a child committed ten days after his eighteenth birthday, for which he was given a standard range sentence of 95 months. On appeal, O'Dell raised two issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of reasonable belief that the victim-here, a 12-year-old girl-was at least 14 years old or less than 36 months younger than O'Dell, based on the victim's declarations as to age; and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to consider O'Dell's own relative youth as a basis to depart from the standard sentence range. After review, the Supreme Court rejected O'Dell's challenge to his conviction but remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court could consider whether youth diminished O'Dell's culpability for his offense. View "Washington v. O'Dell" on Justia Law

Timothy Conover was convicted of three counts of delivering heroin within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop. The trial court imposed one 48-month standard-range base sentence on each count, to run concurrently with each other. It also imposed three 24-month school bus stop enhancements and ran them consecutively to Conover's 48-month base sentence and consecutively to each other (the total sentence was 120 months). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the school bus stop enhancement statute, RCW 9.94A.533(6), required the trial court to run such an enhancement consecutively only to the drug crime sentence it enhances or also required the trial court to run multiple enhancements on different counts consecutively to each other. The Court held that RCW 9.94A.533(6) did not require trial courts to run school bus stop enhancements on different counts consecutively to each other. "[I]nstead, when two or more offenses each carry school bus stop enhancements, the determination of whether those enhancements are to run concurrently or consecutively is also determined by resort to the rules in RCW 9.94A.589(l)(a)." The Court therefore reversed and remanded for resentencing with instructions to use RCW 9.94A.589 to determine whether the multiple 24-month sentence enhancements run concurrently or consecutively with each other. View "Washington v. Conover" on Justia Law

Roman Fedorov was arrested for attempting to elude law enforcement and driving under the influence. He was transported to jail for the purpose of administering a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) test. Fedorov asked for, and was granted, the opportunity to speak with an on-call defense attorney by telephone before consenting to take the BAC test, pursuant to CrR 3 .1. The Washington State Patrol (WSP) trooper, however, remained in the one-room jail, citing safety concerns and his need to perform a fifteen minute observation period before administering the BAC test. The trooper stood out of earshot at the far side of the room. Fedorov and his attorney chose to converse only in yes/no questions, fearing Fedorov would blurt out something incriminating. Fedorov argues that the presence of the trooper in the room violated his right to counsel because only with absolute privacy could the right to counsel be effective. The Supreme Court held that the rule-based right to counsel did not provide for a right to absolute privacy for conversations between attorney and client. "Once contacted, privacy between the arrestee and attorney may be balanced against legitimate safety and practical concerns, and challenges alleging such violations are reviewed under the totality of the circumstances." View "Washington v. Fedorov" on Justia Law

Roman Fedorov was arrested for attempting to elude law enforcement and driving under the influence. He was transported to jail for the purpose of administering a breath alcohol concentration (BAC) test. Fedorov asked for, and was granted, the opportunity to speak with an on-call defense attorney by telephone before consenting to take the BAC test, pursuant to CrR 3 .1. The Washington State Patrol (WSP) trooper, however, remained in the one-room jail, citing safety concerns and his need to perform a fifteen minute observation period before administering the BAC test. The trooper stood out of earshot at the far side of the room. Fedorov and his attorney chose to converse only in yes/no questions, fearing Fedorov would blurt out something incriminating. Fedorov argues that the presence of the trooper in the room violated his right to counsel because only with absolute privacy could the right to counsel be effective. The Supreme Court held that the rule-based right to counsel did not provide for a right to absolute privacy for conversations between attorney and client. "Once contacted, privacy between the arrestee and attorney may be balanced against legitimate safety and practical concerns, and challenges alleging such violations are reviewed under the totality of the circumstances." View "Washington v. Fedorov" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under either the state or federal constitutions, the information provided by multiple 911 callers was reliable and sufficient to justify an investigatory Terry stop of the car in which defendant was a passenger. Defendant Z.U.E. moved to suppress evidence of marijuana found on him following the stop, arguing that the officers lacked a reasonable basis to detain the car and its occupants. The trial court denied Z.U.E.'s motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed. In determining whether the information provided by a series of 911 calls provided the officers sufficient reliable information to justify stopping Z.U.E.'s car, the Supreme Court declined to strictly apply the two-pronged "Aguilar/Spinelli" analysis, but it recognized the two factors' relevance and usefulness to the reliability analysis. In this case case before us, the State did not establish that the series of 911 calls provided the officers with any articulable reason to suspect any of the passengers in this particular car were engaged in criminal activity. Therefore, the officers' subsequent seizure of Z.U.E. was therefore unlawful, and any evidence obtained as a result of that seizure should have been suppressed at trial. View "Washington v. Z. U. E." on Justia Law

At the conclusion of voir dire questioning, counsel exercised for cause challenges orally at the bench and subsequently exercised peremptory challenges silently by exchanging a list of jurors and alternatively striking names from it. All of voir dire, including the juror challenges, occurred in open court, on the record, and in full view of any observer in the courtroom. This issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether that method of challenging jurors after voir dire (a method commonly employed in trial courts around the state) violated the constitutional right to a public trial. After review, the Court held that the juror challenges in this case were exercised in a manner consistent with the minimum safeguards of the public trial right. View "Washington v. Love" on Justia Law

The United District Court for the Western District of Washington certified two questions of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The questions arose from a class action employment lawsuit then pending in the federal court. This case began in 2013 when two workers sued Sakuma Brothers Farms Inc. in federal district court on behalf of all seasonal and migrant agricultural workers Sakuma employed. Sakuma paid a "piece rate" wage based on the Workers' productivity. The piece rate was the only compensation the Workers received. In the only claim relevant here, the Workers alleged that Sakuma deprived them of paid rest breaks required by WAC 296-131-020(2). The Workers contended "on the employer's time" meant that Sakuma had to pay a wage separate from the piece rate for the 10-minute period they are on break, since no piece rate wages accumulate during that time. Sakuma responded that it sets the piece rate with rest periods in mind and that breaks were therefore "on the employer's time" as regulated. The Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of WAC 296-131-020(2) required employers to pay employees for rest breaks separate and apart from the piece rate. "An all-inclusive piece rate compensates employees for rest breaks by deducting pay from the wages the employee has accumulated that day. Hourly employees do not finance their own rest breaks in this way, and requiring pieceworkers to do so strips the phrase 'on the employer's time' of any practical meaning. That same language requires that rest breaks for pieceworkers be paid at least at the applicable minimum wage or the employee's regular rate, whichever is greater." View "Demetrio v. Sakuma Bros. Farms" on Justia Law

After an incident involving his then-deputy coroner, Grant County Coroner Jerry Lee Jasman pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and resigned. By statute, Jasman's conviction prohibited him from holding public office again. However, the new Grant County coroner, Craig Morrison, quickly hired Jasman as chief deputy coroner and chief investigator. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review asked whether Jasman could hold those positions given that he was prohibited from holding public office: Jasman could not hold those positions if they were "public officer" positions. As a separate issue, the Court had to decide whether Coroner Morrison was entitled to a special prosecutor's representation when he intervened as a defendant in this lawsuit. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) both positions were "public officer" positions and that Jasman could not hold either position; and (2) Coroner Morrison was not sued for money damages and the State or county was not the real party in interest, so he was not entitled to a special prosecutor's representation. View "Grant County Prosecuting Att'y v. Jasman" on Justia Law