Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was a direct review of a King County Superior Court decision that found certain portions of Initiative 1240 (I-1240) (Charter School Act), codified at chapter 28A.710 RCW, unconstitutional but left the remainder of the Act standing. In November 2012, Washington voters approved I-1240 providing for the establishment of up to 40 charter schools within five years. The Act was intended to provide parents with "more options" regarding the schooling of their children. But the new schools came with a trade-off: the loss of local control and1local accountability. Charter schools are exempt from many state rules. With the exception of "the specific state statutes and rules" identified in RCW 28A.710.040(2) and any "state statutes and rules made applicable to the charter school in the school's charter contract," charter schools were "not subject to and are exempt from all other state statutes and rules applicable to school districts and school district boards of directors ... in areas such as scheduling, personnel, funding, and educational programs." Alarmed over the lack of local accountability and fiscal impacts of the Act, appellants sued the State seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act was unconstitutional. Several supporters of charter schools intervened. All three parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the State and intervenors on all issues but one. The trial court held that charter schools were not "common schools" under article IX of Washington's Constitution and, therefore, the common school construction fund could not be appropriated to charter schools. The trial court found, however, that the provisions permitting such appropriations were severable. The trial court concluded that the Act was otherwise constitutional. All parties sought direct review, which the Washington Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of I-1240 that designated and treated charter schools as common schools violated article IX, section 2 of the state constitution and were void. This included the Act's funding provisions, which attempted to tap into and shift a portion of moneys allocated for common schools to the new charter schools authorized by the Act. Because the provisions designating and funding charter schools as common schools were integral to the Act, such void provisions were not severable, and that determination was dispositive of this case. View "League of Women Voters of Wash. v. Washington" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether under the State Constitution article I, section 7, an officer may search an arrestee's backpack as a search incident to arrest when the arrestee was wearing the backpack at the moment that he was stopped by police, but not at the time he was arrested several minutes later. When Officer Erik Olson stopped and seized Antoine Brock, he had Brock remove the backpack he was wearing and placed it where Brock could not readily access it. After a period of questioning, the officer arrested Brock and then searched the backpack. Ten minutes elapsed between the time Olson separated Brock from his backpack and the arrest. The trial court denied Brock's motion to suppress the evidence taken from the backpack. The Court of Appeals reversed. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court held that the backpack was a part of Brock's person at the time of arrest and that the search was valid incident to arrest. View "Washington v. Brock" on Justia Law

Advertisements featuring three minor girls, J.S., S.L., and L.C. (collectively J.S.), allegedly were posted on a website owned and maintained by Village Voice Media Holdings, d/b/a Backpage.com, Backpage.com LLC and New Times Media LLC, d/b/a/ Backpage.com (collectively Backpage). J.S. allegedly was raped multiple times by adult customers who responded to the advertisements. J.S. filed a complaint alleging state law claims for damages against Backpage and Baruti Hopson, asserting claims for negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy. Backpage moved to dismiss on the theory that it was immune from suit in relation to J.S. 's state law claims under the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did more than just provide a forum for illegal content; plaintiffs alleged defendants helped develop it. Taking the complaint as true, the Washington Supreme Court found that plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts that, if proved, would show that defendants helped to produce the illegal content and therefore were subject to liability under state law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed and remanded this case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Unit Owners Association of Centre Pointe Condominium (Centre Pointe) was formed in May 2003 by a declaration of condominium (Declaration) recorded in Whatcom County. A clubhouse and three residential buildings with 97 units of the Centre Pointe complex were built prior to 2011. In May 2011, Filmore LLP bought an unfinished portion of the Centre Pointe complex and all related development and special declarant rights. Filmore's property was part of the Centre Point complex and subject to its Declaration. Section 9.1.14 of the Declaration provided that there was "no restriction on the right of any Unit Owner to lease his or her Unit" other than the restrictions described in section 9.1.14. Nothing in section 9.1.14 limited the number of units that could be leased. In October 2011, owners of Centre Pointe units to which at least 67 percent (but less than 90 percent) of the votes in Centre Pointe were allocated approved a 12th amendment to the Declaration, requiring that no more than 30 percent of the total number of units could be leased. In October 2012, Filmore filed a complaint at the Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that the Declaration's Twelfth Amendment violated RCW 64.34.264(4) and section 17.3 of the Declaration because the 12th amendment was not passed with 90 percent of the eligible votes. Filmore requested that the 12th amendment be found void and unenforceable. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Filmore, and the Court of Appeals agreed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments. View "Filmore, LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Centre Pointe Condo." on Justia Law

Julio Davila appealed the Court of Appeals' decision affirming his conviction for second degree murder. At issue was whether the State violated its disclosure obligation under "Brady v. Maryland," (373 U.S. 83 (1963)), when it failed to disclose the fact that a forensic scientist who analyzed certain DNA evidence used in Davila's case had been fired for incompetence. While the Supreme Court concluded that this evidence was both favorable to the defendant and suppressed by the State in violation of its Brady obligations, the Court also concluded that the evidence was not material to the outcome of Davila's trial, given the specific facts presented in this case. View "Washington v. Davila" on Justia Law

Klein Honda was a Honda dealership. From time to time, Honda (the manufacturer) offered a "dealer cash" incentive program for its dealerships whereby dealerships can earn a specific amount of extra money if they sold specific Honda models during specific times and comply with other terms and conditions. At issue in this case was whether Klein Honda's dealer cash earnings were taxable. "Klein Honda received additional, separate income beyond its ordinary retail sales. That constitutes an additional taxable business activity under the [B&O] catchall provision. Although dealer cash would not be taxable under one of the Washington State Department of Revenue's regulations if it represented a 'bona fide discount' on Klein Honda's wholesale purchase of vehicles, dealer cash is not a bona fide discount because Klein Honda does not purchase vehicles from Honda subject to a dealer cash discount. Dealer cash payments are not necessarily quantified or even knowable at the time that Klein Honda purchases vehicles from Honda. Thus, Klein Honda's dealer cash is taxable." View "Steven Klein, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Jose Martines was involved in a car accident. Pursuant to a warrant, a blood sample was extracted from Martines after an officer suspected he was driving while under the influence (DUI). Martines was ultimately charged with felony DUI. He sought to suppress the blood test results showing the presence of drugs on the ground that there was no probable cause to show he was under the influence of drugs, as opposed to alcohol. The trial court denied Martines's motion, and a jury convicted him. The Court of Appeals reversed Martines's conviction, holding that the blood test was an unlawful warrantless search. The court reasoned that drawing blood and testing blood constituted separate searches, each of which requires particular authorization, and that the warrant here authorized only a blood draw. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Martines's conviction, holding that the warrant authorized the drawing and testing of Martines's blood for both alcohol and drugs based on probable cause to believe Martines had committed a DUI. View "Washington v. Martines" on Justia Law

This case involved two requests for public records that Glenda Nissen, a sheriff's detective, sent to Pierce County (County). Both requests asked for records related to Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist. The telephone number identified in these requests was connected to Lindquist's private cell phone. There was no dispute that Lindquist personally bought the phone, paid for its monthly service, and sometimes used it in the course of his job. The County reviewed call and text message logs and disclosed partially redacted copies to Nissen. Accompanied by an exemption log, the redactions concealed line items for calls and text messages that Lindquist self-described as personal in nature. The remaining unredacted portions related to calls and text messages that the County and Lindquist admitted might be work related. The County did not produce the contents of any text message, however, though copies of them existed on the service provider Verizon' s servers. Dissatisfied with the County's disclosures, Nissen sued the County, seeking an in camera review of Lindquist's text messages and the call and text message logs to determine if all of the information was a public record. Lindquist intervened and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin further disclosure of records related to his cell phone. The County moved to dismiss Nissen's complaint under CR 12(b)(6), arguing the records at issue could not be public records as a matter of law, because they related to a personal cell phone rather than a county-issued one. The trial judge granted the County's CR 12(b)(6) motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Applying the Public Record Act's (PRA) definition of "public record," the Court of Appeals held that Lindquist's text messages were public records because he "prepared" them in his official capacity. The court further held that the factual record was not sufficiently developed on the issue of whether the call logs also qualify as "public record[s]," noting that the issue turned on whether Lindquist used or retained the logs in his capacity as prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part. Records that an agency employee prepares, owns, uses, or retains on a private cell phone within the scope of employment can be "public records" of the agency under RCW 42.56.010(3). Because the Court found it "impossible" to determine if any messages were in fact public records, on remand the parties were directed as follows. Lindquist must obtain a transcript of the content of all the text messages at issue, review them, and produce to the County any that are public records. View "Nissen v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

Edward Gorre was a firefighter employed by the city of Tacoma (City), who suffered from valley fever (coccidioidomycosis). Gorre's diagnosis was not disputed. At issue was whether valley fever was considered a "respiratory disease" or an "infectious disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) or (d) that shifts the burden of proving the disease's proximate cause from Gorre to the employer City. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the superior court's judgment in the City's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that "respiratory disease," as used in RCW 51.32.185(1 )(a), referred only to diseases that medical experts diagnose as respiratory diseases. The Court also concluded that the "infectious diseases" qualifying for RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s evidentiary presumption were limited to those diseases specifically enumerated in RCW 51.32.185( 4 ). Because medical experts in Gorre's case testified that valley fever was an infectious disease, not a respiratory one, and because it was not one of the infectious diseases enumerated in RCW 51.32.185(4), the presumption did not apply. View "Gorre v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Several Indian tribes successfully challenged the imposition of state fuel taxes on tribal retailers. Since then, the State and various tribes signed agreements under which the tribes agreed to buy taxed fuel, and the State agreed to refund a portion of the fuel tax receipts to the tribes. An industry group unsuccessfully challenged the lawfulness of these agreements. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review reduced to whether those agreements violated article II, section 40 of the State Constitution. "Without passing judgment on whether the legislature successfully moved the legal incidence of the tax away from tribal retailers," the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the industry group's challenge. View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law