Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Mathew Moi was tried for the murder of Keith McGowan and for unlawful possession of the gun that killed McGowan. No physical evidence tied Moi to the gun, and perhaps because of that, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Based on the same evidence, Moi was acquitted of unlawful possession of the gun. On its second tryMoi was convicted of murder. In the second trial, the State still argued that McGowan was killed with the gun Moi was acquitted of possessing. The State conceded that the same issue of ultimate fact was decided in both trials but argued it would be unjust to apply double jeopardy against it because it was surprised by Moi' s testimony in the first trial that someone else shot McGowan and because Moi had moved to sever the two charges. Given the State's concession, the Supreme Court granted Moi’s personal restraint petition. Moi met his burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice following from having “be[en] twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Moi" on Justia Law

After defaulting on her home loan, Darlene Brown requested a foreclosure fairness act (FFA) mediation. The Department denied the request, reasoning the beneficiary of her deed of trust was exempt from mediation. Whether that determination was correct turned on whether the beneficiary of Brown's deed of trust for purposes of the exemption statute, was the holder of her promissory note (M&T Bank, an exempt entity), or its owner (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), a nonexempt entity). The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Department correctly recognized the holder of the note as the beneficiary for the purposes of the mediation exemption statute. In addition, the Court held that a party's undisputed declaration submitted under penalty of perjury that the party is the holder of the note satisfied the DTA's proof of beneficiary provisions: “The holder of the note satisfies these provisions and is the beneficiary because the legislature intended the beneficiary to be the party who has authority to modify and enforce the note. The Department correctly determined that Brown is not entitled to mediation because the note holder and beneficiary, M&T Bank, satisfies the conditions of the mediation exemption statute, RCW 61.24.166.” View "Brown v. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a deputy sheriff inadequately advised the defendant of his Miranda rights when he initially told the defendant that a lawyer would be appointed for him prior to questioning if he could not afford one but also said that no lawyer would be appointed for him unless he was arrested, jailed, and taken to court. The deputy did not clarify that the defendant was not obligated to respond to questions until he had the opportunity to confer with a lawyer. The Supreme Court held that although this Miranda advisement was contradictory and confusing and thus violated the defendant's Miranda rights, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and sustained defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Mayer" on Justia Law

M.S.M.-P. was born in April 2000. His biological parents, S.K. and N.P.'s relationship was marked from the beginning by physical abuse against S.K. S.K. and N.P.'s relationship ended within two weeks of M.S.M.-P.'s birth. During the first three years of M.S.M.-P.'s life, N.P. visited him fewer than 10 times, and he had not seen or had any contact with him since then. In 2002, when M.S.M.-P. was two years old, his mother S.K. began a relationship with A.K. S.K., A.K., and M.S.M.-P. lived together as a family since 2003, and S.K. and A.K. married in 2008. A.K. has cared for M.S.M.-P. since they began living together and has been the only father M.S.M.-P. has known. S.K. and A.K. have had two other children together. In early 2010, A.K. decided to adopt M.S.M.-P. and sought N .P. 's consent. After N .P. refused to consent to the adoption, A.K. filed a petition to terminate N.P.'s parental rights and to obtain permanent custody with the right to adopt. S.K. joined in the petition. In 2012, N.P.'s parental rights to M.S.M.-P. were terminated in a closed proceeding. N.P. 's attorney affirmatively consented to the closure, and soon afterward, M.S.M.-P. was adopted by his stepfather. N.P. sought reversal because the trial court closed the proceeding without analyzing the "Ishikawa" factors. After review, the Supreme Court concluded N .P. waived his right to open proceedings under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. View "In re Adoption of M.S.M.-P." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to a water right permit issued to the City of Yelm. The permit allowed the Department of Ecology to authorize withdrawals of water that impaired minimum flows where it was determined overriding considerations of public interest (OCPI) were established by the permit applicant. The trial court affirmed the Pollution Control Hearings Hoard's decision approving the permit. Sara Foster was the challenger to Yelm's permit, arguing Ecology exceeded its statutory authority in approving the permit under the OCPI exception. While this case was pending in the trial court, the Washington Supreme Court decided "Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Department of Ecology," (311 P.3d 6 (2013)), in which the Court comprehensively analyzed the statutory provision at issue here, and held that the provision operated as an exception to the overall prioritization of water rights, and that withdrawals of water authorized under that statute could not permanently impair senior water rights with earlier priority. After review of Foster's arguments, the Supreme Court concluded that "Swinomish" controlled in this matter, and reversed for many of the same reasons. View "Foster v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

In this case, the Citizens Alliance for Property Rights Legal Fund (CAPR) sought to invalidate several ordinances passed by San Juan County, alleging violations of Washington's Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA). Specifically, CAPR contended that four ordinances passed as part of a state-mandated update of the County's critical area ordinances (CAO) should have been voided because the ordinances had first been discussed by an informal group of county officials and employees (CAO Team) in meetings that did not comply with the OPMA. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court rejected CAPR's arguments because: (1) none of the CAO team meetings constituted "meetings" of the San Juan County Council under the OPMA; (2) the CAO Team itself was not a "committee" of the Council; and (3) the CAO Team never acted on behalf of the Council. View "Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

Darla Keck filed a medical malpractice case against doctors Chad Collins, DMD, and Patrick Collins, DDS after she experienced complications following sleep apnea surgery. The Doctors moved for summary judgment, arguing she lacked a qualified medical expert who could provide testimony to establish her claim. In response to the motion, her counsel filed two timely affidavits and one untimely affidavit from her medical expert. The trial court granted a motion to strike the untimely affidavit. Considering the remaining affidavits, the court ruled that the expert did not connect his opinions to specific facts to support the contention that the Doctors' treatment fell below the standard of care. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the Doctors. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although it agreed that the two timely affidavits lacked sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment, it held that the trial court should have denied the motion to strike and should have considered the third affidavit. This affidavit, the court held, contained sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment. This case raised two issues for the Supreme Court's review on appeal of the Court of Appeals' reversal: (1) whether the trial court used the appropriate standard of review for the challenged ruling to strike untimely filed evidence submitted in response to the summary judgment motion; and (2) whether the expert's timely second affidavit showed a genuine issue for trial that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider the factors from the governing caselaw, "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," ( 933 P.2d 1036 (1997)), on the record before striking the evidence. The Court also held that the second, timely-filed affidavid showed a genuine issue for trial that ciould have defeated summary judgment. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal. View "Keck v. Collins" on Justia Law

Virginia Jepsen executed her last will and testament on July 1, 2009, and died on November 16, 2011. On December 20, 2011, the superior court admitted Jepsen's will to probate, declared the estate was solvent, and appointed Julie Miles as personal representative (PR) with nonintervention powers. On March 22, 2012, Jepsen's adult son, Mack, filed a petition contesting the validity of Jepsen's will. Mack's attorney e-mailed the petition to the PR's attorney the same day it was filed. There was nothing in the record showing that the PR affirmatively agreed to accept e-mail service on her attorney in lieu of personal service on the PR. On April27, 2012, the PR filed a response to Mack's petition, denying its substantive allegations but not raising any affirmative defenses. On October 31, 2012, the PR filed a motion to dismiss Mack's petition because it was not personally served within 90 days of filing. The trial court initially granted the PR' s motion but reversed itself on reconsideration, holding that service under RCW 11.24.010 went solely to personal jurisdiction and that any objection on that basis was waived. The PR appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the will contest petition was never personally served on the personal representative, so the action was therefore never fully commenced and should have been dismissed. View "In re Estate of Jepsen" on Justia Law

Rolando Reyes was committed to the custody of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) following a determination that he was a sexually violent predator (SVP). On appeal, Reyes requested a new SVP commitment hearing, arguing that the trial court committed structural error by closing a pretrial hearing in violation of article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected Reyes' argument and affirmed his commitment. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a trial court commits structural error by closing a pretrial hearing in a civil proceeding without first conducting an "Ishikawa" analysis. The Court concluded it does not, and therefore affirmed. View "In re Det. of Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Adrian Ozuna challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for intimidating a former witness. Ozuna contended the jury impermissibly convicted him based only on a letter he wrote that authorities confiscated before it was delivered to anyone. In affirming his conviction, the Supreme Court concluded that a rational jury could have found Ozuna guilty of the crime based on the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. View "Washington v. Ozuna" on Justia Law