Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

M.H.P. was the son of Leslie Bramlett and Paul Parvin. He was less than two years old when dependency proceedings commenced. M.H.P.'s parents experienced repeated episodes of mental illness, substance abuse, and incarceration in the years preceding and following M.H.P.'s birth. The dependency proceedings commenced after Bramlett, accompanied by M.H.P., arrived at an emergency room showing signs of paranoia and threatening the ER staff. M.H.P. was removed from his parents' care; he remained in the custody of the State until a guardianship order was entered more than two years later. The Department of Social and Health Services and Diana Farrow, the court appointed special advocate (CASA) for M.H.P., appealed a superior court order denying their motion to unseal several sets of motions and orders. The underlying documents at issue were filed by M.H.P.'s parents to obtain public funding for expert services in connection with proceedings to terminate their parental rights. The court granted the motions ex parte without holding a hearing or providing notice to the other parties or to the public. After the CASA discovered the disputed orders, the Department moved to unseal the disputed documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the superior court's "indiscriminate ex parte sealing of documents pertaining to motions for public funding for expert services" violated General Rule (GR) 15; the justifications advanced by the superior court did not warrant creating a blanket exemption from GR 15 in parental termination cases; and in its memorandum opinion explaining the disputed orders, the superior court did not apply (or even mention) the "lshikawa" factors that all courts must analyze before granting a motion to seal. View "In re Dependency of M.H.P." on Justia Law

In October 2009, a Washington State Patrol trooper observed a truck, driven by Respondent Kenneth Sandholm, drifting back and forth outside of driving lanes and moving at an erratic speed. After pulling the truck over, the trooper noticed that Sandholm had watery, bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol. Sandholm also slurred his speech and displayed poor coordination. He displayed six out of six signs of possible intoxication during his field sobriety test. The trooper arrested Sandholm. Breath alcohol tests, taken approximately two hours later, showed that Sandholm had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .079 and .080. The State charged Sandholm with felony DUI, former RCW 46.61.502(6)(a) (2008), based on Sandholm having four or more prior DUI offenses within 10 years. This case involved an interpretation of former RCW 46.61.502 (2008), and a determination of the number of alternative means of committing an offense established by the statute. Depending on that determination, the issue for the Supreme Court to decide was whether sufficient evidence supported the conviction. Also, this case involved how offender scores for prior convictions were calculated under former RCW 9.94A.525 (2008). The Court of Appeals held that the statute established three alternative means and that the jury instructions were error but harmless in this case. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and concluded that RCW 9.94A.525(2)(e) created an exclusive scoring provision when the conviction is for felony DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and held that former RCW 46.61.502 (2008) created two alternative means of committing DUI. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's sentencing calculation. View "Washington v. Sandholm" on Justia Law

Zahid Khan was tried, without an interpreter, for multiple counts of child molestation and rape. Khan was not a native English speaker, and his level of English fluency was disputed. It was undisputed that he was not offered an interpreter by the court or by his attorney. He was convicted, and on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Khan argued among other things, that his trial was unfair and that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not securing an interpreter. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Khan had not made the requisite showing for the Court to vacate his sentence. In the alternative, Khan asked for an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis for his claims. The Court concluded that Khan did make the requisite showing for such a hearing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' order dismissing this personal restraint petition was vacated, and the case remanded for entry of an order transferring Khan’s petition to the Snohomish County Superior Court for a reference hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Khan" on Justia Law

Norma Tison entered into a lease for a mobile home lot in October 2001. The lease was executed on a preprinted form prepared by Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington. It was a one-year lease with several handwritten provisions that Tison specifically negotiated. The lease called for a monthly rent of $345 and contained a negotiated provision (the “rent cap provision”) that stated, "Every other year, rent will be raised no more than $10.00 for remaining tenancy." Petitioner Western Plaza LLC purchased the mobile home park in February 2008. At that time, Tison's monthly rent was $375. In March 2009, Western Plaza sent Tison a notice that her rent would be increased to $405 starting in July 2009. Tison began paying $385 per month, consistent with the rent cap provision; there was nothing in the record that indicated whether Western Plaza contemporaneously rejected any of Tison's $385 payments or indicated to her that it considered those payments partial. In June 2011, Western Plaza informed Tison that her rent would increase to $495 starting in October 2011. Relying on the rent cap provision, Tison attempted to pay the $395 she believed was due. Western Plaza rejected her payments and initiated this unlawful detainer action. Tison moved for summary judgment, arguing that Western Plaza was bound by the rent cap provision. Western Plaza argued that the rent cap provision was not enforceable because it conflicted with the Manufactured/Mobile Home Landlord-Tenant Act (MHLTA) and violated the statute of frauds. The trial court denied Tison's motion for summary judgment and resolved the unlawful detainer action in Western Plaza's favor. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Supreme Court held hold that the provision was permissible under the MHLTA and that the writing and signatures on the lease satisfied the statute of frauds applicable to rental agreements for mobile home lots. The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Western Plaza, LLC v. Tison" on Justia Law

On the eve of Matthew Hampton's trial, Hampton moved to replace his appointed counsel with a new private attorney on the condition that the trial be continued so his new counsel could prepare. The trial court denied the continuance, so Hampton proceeded with his previously appointed counsel. He was ultimately convicted of third degree rape. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial court's decision violated Hampton's constitutional right to his choice of counsel because it considered Hampton's reasons for wanting a new attorney. The Court of Appeals relied on a United States Supreme Court opinion that held that when a defendant's right to choice of counsel was erroneously denied, a defendant need not show prejudice in order to obtain relief. The Supreme Court reversed: “[a] trial court has wide latitude to grant or deny a motion to delay trial related to a defendant's request to change counsel. . . . In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hampton's request to delay trial to allow him to replace his counsel given that (1) he did not make his request until the day his trial was scheduled to start, (2) his trial had already been continued once, (3) the victim/witness opposed the continuance, and (4) he did not explain his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.” View "Washington v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Appellants sought to reverse a superior court order denying appellants' motion to enjoin the secretary of state from placing Initiative 1366 (I-1366) on the November 2015 general election ballot. Appellants claimed the initiative went beyond the scope of the people’s initiative power under article II, section 1 of the Washington constitution and was therefore not proper for direct legislation. The trial court ruled that: ( 1) appellants had standing to challenge the initiative as taxpayers, county election officials, and legislators; (2) this was a challenge to the scope of the initiative and therefore appropriate for preelection review; (3) the "fundamental, stated and overriding purpose" of I-1366 was to amend the constitution in violation of article II of the state constitution; (4) I-1366 violated article XXIII of the state constitution; and (5) appellants were unable to show a "clear legal or equitable right" to an injunction under “Rabon v. City of Seattle,” ( 957 P.2d 621 (1998)), because the Supreme Court had yet to decide whether preelection restrictions on initiatives infringe on free speech rights under the First Amendment or article I, section 5 of the Washington constitution. After review, the Washington Court determined that appellants did not make a clear showing that the subject matter of the initiative was not within the broad scope of the people's power of direct legislation and, as such, failed to demonstrate a clear legal right for injunctive relief. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "Huff v. Wyman" on Justia Law

In this case, Javier Ruiz-Sanabria timely filed a motion in superior court to withdraw his guilty plea to several sex offenses. The court transferred his motion to Division One of the Court of Appeals, but without indicating the basis for the transfer and without transferring all records filed in relation to Ruiz-Sanabria's motion. Considering the motion as a personal restraint petition based solely on the partial record that was transmitted, and without requesting a response from the State, the acting chief judge of Division One dismissed the petition as frivolous. By way of this opinion, the Supreme Court clarified the criteria a superior court must consider before transferring a postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals, the relationship between the rules governing personal restraint petitions and evidentiary prerequisites that a petitioner must meet, and when the petitioner's allegations may require the court to consult existing court records that the petitioner has not produced: “We have said that the petitioner must demonstrate that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish the facts that entitle him to relief, and that bare assertions and conclusory allegations are insufficient. But if the petitioner makes specific and material factual allegations within the petitioner's knowledge about court proceedings that can be answered by the State, the Court of Appeals should require a response that includes the relevant court documents. In this instance, remand to the Court of Appeals is warranted.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Ruiz-Sanabria" on Justia Law

The State charged Tammera Thurlby with three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Thurlby was present when her two day trial started, but she failed to appear on the second day. The trial court found that Thurlby was voluntarily absent and exercised its discretion to proceed with trial. In Thurlby' s absence, the jury found her guilty on all three counts. Thurlby challenged the trial court's finding of voluntary absence. She also argued that the trial court erred because it failed to expressly state it was considering a presumption against waiver during its analysis of voluntary absence, as required by a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Thurlby’s convictions. View "Washington v. Thurlby" on Justia Law

Mark Besola and Jeffrey Swenson lived together in Besola's house. After a friend of Swenson's, Kellie Westfall, was arrested, she told police that she had seen drugs and child pornography at Besola' s house. Besola was a veterinarian, and Westfall said that he provided prescription drugs from his veterinary clinic to Swenson, who was a drug addict. Based on the information provided by Westfall, a judge issued a search warrant for illegal drugs but declined to issue a search warrant related to child pornography at that time. At the scene, police saw CDs (compact disks) and DVDs (digital video disks) with handwritten titles that implied that they contained child pornography. On the basis of this observation, police requested and obtained an addendum to the search warrant. The language of that amended warrant (and whether it was sufficiently particular) is at the heart of the legal issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the warrant in “Washington v. Perrone,” 834 P.2d 611 (1992)) failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in part because it provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography. That holding was binding in this case, where the warrant similarly provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess. The State argued that the warrant in this case was saved by a citation to the child pornography statute at the top of the warrant. The Supreme Court held that the State was incorrect because the statutory citation did not modify or limit the items listed in the warrant, so it did not save the warrant from being overbroad. “More importantly, the State's position conflicts with our reasoning in Perrone and would hinder the goals of the warrant particularity requirement.” Because the warrant failed to meet the Constitution's p View "Washington v. Besola" on Justia Law

Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments. The Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days. Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property. Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act (RLTA). The Cabreras answered, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that"[ d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking money for rent, security deposit, utility deposit, relocation assistance and other expenses related to moving into a new home, plus $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages, and $5,209.55 in attorney fees. The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of RCW 59.18.085 does not allow recovery for emotional distress. View "Segura v. Cabrera" on Justia Law