Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law

Kut Suen and May Far Lui (the Luis) owned a building that sustained water damage after a pipe burst while the building was vacant. The Luis' insurance policy for the building limited coverage for water damage based on vacancy: coverage was suspended if the building remained vacant for 60 consecutive days and, effective at the beginning of any vacancy, and there was no coverage for certain specified losses, including water damage. The Luis argued that the policy was ambiguous and should have been interpreted in the Luis' favor to mean that the exclusion of coverage for water damage would commence only after a 60-day vacancy. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Luis' arguments and found that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for water damage immediately upon vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's contrary holding and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lui v. Essex Insur. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nalda Otton sought reversal of his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment. Otton and the victim had a romantic relationship and lived in the same household. The victim was disabled due to a history of multiple brain surgeries and sometimes had difficulties with memory and speaking. Late one night in December 2012, Otton and the victim had a confrontation. After Otton left the house, the victim called 911. When the police arrived, the victim gave a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, alleging that Otton held her on the bed and against the wall by her neck so that she could not breathe and told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified at Otton's trial, and because her testimony was inconsistent with her prior sworn statement to police about the incident, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statement as substantive evidence. Otton acknowledged that the trial court's decision and the Court of Appeals opinion affirming that decision were proper in accordance with long-standing precedent. But in this appeal, Otton asked the Supreme Court to reject that precedent. The victim's statement was not hearsay, and admissible as substantive evidence. A question arose on whether the victim's police interview was an "other proceeding" contemplated by ER 801(d)(1)(i). When confronted with the same question in 1982, the Supreme Court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview was either always or never considered an "other proceeding." The Court had not reexamined that 1982 case since it was issued. Based on that precedential case, the Court of Appeals formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness was admissible. Otton did not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations with regard to the four-part test; instead he argued the Supreme Court should reject the 1982 case. Finding that Otton has not shown that the 1982 case was incorrect, or any other reversible reason, the Supreme Court declined Otton's invitation and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Otton" on Justia Law

Appellants sought reversal of a King County Superior Court order declaring Initiative 1366 (I-1366) unconstitutional. At the center of this case, the fact that I-1366, if enacted, would "result[] in either a onetime reduction in the sales tax or [the proposal of a constitutional amendment]." Based on the plain language of the initiative, the Supreme Court held that I -13 66 required the legislature to choose between two operative provisions. "This does not constitute valid contingent legislation. Instead, this is the kind of logrolling of unrelated measures article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution was adopted to prevent." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that I-1366 violated the single-subject rule of article II, section 19, and that it was void in its entirety. View "Lee v. Washington" on Justia Law

New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC, an affiliate of AT&T Mobility LLC, provides both wireless voice telephone services and data services to customers in the city of Clyde Hill. Clyde Hill imposes a local utility tax on wireless telephone services, which applies to both voice and data services. New Cingular had for years collected utility taxes from Clyde Hill's residents on all charges for wireless and telephone voice and data services, and paid the tax to the city. In this case, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the cellular service provider could challenge a city fine through an action for declaratory judgment in superior court. The trial court dismissed, holding that a declaratory judgment action was improper and judicial review should have been sought by way of a statutory writ of review under RCW 7 .16.040. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating the declaratory action and remanding for a decision on the merits. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. City of Clyde Hill" on Justia Law

Lyons Enterprises Inc. was a regional franchisor of an international janitorial franchise operating in western Washington. The Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) determined that some of Lyons' franchisees, those that did not actually employ subordinates, met the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA, Title 51 RCW) definition of "worker" and assessed workers' compensation premiums against Lyons for those franchisees. The parties appealed the initial agency audit through four different administrative and judicial bodies that reached varying results as to whether Lyons' franchisees were covered workers. As part of these determinations, each adjudicative body that ruled that Lyons' franchisees were workers had also considered whether the franchisees were exempt from coverage under the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "White v. Department of Labor & Industries," (294 P.2d 650 (1956)) or under RCW 51.08.195. "[T]he answer to the exemption question has changed at nearly every level of review." Whether the franchisor-franchisee relationship was subject to the IIA was a question of first impression for the Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Board to determine which of Lyons' franchisees actually employed subordinates. View "Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Lyons Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether police officers had to give resident-respondent Michael Budd "Ferrier" warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the resident's home in order to seize an item containing suspected contraband. In 2009, the Washington State Patrol received an anonymous cybertip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children alleging that respondent possessed child pornography on his computer, used Internet messaging services to communicate with minors, and bragged about molesting his nine-and-a-half-year-old daughter. After review of the record, the Supreme Court held that the Ferrier warnings were required under such circumstances. Here, the trial court found that the officers did not give respondent the warnings before making a warrantless, consent-based entry into the home to seize his computer. Based on this finding, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that respondent's consent was invalid. View "Washington v. Budd" on Justia Law

Ho Im Bae died from acute morphine intoxication at Lakeside Adult Family Home. Esther Kim, the personal representative of Bae's estate, brought tort claims against several individuals involved in Bae's care. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review came from Alpha Nursing & Services Inc. and two of its nurses, who did not provide nursing services to Bae, but who were alleged to have observed signs of abuse and physical assault that should have been reported to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and law enforcement. Specifically, the issue was whether the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA) created an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one of the nurses did not have a duty to report and the other nurse fulfilled her reporting duty by contacting DSHS. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue: "[t]he AVAA creates a private cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment." A separate issue was whether the claims against one of the nurses should have been dismissed for insufficient service. The nurse, Christine Thomas, moved to Norway, and plaintiff personally served her there almost a year after filing and amended complaint and properly serving Alpha. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the nurse's motion to dismiss: "Consistent with Norway's ratification of the Hague Convention, however, the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in serving Thomas through Norway's designated central authority." View "Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether a city of Seattle (City) employee who recovered wages from a Seattle Civil Service Commission (Commission) hearing was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.48.030 when the city code provided she could be represented in those proceedings only at her own expense. Georgiana Arnold recovered wages from the civil service proceeding, after which she initiated an action in superior court to request attorney fees. The trial court denied attorney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed and granted her attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that the commission proceedings at issue here constituted an "action" for which RCW 49.48.030 provided attorney fees when requested in a separate court action. View "Arnold v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the alleged tortious conduct of an Idaho state trooper against an Idaho citizen during a traffic stop in which pursuit began in Idaho, but ended in Washington. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under these facts, a trial court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction under the Washington long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185. Based on the facts of this case, the Court held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, but that personal jurisdiction was in either Idaho or Washington. The Court remanded this case back to the trial court to consider whether to dismiss this case on comity grounds. View "Pruczinski v. Ashby" on Justia Law