Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

The State challenged a Court of Appeals decision reversing Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Pursuant to a search warrant, police discovered portions of a stolen vehicle on Porter's property. At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Specifically, Porter argued that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document omitted an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1 )'s provision stating that possession means to "'withhold or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto."' The State contended the information need not include the "withhold or appropriate" language because it merely defined the essential element of possession and was not itself an essential element. The Supreme Court concluded the State had the better argument, and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. View "Washington v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kisha Fisher and Corey Trosclair were tried as codefendants for the felony murder of Leonard Masten. Prior to trial, Fisher made out-of-court statements that incriminated both herself and Trosclair. After denying both defendants' motions to sever, the State offered Fisher's statement at trial as evidence against her. Trosclair challenged the sufficiency of the redactions in protecting his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the federal constitution. Fisher challenged the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with her requested affirmative defense jury instruction. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the redaction of Trosclair's name to "first guy" in Fisher's confession was insufficient, as it obviously referred to Trosclair. The Court therefore held it was error to read Fisher's statement into evidence. However, in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence, the Court concluded this error was harmless and affirmed Trosclair's conviction. As to Fisher, the Court held she produced sufficient evidence at trial to warrant an affirmative defense jury instruction. Failure to do so constituted reversible error, and the Court reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case alleged negligence based on a failure to schedule a resentencing hearing for a criminal defendant after the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing. Consequently, the defendant served more prison time than he otherwise would have had he been promptly resentenced. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the "actual innocence" element of a criminal malpractice claim against the trial attorney, the appellate attorney and King County (through its agency, the Department of Public Defense), applied to the facts of this case to bar the complaint. The Supreme Court held that actual innocence was a necessary requirement to pursue the criminal malpractice claim and that no exception applied. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal in favor of all respondents. View "Piris v. Kitching" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Laura Jordan defaulted on a mortgage payment, and one day after returning home from work, she could not enter the house: the locks had been changed without warning. Nationstar Mortgage left a notice on the house that she needed to contact them to retrieve her belongings. Jordan removed those belongings the next day, and did not return. The house was secured by a deed of trust that contained provisions that allowed Nationstar to enter her home upon default without providing any notice. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether those provisions conflicted with Washington law. Jordan represented a class action proceeding in federal court, which certified two questions of Washington law: (1) whether the deed of trust provisions conflicted with a Washington law that prohibited a lender from taking possession of property prior to foreclosure; and (2) whether Washington's statutory receivership scheme was the exclusive remedy by which a lender may gain access to the property. The Washington Supreme Court held that the deed of trust provisions in this case conflicted with Washington law because they allowed Nationstar to take possession of the property after default. Furthermore, the Court held that nothing in Washington law established the receivership statutes as an exclusive remedy. View "Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a third party, a step-grandfather with no legally established relationship to his step-grandson, could petition for visitation rights through a custody proceeding pursuant to chapter 26.10 RCW or under some equitable doctrine. At that time, M.W. was in the physical custody of petitioners Greg and Linda Minium, M.W. 's maternal grandparents. Approximately one month after the accident, the Miniums filed a petition for nonparental custody of M.W. pursuant to RCW 26.10.030(1). The petition named Patti Shmilenko, M.W.'s paternal grandmother, as the sole respondent. In March 2010, the Miniums and Mrs. Shmilenko agreed to the entry of a nonparental custody decree establishing the Miniums as M.W. 's legal custodians and granting visitation rights to Mrs. Shmilenko according to an agreed residential schedule. The record is silent as to why respondent John Shmilenko was not included in the court's orders despite residing in the same household as his wife, but all of the orders explicitly provide for visitation with "Patti Shmilenko." Mr. Shmilenko maintained a relationship with M.W. through his wife's visitation rights. When M.W. reached school age three years later, the parties could not agree on a modified residential schedule. Mrs. Shmilenko subsequently petitioned the superior court to modify the original custody decree and residential schedule, naming both herself and her husband as "requesting parties." In response, the Miniums asked the court to terminate Mrs. Shmilenko's visitation rights, contending that her court-ordered, third-party visitation was unconstitutional and that she also was not entitled to visitation under the equitable doctrine of de facto parentage. The court entered a temporary order amending M.W.'s residential schedule and allowing Mrs. Shmilenko to continue to exercise her own visitation rights pursuant to the parties' prior agreed order, and crossed out a reference to Mr. Shmilenko as a "requesting party." Ultimately, the court entered a final order ensuring that Mrs. Shmilenko would continue to have midweek visits with M.W. during the school year, as well as other visitation during certain weekends, holidays, and vacations. Mrs. Shmilenko petitioned to modify the original custody decree, and concurrently filed a motion to join her husband as an additional party to the underlying nonparental custody proceeding. The court denied that motion but indicated that Mr. Shmilenko would be permitted to state the factual basis for bringing his own third-party custody or de facto parentage action and, if he did bring such an action, it would be consolidated with Mrs. Shmilenko's petition to modify the custody decree. "There is no statutory right to third-party visitation under our laws, and we decline to exercise our equitable powers to create such a right." Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of Mr. Shmilenko's petition and the determination of attorney fees. View "In re Custody of M.W." on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Farnsworth, Jr. and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to "rob" a bank. They were arrested and charged with first degree robbery. The jury was instructed on both first degree theft and first degree robbery; it unanimously convicted Farnsworth of first degree robbery and, per the jury instructions, it did not consider the lesser-included crime of first degree theft. The trial court found that the conviction was his third strike under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) and sentenced Farnsworth to life in prison without the possibility of release. The main question raised by Farnsworth's appeal of that sentence was whether certain conduct constituted a "threat of force," making the crime a robbery, not a theft. Specifically, the question centered on whether Farnsworth's handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained an implied threat of force. "Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. … As Farnsworth's partner in crime explained, they were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat; in fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime. In this context, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the pair's conduct implied a threat of harm." Furthermore, the Court concluded no errors at trial court accumulated to deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial. The Court therefore affirmed Farnsworth's conviction for first degree robbery. View "Washington v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Officer Scott Campbell made a traffic stop of petitioner Mark Mecham, observing that Mecham might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Campbell asked Mecham to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell's observing Mecham's eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused, and his refusal was used against him at trial. Mecham argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated when the State introduced evidence of his refusal to submit to the FSTs. After review, the Supreme Court held that Mecham's rights were not violated because an FST is not a search under the state and federal constitutions, and Mecham had no constitutional right to refuse to perform the FSTs. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "Washington v. Mecham" on Justia Law

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law