Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The complaint in this case alleged negligence based on a failure to schedule a resentencing hearing for a criminal defendant after the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing. Consequently, the defendant served more prison time than he otherwise would have had he been promptly resentenced. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the "actual innocence" element of a criminal malpractice claim against the trial attorney, the appellate attorney and King County (through its agency, the Department of Public Defense), applied to the facts of this case to bar the complaint. The Supreme Court held that actual innocence was a necessary requirement to pursue the criminal malpractice claim and that no exception applied. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment of dismissal in favor of all respondents. View "Piris v. Kitching" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Laura Jordan defaulted on a mortgage payment, and one day after returning home from work, she could not enter the house: the locks had been changed without warning. Nationstar Mortgage left a notice on the house that she needed to contact them to retrieve her belongings. Jordan removed those belongings the next day, and did not return. The house was secured by a deed of trust that contained provisions that allowed Nationstar to enter her home upon default without providing any notice. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether those provisions conflicted with Washington law. Jordan represented a class action proceeding in federal court, which certified two questions of Washington law: (1) whether the deed of trust provisions conflicted with a Washington law that prohibited a lender from taking possession of property prior to foreclosure; and (2) whether Washington's statutory receivership scheme was the exclusive remedy by which a lender may gain access to the property. The Washington Supreme Court held that the deed of trust provisions in this case conflicted with Washington law because they allowed Nationstar to take possession of the property after default. Furthermore, the Court held that nothing in Washington law established the receivership statutes as an exclusive remedy. View "Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a third party, a step-grandfather with no legally established relationship to his step-grandson, could petition for visitation rights through a custody proceeding pursuant to chapter 26.10 RCW or under some equitable doctrine. At that time, M.W. was in the physical custody of petitioners Greg and Linda Minium, M.W. 's maternal grandparents. Approximately one month after the accident, the Miniums filed a petition for nonparental custody of M.W. pursuant to RCW 26.10.030(1). The petition named Patti Shmilenko, M.W.'s paternal grandmother, as the sole respondent. In March 2010, the Miniums and Mrs. Shmilenko agreed to the entry of a nonparental custody decree establishing the Miniums as M.W. 's legal custodians and granting visitation rights to Mrs. Shmilenko according to an agreed residential schedule. The record is silent as to why respondent John Shmilenko was not included in the court's orders despite residing in the same household as his wife, but all of the orders explicitly provide for visitation with "Patti Shmilenko." Mr. Shmilenko maintained a relationship with M.W. through his wife's visitation rights. When M.W. reached school age three years later, the parties could not agree on a modified residential schedule. Mrs. Shmilenko subsequently petitioned the superior court to modify the original custody decree and residential schedule, naming both herself and her husband as "requesting parties." In response, the Miniums asked the court to terminate Mrs. Shmilenko's visitation rights, contending that her court-ordered, third-party visitation was unconstitutional and that she also was not entitled to visitation under the equitable doctrine of de facto parentage. The court entered a temporary order amending M.W.'s residential schedule and allowing Mrs. Shmilenko to continue to exercise her own visitation rights pursuant to the parties' prior agreed order, and crossed out a reference to Mr. Shmilenko as a "requesting party." Ultimately, the court entered a final order ensuring that Mrs. Shmilenko would continue to have midweek visits with M.W. during the school year, as well as other visitation during certain weekends, holidays, and vacations. Mrs. Shmilenko petitioned to modify the original custody decree, and concurrently filed a motion to join her husband as an additional party to the underlying nonparental custody proceeding. The court denied that motion but indicated that Mr. Shmilenko would be permitted to state the factual basis for bringing his own third-party custody or de facto parentage action and, if he did bring such an action, it would be consolidated with Mrs. Shmilenko's petition to modify the custody decree. "There is no statutory right to third-party visitation under our laws, and we decline to exercise our equitable powers to create such a right." Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of Mr. Shmilenko's petition and the determination of attorney fees. View "In re Custody of M.W." on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Farnsworth, Jr. and James McFarland were suffering heroin withdrawals and had no money to purchase more. The pair made a plan to "rob" a bank. They were arrested and charged with first degree robbery. The jury was instructed on both first degree theft and first degree robbery; it unanimously convicted Farnsworth of first degree robbery and, per the jury instructions, it did not consider the lesser-included crime of first degree theft. The trial court found that the conviction was his third strike under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) and sentenced Farnsworth to life in prison without the possibility of release. The main question raised by Farnsworth's appeal of that sentence was whether certain conduct constituted a "threat of force," making the crime a robbery, not a theft. Specifically, the question centered on whether Farnsworth's handwritten note demanding money from a bank teller contained an implied threat of force. "Although the note did not convey an explicitly threatening message, we believe it was laden with inherent intimidation. … As Farnsworth's partner in crime explained, they were well aware that banks generally instructed their employees to react to such notes as if they contained an explicit threat; in fact, the pair relied on that knowledge and fear to commit this crime. In this context, we hold that there is sufficient evidence that the pair's conduct implied a threat of harm." Furthermore, the Court concluded no errors at trial court accumulated to deprive Farnsworth of a fair trial. The Court therefore affirmed Farnsworth's conviction for first degree robbery. View "Washington v. Farnsworth" on Justia Law

Officer Scott Campbell made a traffic stop of petitioner Mark Mecham, observing that Mecham might have been driving while intoxicated. Officer Campbell asked Mecham to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs), which would have involved Officer Campbell's observing Mecham's eye movements and ability to walk a straight line and stand on one leg. Mecham refused, and his refusal was used against him at trial. Mecham argued on appeal that his constitutional rights were violated when the State introduced evidence of his refusal to submit to the FSTs. After review, the Supreme Court held that Mecham's rights were not violated because an FST is not a search under the state and federal constitutions, and Mecham had no constitutional right to refuse to perform the FSTs. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. View "Washington v. Mecham" on Justia Law

The respondents' cases were unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii). M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation. Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: those contained in RCW 71.05.280(2), (3) and (4). M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3). Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4) (gravely disabled); and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggered the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provided a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony. The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds. The Supreme Court concluded M.W. and W.D failed to meet their burden to prove that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) violated substantive or procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, or the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court commissioner's ruling and upheld former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii) as constitutional. View "In re Det. of M. W." on Justia Law

Kut Suen and May Far Lui (the Luis) owned a building that sustained water damage after a pipe burst while the building was vacant. The Luis' insurance policy for the building limited coverage for water damage based on vacancy: coverage was suspended if the building remained vacant for 60 consecutive days and, effective at the beginning of any vacancy, and there was no coverage for certain specified losses, including water damage. The Luis argued that the policy was ambiguous and should have been interpreted in the Luis' favor to mean that the exclusion of coverage for water damage would commence only after a 60-day vacancy. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the Luis' arguments and found that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for water damage immediately upon vacancy. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's contrary holding and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Lui v. Essex Insur. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nalda Otton sought reversal of his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment. Otton and the victim had a romantic relationship and lived in the same household. The victim was disabled due to a history of multiple brain surgeries and sometimes had difficulties with memory and speaking. Late one night in December 2012, Otton and the victim had a confrontation. After Otton left the house, the victim called 911. When the police arrived, the victim gave a written statement, signed under penalty of perjury, alleging that Otton held her on the bed and against the wall by her neck so that she could not breathe and told her he was going to kill her. The victim testified at Otton's trial, and because her testimony was inconsistent with her prior sworn statement to police about the incident, the trial court admitted the victim's prior statement as substantive evidence. Otton acknowledged that the trial court's decision and the Court of Appeals opinion affirming that decision were proper in accordance with long-standing precedent. But in this appeal, Otton asked the Supreme Court to reject that precedent. The victim's statement was not hearsay, and admissible as substantive evidence. A question arose on whether the victim's police interview was an "other proceeding" contemplated by ER 801(d)(1)(i). When confronted with the same question in 1982, the Supreme Court declined to issue a categorical ruling that a police interview was either always or never considered an "other proceeding." The Court had not reexamined that 1982 case since it was issued. Based on that precedential case, the Court of Appeals formulated a four-factor test for determining whether an out-of-court statement by a nonparty witness was admissible. Otton did not challenge the trial court's discretionary determinations with regard to the four-part test; instead he argued the Supreme Court should reject the 1982 case. Finding that Otton has not shown that the 1982 case was incorrect, or any other reversible reason, the Supreme Court declined Otton's invitation and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Otton" on Justia Law

Appellants sought reversal of a King County Superior Court order declaring Initiative 1366 (I-1366) unconstitutional. At the center of this case, the fact that I-1366, if enacted, would "result[] in either a onetime reduction in the sales tax or [the proposal of a constitutional amendment]." Based on the plain language of the initiative, the Supreme Court held that I -13 66 required the legislature to choose between two operative provisions. "This does not constitute valid contingent legislation. Instead, this is the kind of logrolling of unrelated measures article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution was adopted to prevent." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and held that I-1366 violated the single-subject rule of article II, section 19, and that it was void in its entirety. View "Lee v. Washington" on Justia Law