Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Washington sued more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies (including petitioners) for price fixing. The State claimed the foreign companies conspired to fix prices by selling CRTs (cathode ray tubes) into international streams of commerce intending they be incorporated into products sold at inflated prices in large numbers in Washington State. The trial court dismissed on the pleadings, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the foreign companies. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the State alleged sufficient minimum contacts with Washington to satisfy both the long arm statute and the due process clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to defendant Sayiden Mohamed's residence to follow up on several 911 hang-up calls that had originated from the house. Upon speaking with him, the officers observed that defendant was intoxicated but determined that no further action was needed. Shortly after ending the initial contact, the officers received information that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest. When the officers returned to carry out the arrest, the defendant became hostile and belligerent and resisted the officers' attempts to place him in the patrol car. While the officers were in the process of forcibly subduing him until backup arrived, defendant spit in both of the officers' faces. He continued to spit at the officers even after a spit mask was placed over his head. Once defendant was restrained, the officers were able to place him in the patrol car and take him to jail. Defendant was charged with two counts of third degree assault for spitting on the arresting officers. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether it was permissible to impeach a hearsay declarant with his or her prior convictions under certain circumstances. In this case, defendant did not testify and his own out-of-court statements were admitted into evidence through his expert witness' testimony. Defense counsel expressly declined a limiting instruction offered by the trial court regarding the purpose of defendant's statements. The State then cross-examined the expert witness with the defendant's previously admitted prior convictions pursuant to ER 806. Defendant contended that his out-of-court statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, barring impeachment pursuant to ER 806. Because defense counsel declined an instruction that would have limited the evidence to its proper purpose, the Supreme Court held that the statements were also offered for their truth and that impeachment of the defendant's credibility was therefore permissible pursuant to ER 806. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the convictions. View "Washington v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court: "Does a title company owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments?" This certified question arose out of a civil action for money damages. Plaintiffs Centurion Properties Ill LLC (CP Ill) and SMI Group XIV LLC (collectively Plaintiffs) asserted that defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company negligently breached its duty of care and caused damages when it recorded unauthorized liens on CP Ill's property. The Washington Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit's question "no," holding that title companies did not owe a duty of care to third parties in the recording of legal instruments. "Such a duty is contrary to Washington's policy and precedent, and other duty of care considerations." View "Centurion Props. III, LLC v. Chi. Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2013, the Washington legislature enacted amendments to the dependency statutes to expressly address incarcerated parents. Those factors barred a court from assuming that incarceration would make it impossible to parent; they focused instead on the sufficiency of the Department of Social and Health Services' (Department) services and the parent's efforts, requiring a court to evaluate those things on a case-by-case basis. Petitioner Edelyn Saint-Louis was incarcerated in the middle of a dependency proceeding that lasted over 2 years, but was released one month and ten days before the termination trial began. The main question presented by this case was one of statutory interpretation: does RCW 13.34.180(l)(t)'s requirement that certain factors be considered at the termination hearing "[i]f the parent is incarcerated" apply if the parent isn't incarcerated at that time? The Supreme Court held that based on the language and purpose of the amendments, that the answer was no. "The provision at issue in this case, by contrast, looks to the incarcerated parent's ability to parent in the future. Limiting its application to those incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing thus fits well into the statutory scheme." View "In re Dependency of D.L.B." on Justia Law

Petitioner Clark Stuhr was in the custody of Department of Corrections (DOC), serving two consecutive sentences imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA). As penalties for Stuhr's serious disciplinary infractions, DOC revoked potentially available good conduct time for both of his sentences. Stuhr filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), arguing that this loss of potential good conduct time violated statutory and constitutional law. The Supreme Court disagreed and therefore denied relief. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stuhr" on Justia Law

John Kovacs injured his back while working for Pro Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. on September 29, 2010. Kovacs filed an application for benefits on September 29, 2011. The Department of Labor and Industries initially found that Kovacs qualified for benefits, which he began to receive. Kovacs's employer challenged the award, arguing that Kovacs's application was not timely. In response, the department reversed its decision, rejected the claim, and ordered Kovacs to pay back the benefits already paid to him. Kovacs appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which affirmed the department's decision that the application was untimely. Kovacs appealed again to the superior court, which reversed the board's decision, held that Kovacs's claim was "timely within the meaning of RCW 51.28.050," entered judgment for Kovacs, and granted Kovacs's motion for attorney fees. By divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court. The Supreme Court found that applications for workers' compensation benefits had to be filed "within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred." Generally, the day of injury is excluded from time calculations. The Court determined that the legislature did not intend to include the day of injury in calculating the time to file a worker's compensation claim, and held that the one-year statute of limitations here began to run the day after the injury and reversed. View "Kovacs v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Baron Ashley Jr. appealed his conviction for unlawful imprisonment with domestic violence. At trial, the State introduced evidence of Ashley's prior acts of domestic violence against the victim pursuant to ER 404(b). The Washington Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose of establishing an element of the charged crime but that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence for the purpose of bolstering the witness's credibility. However, because the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless, it affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Ashley" on Justia Law

Historically, sovereigns were not subject to statutes of limitations without their explicit consent. Washington State consented to some statutes of limitations but not to others. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Washington consented to a statute of limitations that would bar this antitrust suit filed by the Washington State attorney general on behalf of the State against more than 20 foreign electronics manufacturing companies. The State alleged that between at least March 1, 1995, through at least November 25, 2007, the defendants violated RCW 19.86.030, which prohibited any "contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," by agreeing to raise prices and agreeing on production levels in the market for CRTs (cathode ray tubes) used in televisions and computer monitors before the advent of LCD (liquid crystal display) panels and plasma display technologies. Due to this unlawful conspiracy, the State alleges, Washington consumers and the State of Washington itself paid supracompetitive prices for CRT products. Ten of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claims were time barred because Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) must be brought within four years. The State responded that RCW 19.86.120's statute of limitations did not apply to its claims under RCW 19.86.080. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the State's action for injunctive relief and restitution was exempt from the statute of limitations in RCW 19.86.120 and from the general statutes of limitations in chapter 4.16 RCW. View "Washington v. LG Elecs., Inc." on Justia Law

The State challenged a Court of Appeals decision reversing Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Pursuant to a search warrant, police discovered portions of a stolen vehicle on Porter's property. At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Specifically, Porter argued that his conviction should be overturned because the charging document omitted an essential element of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1 )'s provision stating that possession means to "'withhold or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto."' The State contended the information need not include the "withhold or appropriate" language because it merely defined the essential element of possession and was not itself an essential element. The Supreme Court concluded the State had the better argument, and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. View "Washington v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kisha Fisher and Corey Trosclair were tried as codefendants for the felony murder of Leonard Masten. Prior to trial, Fisher made out-of-court statements that incriminated both herself and Trosclair. After denying both defendants' motions to sever, the State offered Fisher's statement at trial as evidence against her. Trosclair challenged the sufficiency of the redactions in protecting his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights under the federal constitution. Fisher challenged the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with her requested affirmative defense jury instruction. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the redaction of Trosclair's name to "first guy" in Fisher's confession was insufficient, as it obviously referred to Trosclair. The Court therefore held it was error to read Fisher's statement into evidence. However, in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence, the Court concluded this error was harmless and affirmed Trosclair's conviction. As to Fisher, the Court held she produced sufficient evidence at trial to warrant an affirmative defense jury instruction. Failure to do so constituted reversible error, and the Court reversed her conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Washington v. Fisher" on Justia Law