Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

N.L. met Nicholas Clark at school track practice. She was 14, and he was 18. Both were students in the Bethel School District. Neither N.L. nor any responsible adult on the field knew that Clark was a registered sex offender who had previously sexually assaulted a younger girl who had been about N.L. 'sage at the time. The Pierce County Sheriff's Department had informed Clark's school principal of his sex offender status, but the principal took no action in response. Clark persuaded N.L. to leave campus with him and raped her. N.L. sued the district, alleging negligence. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the School District’s duty to N.L. ended when she left campus and whether its alleged negligence, as a matter of law, was not a proximate cause of her injury. The Court answered both questions “no,” affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court’s dismissal of this case on summary judgment. View "N.L. v. Bethel Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2000, the Department of Retirement Systems (DRS) created a new option for eligible retirees in which the retiree could opt for a pension that would allow a surviving spouse to continue to receive monthly pension benefits at the same amount after the retiree's death. To make this pension actuarially equivalent in value to the previous pension, the DRS provided for a greater reduction in the retiree's monthly benefits. In 2010, the DRS adopted rules that modified the degree of the actuarial reduction. Appellant Tim Lenander challenged the changes to the reduction, arguing that the changes violated the statutory scheme and impaired his contract right to a lower reduction in his pension payment. The Supreme Court found Lenander's arguments unavailing, holding that the DRS acted within its authority in amending the survivor benefit actuarial reduction regulations as set forth under former WACs 415-02-380 (2010) and 415-103-215 (2010). In amending these regulations, the DRS did not violate the contract clause of article I, section 23 of the Washington Constitution. Consequently, the Court held that the DRS did not infringe on Lenander's right to an "actuarial equivalent" survivor benefit, and that Lenander did not suffer substantial impairment to his pension contract rights. View "Lenander v. Dep't of Retirement Sys." on Justia Law

Petitioner-plaintiff Jess Nelson sued defendant-respondent Erickson for personal injuries after a car accident. They went to mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded the plaintiff a total of $44,923. Of that total award, $1,522 was for attorney fees and costs. Defendant decided to seek trial de novo. In an effort to avoid trial, plaintiff offered to settle for "$26,000 plus taxable costs incurred at arbitration." This language from the settlement offer was the center of the legal dispute in this case. Defendant did not respond to the offer, and the parties went to trial. The jury awarded the plaintiff $24,167. Upon plaintiff's motion for additur, the judge added $3,000 for future noneconomic damages. This brought the total award at trial to $27,167. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, arguing that defendant had not improved his position at trial. The trial judge agreed and awarded plaintiff $58,908 in attorney fees and $4,488 in costs. Defendant appealed, arguing that the settlement offer was actually for $26,000 plus the known arbitration costs of $1,522. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether defendant improved his position at trial. After review, the Court held that defendant's position prior to trial should have been interpreted as an ordinary person would. Applying that rule, defendant improved his position at trial and was not required to pay the opposing party's attorney fees. View "Nelson v. Erickson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Goss argued that the charging document the State used to accuse him of second degree child molestation failed to pass constitutional muster because it violated his right to know the "nature and cause of the accusation" made against him, and failed to give notice of every fact that increased any penalties he faced. Specifically, Goss contended the State's charging document failed to allege that the victim was "at least twelve years old," the lower limit of the age range for that degree of the crime. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fact that the victim was "at least twelve years old" was not an essential element of second degree child molestation, and that Goss had notice of every fact that exposed him to a greater penalty. View "Washington v. Goss" on Justia Law

Alsco, Inc. was a textile rental and sales company that supplied uniforms, linens, and other products to other businesses in industrial, hospitality, health care, and other fields. Alsco did not provide products or services for resale. Alsco and its employees were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review turned on whether Alsco was a "retail or service establishment" (RSE) under chapter 49.46 RCW for purposes of an exemption to the overtime pay requirement. The trial court granted the employees' motion for summary judgment regarding entitlement to overtime pay, finding that Alsco was not an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay exception. In granting the employees' subsequent motion for summary judgment on the issue of calculating the amount of overtime due, the court calculated the "regular rate of pay" by dividing the total weekly compensation actually paid by 40 hours, not by hours actually worked. The Washington Supreme Court accepted direct review and reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that Alsco was an RSE for purposes of the overtime pay requirement. View "Cooper v. Alsco, Inc." on Justia Law

Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) condemned property owned by Airport Investment Company (AIC) in order to secure easements to construct and operate an elevated light rail. The parties could not agree on the amount of just compensation for the taking, so the matter proceeded to trial. AIC argued it was statutorily entitled to attorney fees because Sound Transit failed to make a valid settlement offer 30 days before trial. Specifically, AIC argued that the 30-day offer Sound Transit made did not reflect the reduced temporary construction easement it ultimately obtained, making the offer ineffective or resulting in a total abandonment of the condemnation. AIC also sought a new trial, alleging the trial court erroneously allowed Sound Transit's counsel to question AIC's president about the taking valuation of an appraisal expert who did not testify. The Supreme Court, after review, affirmed the Court of Appeals: a condemnee is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 8.25.070(l)(a) only "[i]f[the] condemnor fails to make any written offer in settlement" at least 30 days before trial. Sound Transit made a timely settlement offer, which was not rendered ineffective by subsequent revisions to reduce the impact of its temporary construction easement. The Court was not persuaded by AIC's evidentiary objection, finding the trial court properly admitted the president's testimony under ER 80l(d)(2) as an admission of a party opponent. View "Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. v. Airport Inv. Co." on Justia Law

H.O. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her child, B.P. H.O., suffered from drug addiction, depression and other mental health issues, and the effects of long term childhood trauma. B.P., suffered too: she was born addicted to methamphetamine, endured withdrawal, was abandoned by H.O. during infancy, and experienced multiple disruptions when forming attachments with H.O. and various foster parents. On the other hand, after several tries, H.O. achieved sobriety; benefited from treatment in a structured environment; and became an attentive and caring mother to another child, A., in that structured environment. She also engaged in partially supervised, therapeutic visitation with B.P., and the two began to form what witnesses at the termination hearing called a social relationship with an emerging emotional attachment. Despite all that, the Department of Social and Health Services recommended termination of H.O.'s parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that where a child has special needs (here, special attachment needs); and where, as here, those special needs were exacerbated by the State's failure to timely provide necessary services to the biological parent; then the State has failed to prove this legislatively mandated prerequisite to termination (absent futility, which was not shown here). View "In re Welfare of B.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner Adrian Sutlej Samalia fled on foot from a stolen car during a lawful traffic stop, leaving his cell phone behind in the vehicle. After Samalia successfully escaped, the police searched the cell phone without a warrant and made contact with one of the numbers stored in the cell phone. That contact led to Samalia's identification as the owner of the phone and driver of the stolen vehicle. The State used this evidence against Samalia at trial. Samalia contends that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the State introduced the identification evidence derived from the search of his cell phone. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that although Samalia initially had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the cell phone and its data, he abandoned that interest when he voluntarily left the cell phone in a stolen vehicle while fleeing from a lawful traffic stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Samalia" on Justia Law

Nine employees of Western State Hospital (WSH) claimed that the hospital illegally took race into account when making staffing decisions in response to patients' race-based threats or demands. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court found that WSH managers issued a staffing directive that prevented African-American staff from working with a violent patient making threats over the course of one weekend in 2011. Despite this race-based staffing directive, the trial court entered a verdict for the State and dismissed Employees' employment discrimination claims. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's racially discriminatory staffing directive violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). View "Blackburn v. Washington" on Justia Law

A city of Lakewood police officer saw petitioner Robert Willis walk into the traffic lanes at Interstate 5's (I-5) northbound exit ramp on Gravelly Lake Drive. Willis carried a sign saying he was disabled and needed help. The officer issued Willis a criminal citation, not for walking into the traffic lane, blocking traffic, or disrupting pedestrian or vehicle progress, but for begging. Willis raised several challenges to the anti-begging ordinance under which he was charged (and later convicted). After review, the Washington Supreme Court found that Willis could challenge LMC 9A.04.020A(1) and (2) as facially overbroad regardless of his own conduct when cited. Because both provisions imposed a content-based speech restriction in a substantial number of traditional public forums, Willis' facial challenge succeeds. Thus, his conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Lakewood v. Willis" on Justia Law