Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In decriminalizing recreational use of cannabis, a Washington State initiative set the legal concentration limit for the psychoactive compound in cannabis, tetracannabinol (or THC), in the bloodstream. The initiative also amended the implied consent statute to direct police officers to warn drivers of the legal consequences of a breath test that revealed that THC concentration. No breath test available at the time measured THC concentrations in the blood. The Washington legislature has since amended the implied consent statute so that it no longer requires officers give the warning that suggested the then-current breath test measured something it could not. Before that amendment, Judith Murray and Darren Robison were given implied consent warnings that conformed to the ability of the breath test but not to the specific language of the statute. The issue these cases presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the breath test results should have been suppressed because the THC warnings were not given. The Court found that for the breath tests given, the warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted. View "Washington v. Murray" on Justia Law

Kevin Case was convicted of felony violation of a domestic violence no-contact order. Violating a no-contact order became a felony when an offender had at least two prior convictions for violating a no-contact order or similar order issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.110(5). Case stipulated that he had been convicted of violating no-contact orders before. However, his stipulation did not explicitly state that the previously violated orders had been issued under qualifying provisions listed in the statute. For the first time on appeal, Case argued the State failed to prove its case because his stipulation was inadequate. After review, the Supreme Court found that whether the prior convictions were issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.11 0(5) was a threshold legal matter to be decided by the judge and that Case's stipulation, in context, was sufficient. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Case's conviction. View "Washington v. Case" on Justia Law

Avnet Inc. was a New York corporation, headquartered in Arizona, and a major distributor of electronic components and computer technology worldwide. Avnet sold products through its headquarters in Arizona and through its many regional sales offices, including one in Redmond, Washington. Following an audit, the Washington State Department of Revenue (Department) determined that from 2003 to 2005, Avnet underreported its business and operations (B&O) tax liabilities by failing to include its national and drop-shipped sales in its tax filings. At issue in this appeal was whether national and drop-shipped sales were subject to Washington's B&O tax under the dormant commerce clause and the Department former "Rule 193." The Washington Supreme Court concluded that neither the dormant commerce clause nor Rule 193 barred the imposition of a B&O tax to Avnet's national and drop-shipped sales delivered in Washington. View "Avnet, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on under which of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s (UIFSA) choice of law rules Washington’s nonclaim statutes fell. Stephanie Bell and Juan Sidran Heflin were the parents of M.H. In 1994, Bell established paternity and obtained an order of child support from an Indiana circuit court. Bell and M.H. lived in Indiana at that time, but Heflin lived in Washington. In 2010, Bell registered the Indiana support order in King County, Washington for enforcement only. After various hearings, the King County Superior Court confirmed the Indiana support order. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement in 2011 where Heflin agreed to pay a sum of$120,000 in monthly payments of $2,000. After Heflin failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, Bell filed the motion for wage withholding in King County Superior Court at issue in this appeal. After finding that Indiana law applied, the superior court issued the wage withholding order. The Court of Appeals reversed the wage withholding order in an unpublished opinion, finding that Washington law applied and the trial court lacked the authority to issues the wage withholding order because a time period in RCW 4.56.210(2) had passed and the Indiana judgment had expired. Bell petitioned for review. Relying on the comments to the model UIFSA and other states' interpretations of it, the Washington Supreme Court held that under UIFSA's choice of law provision, a statute authorizing wage withholding was a "remedy," whereas a nonclaim statute was a "statute of limitation." After comparing the two statutes of limitations applicable in this case, the 20-year Indiana statute of limitation controlled because it was longer. Therefore, the trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for entry of judgment in Stephanie Bell's favor. View "In re Paternity of M.H." on Justia Law

A jury found Miguel Albarran guilty of several crimes, including second degree rape of a child and second degree rape, based on a single act. At sentencing, the parties and the trial court all agreed that the rape and child rape convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The remedy for a double jeopardy violation was vacation of the conviction for the lesser offense. Here, the trial court concluded that the lesser offense was second degree child rape and vacated that conviction Albarran appealed because the enhanced second degree rape carried a mandatory sentence of 25 years, while the vacated conviction did not. Albarran argued that a different and more important violation occurred in this case: a violation of the so-called "general-specific rule." The remedy for a violation of the "general-specific" rule was vacation of the conviction for the "general" offense. Albarran argued that the more general offense in this case was second degree rape. The Court of Appeals agreed with Albarran, vacated the conviction for second degree rape, reinstated the conviction for second degree rape of a child, and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in reaching its conclusion, and reversed the Court of Appeals. The original judgment and sentence were reinstated. View "Washington v. Albarran" on Justia Law

An employee of a nonprofit serving disabled adult clients used her position to embezzle more than half a million dollars held by the nonprofit for its clients. After the embezzlement was discovered, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, the nonprofit's insurance company, made the nonprofit whole. Travelers then sought contribution from the bank in federal court. By submitting certified questions of Washington law, that court has asked the Washington Supreme Court to decide, among other things, whether a nonpayee's signature on the back of a check was an indorsement. Furthermore, the Court was also asked whether claims based on unauthorized indorsements that are not discovered and reported to a bank within one year of being made available to the customer are time barred. The Supreme Court answered yes to both questions. View "Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Wash. Trust Bank" on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was convicted three times of killing John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed on appeal. Potential jurors in his third trial were given an initial written questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether any knew of Slert's prior convictions. Based on the written answers and after a discussion in chambers and out of Slert's presence, four jurors were dismissed. For the first time on appeal, Slert challenged his conviction on the grounds that the discussion in chambers violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his own trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Slert waived his right to raise his exclusion from the in chambers discussion by not raising it at trial. The Court also concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was clear the dismissed jurors had disqualifying knowledge of Slert's prior convictions or held disqualifying opinions about his guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

Jerry Swagerty raped a child in 2004, but he was not identified until DNA tests were done in 2012. Swagerty was charged well within the relevant statutes of limitations with first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. Because of his criminal history, he faced a life sentence if convicted as charged. In order to avoid a life sentence, Swagerty pleaded guilty to four lesser offenses in 2013. However, the statute of limitations had run on three of the amended charges. Swagerty sought to vacate those three convictions and be resentenced only on the one remaining charge. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may expressly waive an expired statute of limitations on lesser charges during plea negotiations to take advantage of a favorable plea offer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case back to the trial court with direction to allow Swagerty a choice of two options: (1) he could withdraw his personal restraint petition (effectively keeping to the plea bargain he made); or (2) he could keep the victory he won at the Court of Appeals and move to vacate the 2013 judgment and sentence, and the State would have the opportunity to refile the original charges. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty" on Justia Law