Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jamie Fast sought medical care because of difficulty conceiving and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. Upon first consulting with Dr. Adam Smith, she noted on her medical history forms that her grandmother had diabetes and her parents had high cholesterol. In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy-visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy. At an August 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff discovered Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal. A second test confirmed the high result was not a fluke. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips. Nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat; Jamie delivered a stillborn baby. She was diagnosed as an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since the stillbirth. The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) required filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence was or should have been discovered, whichever is later. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. The general torts catchall statute of limitations was also three years, but with no associated tolling provision. statute of limitations. Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, because the Fasts’ wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)) applied. View "Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist." on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on under which of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s (UIFSA) choice of law rules Washington’s nonclaim statutes fell. Stephanie Bell and Juan Sidran Heflin were the parents of M.H. In 1994, Bell established paternity and obtained an order of child support from an Indiana circuit court. Bell and M.H. lived in Indiana at that time, but Heflin lived in Washington. In 2010, Bell registered the Indiana support order in King County, Washington for enforcement only. After various hearings, the King County Superior Court confirmed the Indiana support order. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement in 2011 where Heflin agreed to pay a sum of$120,000 in monthly payments of $2,000. After Heflin failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, Bell filed the motion for wage withholding in King County Superior Court at issue in this appeal. After finding that Indiana law applied, the superior court issued the wage withholding order. The Court of Appeals reversed the wage withholding order in an unpublished opinion, finding that Washington law applied and the trial court lacked the authority to issues the wage withholding order because a time period in RCW 4.56.210(2) had passed and the Indiana judgment had expired. Bell petitioned for review. Relying on the comments to the model UIFSA and other states' interpretations of it, the Washington Supreme Court held that under UIFSA's choice of law provision, a statute authorizing wage withholding was a "remedy," whereas a nonclaim statute was a "statute of limitation." After comparing the two statutes of limitations applicable in this case, the 20-year Indiana statute of limitation controlled because it was longer. Therefore, the trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for entry of judgment in Stephanie Bell's favor. View "In re Paternity of M.H." on Justia Law

A jury found Miguel Albarran guilty of several crimes, including second degree rape of a child and second degree rape, based on a single act. At sentencing, the parties and the trial court all agreed that the rape and child rape convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The remedy for a double jeopardy violation was vacation of the conviction for the lesser offense. Here, the trial court concluded that the lesser offense was second degree child rape and vacated that conviction Albarran appealed because the enhanced second degree rape carried a mandatory sentence of 25 years, while the vacated conviction did not. Albarran argued that a different and more important violation occurred in this case: a violation of the so-called "general-specific rule." The remedy for a violation of the "general-specific" rule was vacation of the conviction for the "general" offense. Albarran argued that the more general offense in this case was second degree rape. The Court of Appeals agreed with Albarran, vacated the conviction for second degree rape, reinstated the conviction for second degree rape of a child, and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in reaching its conclusion, and reversed the Court of Appeals. The original judgment and sentence were reinstated. View "Washington v. Albarran" on Justia Law

An employee of a nonprofit serving disabled adult clients used her position to embezzle more than half a million dollars held by the nonprofit for its clients. After the embezzlement was discovered, Travelers Casualty & Surety Company, the nonprofit's insurance company, made the nonprofit whole. Travelers then sought contribution from the bank in federal court. By submitting certified questions of Washington law, that court has asked the Washington Supreme Court to decide, among other things, whether a nonpayee's signature on the back of a check was an indorsement. Furthermore, the Court was also asked whether claims based on unauthorized indorsements that are not discovered and reported to a bank within one year of being made available to the customer are time barred. The Supreme Court answered yes to both questions. View "Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Wash. Trust Bank" on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was convicted three times of killing John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed on appeal. Potential jurors in his third trial were given an initial written questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether any knew of Slert's prior convictions. Based on the written answers and after a discussion in chambers and out of Slert's presence, four jurors were dismissed. For the first time on appeal, Slert challenged his conviction on the grounds that the discussion in chambers violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his own trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Slert waived his right to raise his exclusion from the in chambers discussion by not raising it at trial. The Court also concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was clear the dismissed jurors had disqualifying knowledge of Slert's prior convictions or held disqualifying opinions about his guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

Jerry Swagerty raped a child in 2004, but he was not identified until DNA tests were done in 2012. Swagerty was charged well within the relevant statutes of limitations with first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. Because of his criminal history, he faced a life sentence if convicted as charged. In order to avoid a life sentence, Swagerty pleaded guilty to four lesser offenses in 2013. However, the statute of limitations had run on three of the amended charges. Swagerty sought to vacate those three convictions and be resentenced only on the one remaining charge. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may expressly waive an expired statute of limitations on lesser charges during plea negotiations to take advantage of a favorable plea offer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case back to the trial court with direction to allow Swagerty a choice of two options: (1) he could withdraw his personal restraint petition (effectively keeping to the plea bargain he made); or (2) he could keep the victory he won at the Court of Appeals and move to vacate the 2013 judgment and sentence, and the State would have the opportunity to refile the original charges. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty" on Justia Law

In June 2013, C.B.(mother) married R.B. (stepfather). C.B. and R.B. filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to C.W. (biological father) and adoption later that month of T.A.W., C.B.'s biological child and an "Indian child" under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). C.W. was non-Indian, but C.B. was, and an enrolled member of the Shoalwater Bay Tribe. C.W. had been incarcerated at the time of the termination petition on charges relating to drug abuse and domestic violence. C.W.'s parental rights were ultimately terminated. In reaching its decision, the trial court found that ICWA applied to the termination proceedings and that ICWA's requirements were met beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not require C.B. and R.B. to prove that active efforts were undertaken to remedy C.W.'s parental deficiencies prior to terminating his parental rights and made no finding to that effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding: (1) ICWA and WICWA protected non-Indian and Indian parents alike; (2) the trial court erred by not making an active efforts finding; (3) the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl," (133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)), was factually distinguishable; and (4) WICWA had no abandonment exception. C.B. and R.B. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded this case to the trial court so that it could reconsider the termination petition in light of those holdings. View "In re Adoption of T.A.W." on Justia Law

Highland High School quarterback Matthew Newman suffered a permanent brain injury at a football game in 2009, one day after he allegedly sustained a head injury at football practice. Three years later, Newman and his parents (collectively Newman) sued Highland School District No. 203 (Highland) for negligence. Before trial, Highland's counsel interviewed several former coaches and appeared on their behalf at their depositions. Newman moved to disqualify Highland's counsel, asserting a conflict of interest. The superior court denied the motion but ruled that Highland's counsel "may not represent non-employee witness[es] in the future." Newman then sought discovery concerning communications between Highland and the former coaches during time periods when the former coaches were unrepresented by Highland's counsel. Highland moved for a protective order, arguing its attorney-client privilege shielded counsel's communications with the former coaches. The trial court denied the motion, and Highland appealed. At issue was whether postemployment communications between former employees and corporate counsel should have been treated the same as communications with current employees for purposes of applying the corporate attorney-client privilege. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the privilege does not broadly shield counsel's postemployment communications with former employees. The superior court properly denied Highland's motion for a protective order. View "Newman v. Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203" on Justia Law

A police dog bit a police officer during a nighttime search for a burglary suspect in an abandoned building. Dog owners are usually strictly liable for dog bite damages. However, there is a statutory exception to strict liability for dog bites caused by the "lawful application of a police dog." At issue in this case was whether the County was strictly liable for an on-duty police dog biting an on-duty police officer. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of this case, the County was not subject to strict liability. View "Finch v. Thurston County" on Justia Law