Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jan DeMeerleer murdered Rebecca Schiering and her nine year old son Philip, and attempted to murder Schiering's older son, Brian Winkler. After the attack, DeMeerleer committed suicide. DeMeerleer had been an outpatient of psychiatrist Dr. Howard Ashby for nine years leading up to the attack, during which time he expressed suicidal and homicidal ideations but never named Schiering or her children as potential victims. At issue in this case was whether Ashby, as a mental health professional, owed DeMeerleer's victims a duty of care based on his relationship with DeMeerleer. After review, the Supreme Court held that Ashby and DeMeerleer shared a special relationship and that special relationship required Ashby to act with reasonable care, consistent with the standards of the mental health profession, to protect the foreseeable victims of DeMeerleer. Ashby conceded the existence of a special relationship between him and DeMeerleer; the foreseeability of DeMeerleer's victims was a question of fact appropriately resolved by the fact finder. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the medical negligence claim. View "Volk v. DeMeerleer" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the State could offer a driver's refusal to take a breath test under Washington's implied consent statute, RCW 46.20.308, as evidence of guilt at a criminal trial after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in “Missouri v. McNeely,” (133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)). In the two cases here, an officer asked each defendant to submit to a breath test. Dominic Baird agreed to the test; Collette Adams refused it. Baird's test results showed a BAC above the legal limit. Pretrial, both defendants moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the breath test was a request to consent to a warrantless search and they had a constitutional right to refuse consent. Consequently, the State could not use their refusal as evidence of guilt. Baird further argued that because the officer told him that his refusal could be used as evidence, the officer coerced his consent through an unlawful threat, thereby invalidating his consent. The State took the position that the defendants had no constitutional right to refuse because the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied in all DUI cases. Due to the body's natural elimination of alcohol from the bloodstream as time passes, the delay necessary to obtain a warrant is impractical since the delay will cause the destruction of DUI evidence. The Washington Supreme Court found that the district courts correctly rejected the State's argument that alcohol dissipation constituted exigency per se. The Court held that the implied consent statute did not authorize a warrantless search, and a driver has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test because such a search falls under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Further, although the implied consent statute gives a driver a statutory right to refuse the test, by exercising the privilege to drive, a driver consents to admitting that refusal to take the breath test into evidence. Accordingly, the Court held that a driver's refusal was admissible as evidence of guilt under Washington's implied consent law. View "Washington v. Baird" on Justia Law

Mark Black challenged his commitment as a sexually violent predator under chapter 71.09 RCW. He contended that his commitment had to be vacated because he was not present when some potential jurors were questioned individually in open court about their prior experiences with sexual abuse. After its review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded Black waived his right to be present while jurors were individually questioned about these sensitive subjects. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

Noel Caldellis shot into a crowd of people outside a party, killing one. He was charged with first degree murder "[u]nder circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." The jury was given a "to-convict" instruction modeled on the relevant pattern jury instruction, which itself was modeled on subsection RCW 9A.32.030(l)(b). After Caldellis' trial, the pattern jury committee amended the relevant pattern instruction to require an additional "element" that "the defendant knew of and disregarded the grave risk of death." Among other things, Caldellis argued his conviction should have been set aside because the jury was not required to find this new "element" in his case. The Supreme Court held the instruction given in Caldellis' trial included the required elements of the crime and was sufficient. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Caldellis" on Justia Law

Island County's board of commissioners hired Susan Drummond and her law office to provide legal services. Providing legal services was among the duties of county prosecuting attorneys as combined civil and criminal county counsel. Island County's prosecuting attorney, Gregory Banks, objected to Drummond's appointment because his office was able and willing to provide the necessary legal advice. Prosecutor Banks brought a quo warranto action challenging Drummond's usurpation of his elected public office. The superior court denied the claim on summary judgment, holding that the board of commissioners had the authority to freely hire outside counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the county board of commissioners did not possess statutory authority to appoint outside counsel over the objection of an able and willing prosecuting attorney. View "Washington ex rel. Banks v. Drummond" on Justia Law

The City of Bremerton, Kitsap County, and other defendants filed a motion to dismiss a civil suit filed by pro se litigant John Worthington. He responded by filing a special motion to strike under the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court denied the motion and imposed financial sanctions on Worthington on grounds that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. The Supreme Court found only that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court on the issue of the monetary sanction: the statute under which authority the trial court used in applying the sanctions was made invalid at the time of Worthington's anti-SLAPP motion. View "Worthington v. City of Bremerton" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Earl Flippo of four counts of child molestation in 2008. Flippo timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the verdict and sentence in 2010. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's first personal restraint petition (PRP) in 2011. In 2015, Flippo filed his second PRP, arguing for the first time that the sentencing court imposed discretionary legal financial obligations without having performed an individualized inquiry into his ability to pay. The Court of Appeals dismissed Flippo's PRP on the basis that it was untimely, and Flippo appealed that decision. The Washington Supreme Court granted discretionary review, found no reversible error in the dismissal of Flippo's case, and affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Flippo" on Justia Law

In decriminalizing recreational use of cannabis, a Washington State initiative set the legal concentration limit for the psychoactive compound in cannabis, tetracannabinol (or THC), in the bloodstream. The initiative also amended the implied consent statute to direct police officers to warn drivers of the legal consequences of a breath test that revealed that THC concentration. No breath test available at the time measured THC concentrations in the blood. The Washington legislature has since amended the implied consent statute so that it no longer requires officers give the warning that suggested the then-current breath test measured something it could not. Before that amendment, Judith Murray and Darren Robison were given implied consent warnings that conformed to the ability of the breath test but not to the specific language of the statute. The issue these cases presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the breath test results should have been suppressed because the THC warnings were not given. The Court found that for the breath tests given, the warnings did not omit any relevant part of the statute, accurately expressed the relevant parts of the statute, and were not misleading. Accordingly, the warnings substantially complied with the implied consent statute and the test results were properly admitted. View "Washington v. Murray" on Justia Law

Kevin Case was convicted of felony violation of a domestic violence no-contact order. Violating a no-contact order became a felony when an offender had at least two prior convictions for violating a no-contact order or similar order issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.110(5). Case stipulated that he had been convicted of violating no-contact orders before. However, his stipulation did not explicitly state that the previously violated orders had been issued under qualifying provisions listed in the statute. For the first time on appeal, Case argued the State failed to prove its case because his stipulation was inadequate. After review, the Supreme Court found that whether the prior convictions were issued under qualifying provisions listed in RCW 26.50.11 0(5) was a threshold legal matter to be decided by the judge and that Case's stipulation, in context, was sufficient. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Case's conviction. View "Washington v. Case" on Justia Law

Avnet Inc. was a New York corporation, headquartered in Arizona, and a major distributor of electronic components and computer technology worldwide. Avnet sold products through its headquarters in Arizona and through its many regional sales offices, including one in Redmond, Washington. Following an audit, the Washington State Department of Revenue (Department) determined that from 2003 to 2005, Avnet underreported its business and operations (B&O) tax liabilities by failing to include its national and drop-shipped sales in its tax filings. At issue in this appeal was whether national and drop-shipped sales were subject to Washington's B&O tax under the dormant commerce clause and the Department former "Rule 193." The Washington Supreme Court concluded that neither the dormant commerce clause nor Rule 193 barred the imposition of a B&O tax to Avnet's national and drop-shipped sales delivered in Washington. View "Avnet, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law