Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clark County Councilor Thomas Mielke filed recall charges essentially alleging that three fellow council members improperly held a vote in executive session, improperly designated The Columbian as the newspaper of record, and did not prevent the county executive from dissolving a county department. The superior court judge dismissed the charges as legally and factually insufficient, which Mielke appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Boldt" on Justia Law

Two companies applied for permits to expand their oil terminals on Grays Harbor. The issue here this case presented was whether the Ocean Resources Management Act (ORMA), applied to these expansion projects. The Shoreline Hearings Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals held that ORMA did not apply to these projects based on limited definitions in the Department of Ecology's (DOE) ORMA implementation regulations. The parties also contested whether these projects qualify as "ocean uses" or "transportation" under DOE's regulations. The Washington Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation improperly restricted ORMA, which was enacted to broadly protect against the environmental dangers of oil and other fossil fuels. The Supreme Court also held that these projects qualified as both ocean uses and transportation. And though not discussed by the parties or the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court found these projects qualified as "coastal uses" under DOE's regulations. Accordingly, it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further review under ORMA's provisions. View "Quinault Indian Nation v. City of Hoquiam" on Justia Law

A jury found Alexander Ortiz-Abrego guilty on charges of child rape. The trial court held a contested competency hearing. The court determined that Ortiz-Abrego was incompetent during his trial, though various accommodations suggested by an expert who evaluated him midtrial could have helped him follow the proceedings. The court ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court departed from the established competency standard by analyzing whether Ortiz-Abrego actually understood his trial and by injecting concepts from disability accommodations law. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse the wide discretion appropriate to competency determinations. "This case is unusual in that the competency hearing took place after the trial concluded. Viewing the record in that context, the trial court's consideration of the defendant's observed behavior during trial, and its discussion of whether accommodations could have been made, do not reflect a departure from the established competency standard." Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's ruling. View "Washington v. Ortiz-Abrego" on Justia Law

As a juvenile homicide offender facing a de facto life-without-parole sentence, petitioner Joel Rodriguez Ramos was entitled to a "Miller" hearing, just as a juvenile homicide offender facing a literal life-without-parole sentence would be. Based on the record presented, the Supreme Court found that that Ramos received a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing and he did not show that his aggregated 85-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Washington v. Rodriguez Ramos" on Justia Law

Guadalupe Solis-Diaz Jr. seeks review of a Court of Appeals decision vacating his sentence a second time and remanding for resentencing but declining to disqualify the sentencing judge. In 2007, 16-year-old Solis-Diaz was tried as an adult in connection with a drive-by shooting in Centralia and was convicted of six counts of first degree assault, each with a firearm enhancement; one count of drive-by shooting; and one count of second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. Judge Nelson Hunt imposed a standard range sentence of 1,111 months (92.6 years) of imprisonment. After his judgment and sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, Solis-Diaz filed a personal restraint petition challenging his sentence. The Court of Appeals ordered resentencing on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a sentencing report and properly inform the trial court that SolisDiaz's case had been automatically declined to adult court as a result of his age and the nature of the charges. At resentencing, again before Judge Hunt, the State noted recent changes in the law that allowed the judge to consider an offender's youth in deciding whether to impose an exceptional downward sentence, and it asked Judge Hunt to conduct an individualized determination of the propriety of an exceptional downward sentence for Solis-Diaz. Judge Hunt again imposed a prison sentence of 1,111 months, but in doing so, he commented on the Court of Appeals' holding that defense counsel had been ineffective in connection with the original sentencing. He found it "insulting" for the court to postulate that he would be "so ignorant, lazy, or stupid as to not know or inquire" why a teenage offender was in adult court, and that it was particularly insulting that the court presupposed that he did not "review the file or was so behind in the law not to know ... about the automatic adult jurisdiction" in Washington, and was even "ludicrous" given the judge's years practicing as a prosecutor and defense attorney and his work on juvenile justice issues. Solis-Diaz's request to disqualify Judge Hunt from presiding over resentencing was still declined. "Judge Hunt will be asked to exercise discretion on remand regarding the propriety of a sentence he has twice imposed, and the record reflects that he not only has strong opinions on sentencing generally and juvenile sentencing in particular, but also suggests he has already reached a firm conclusion about the propriety of a mitigated sentence in this case and may not be amenable to considering mitigating evidence with an open mind." As such, the Supreme Court reversed with respect to resentencing only, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Solis-Diaz" on Justia Law

Shacon Barbee was a pimp that made money from prostitutes working under his supervision. The State charged Barbee with two counts of promoting sexual abuse of a minor (SE), one count of first degree promoting prostitution (BK), one count of second degree promoting prostitution (CW), one count of leading organized crime, two counts of first degree theft from the Social Security Administration, and one count of second degree theft from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). The jury found Barbee guilty on all counts, except that they found him guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree promoting prostitution of BK. The jury made a special finding that promoting commercial sexual abuse of SE was part of a pattern of abuse over a "prolonged period of time," and the court imposed exceptional sentences of 420 months for the first two promoting commercial sexual abuse of a minor (PCSAM) convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed all of Barbee's convictions. At issue for the Supreme Court’s review was whether a pimp could be convicted on multiple counts of promoting prostitution when multiple prostitutes were involved. The Court had not previously considered the unit of prosecution for second degree promoting prostitution. In light of the statute's plain language and its prior decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the legislature expressed its clear intent to authorize multiple convictions when one pimp exploits multiple individuals. View "Washington v. Barbee" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Washington's vested rights doctrine excused compliance with the requirements of a municipal storm water permit. The Washington State Department of Ecology issued the third iteration of a municipal storm water permit pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program (established by the Act). Various permittees appealed this portion of the permit to the Pollution Control Hearings Board, claiming that it violated the vested rights doctrine because it compelled them to retroactively apply new storm water regulations to completed development applications. The Pollution Control Hearings Board held that the vested rights doctrine did not apply to storm water regulations permittees must implement as part of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting program. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the vested rights doctrine excused compliance with the storm water regulations because they were "land use control ordinances." Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, the Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Pollution Control Hearings Board's order. View "Snohomish County v. Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd." on Justia Law

Multiple cases were consolidated cases in this opinion, all stemming from a 2007 flood of the Chehalis River in Lewis County. In its first review, the Washington Supreme Court considered the trial court's orders dismissing the cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; a majority of the Court held that "RCW 4.12.010 relates to venue, not jurisdiction" and therefore "reverse[d] and remand[ed] for further proceedings." the respondents promptly moved to transfer venue to Lewis County in each case. Over the petitioners' objections, the trial court granted the respondents' motions. Those transfer orders were at issue here. The Supreme Court held that respondents did not waive their objections to proper venue for these actions, but that as a matter of statutory interpretation, RCW 4.12.010(1) did not provide for exclusive proper venue in Lewis County. King County was another possible proper venue in accordance with RCW 4.12.020(3) and 4.12.025(3). The Court therefore reversed the trial court's orders transferring venue to Lewis County to the extent those orders were based solely on exclusive proper venue. It was unclear from the record if the trial court considered whether venue should be transferred to Lewis County for the convenience to the witnesses, so the Court remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion on that issue in a manner consistent with its decision here. View "Ralph v. Weyerhaeuser Co." on Justia Law

Tenants Michael Brown and Jill Wahleithner received a notice of eviction from landlords Stephen Faciszewski and Virginia Klamon, invoking Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 22.206.160(C)(1)(e). In accordance with that provision, the notice stated Landlords were terminating the tenancy because "[Landlords] seek to possess the Property so that at least one immediate family member (or, in the alternative, one of us) may occupy the [Seattle] Property as a principal residence." Landlords subsequently clarified that Faciszewski's parents would be moving into the house so that Faciszewski could care for his ailing father. Following his father's death, Faciszewski indicated that only his mother planned to move into the house. Because of an earlier dispute, Tenants believed that Landlords' stated reason was pretext. Tenants thus began researching Faciszewski's parents on the Internet and found that Faciszewski's mother: (1) owned a home in Colorado that was not listed for sale or for rent; (2) she was scheduled to teach a class at a Colorado center in the fall; (3) she volunteered at a Colorado hospital for many years and continued to do so; and ( 4) she had not informed the center or the hospital of any plans to move. Citing this information, Tenants complained to the City, and in response Landlords filed with the City a certification of intent to carry out the stated reason. Because the certification provided that "[Faciszewski] or/and ... his mother" would occupy the property, Tenants continued to believe Landlords' stated reason was a pretext. Accordingly, Tenants refused to comply. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the trial court could consider evidence challenging just cause once the landlord filed the certification allowed under Seattle Municipal Code 22.206.160(C)(4). The court commissioner presiding over the show cause hearing set the matter for trial after determining that there were issues of fact as to the landlords' stated reason for the eviction. The King County Superior Court revised the commissioner's ruling, issued a writ of restitution restoring possession of the property to the landlords, and struck the trial date because "the statutory scheme does not require ... a trial once [the landlord files a] statement under penalty of perjury." The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law afforded the tenant to contest the eviction at the show cause hearing. View "Faciszewski v. Brown" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a certain governmental charge imposed on Indian tribes was a tax. After the legislature amended a statute to expand the types of tribal property that were eligible for a property tax: exemption, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe applied for and received an exemption on its Salish Lodge property pursuant to the amendment. As required by statute, the tribe negotiated and paid an amount to the county in lieu of taxes. The issue before the Washington Supreme Court centered on the constitutionality of this payment in lieu of tax (PILT). The Court found that the PILT was not a tax at all but, rather, a charge that tribes pay to compensate municipalities for public services provided to the exempt property. View "City of Snoqualmie v. King County Exec. Constantine" on Justia Law