Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case before the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, a consortium of over 130 institutions of higher education sued a group of 16 insurance carriers for denying their COVID-19 related claims. The insurance carriers had issued identical “all risk” property insurance policies to the institutions via the Educational & Institutional Insurance Administrators Inc. (EIIA). The colleges, including three in Washington, filed the suit in Pierce County Superior Court, Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment that their COVID-19 related losses were covered under the insurance policies. However, two of the defendant insurers filed a similar suit in Illinois, seeking a declaratory judgment that the losses were not covered by the policies.The insurers argued that the Washington court should dismiss the case based on forum non conveniens, asserting that Illinois was a more convenient forum due to the geographical distribution of the colleges. They also argued that the Illinois action should be allowed to proceed. The colleges, on the other hand, argued that the insurance policies' "suit against the company" clause allowed them to choose the forum and prohibited the insurers from seeking to alter that choice.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the lower court's decision, denying the motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and issuing an injunction against further proceedings in the Illinois action. The court held that the insurers had contractually agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of any court chosen by the insured and could not seek to transfer, change venue, or remove any lawsuit filed by the insured in such a court. The court also found that an injunction was appropriate under the circumstances to protect the colleges' contractual rights and prevent a manifest wrong and injustice. View "Pacific Lutheran Univ. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to consider a class action suit brought by patients against MultiCare Health System, Inc., a Washington corporation that operates Good Samaritan Hospital. The suit arose after a nurse employed by MultiCare, Cora Weberg, improperly diverted injectable narcotics for her own use and infected some emergency department patients with hepatitis C. The patients claimed that MultiCare failed to meet the accepted standard of care in supervising and hiring Nurse Weberg. The trial court divided the class into two groups: those who were assigned to Nurse Weberg and those who were not. It then dismissed the claims of the second group. The trial court ruled that legal causation was not satisfied because Nurse Weberg did not directly treat these patients. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.However, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed both courts and held that legal causation is satisfied. The court held that both classes can proceed with their chapter 7.70 RCW claims, which govern civil actions for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care. The court reasoned that the General Treatment Class's injuries arose as a result of health care, allowing their claim under chapter 7.70 RCW to proceed. The court also found that legal causation is satisfied when a hospital’s negligent supervision and hiring potentially exposes patients to a bloodborne pathogen, inducing fear and requiring blood testing. Thus, the court concluded that the General Treatment Class's claims should not have been dismissed. View "M.N. v. MultiCare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In Washington State, a second-tier subcontractor, Velazquez Framing LLC, was not paid for the work it did on property owned by Cascadia Homes Inc., a general contracting company. High End Construction LLC, who had been contracted by Cascadia, subcontracted the work to Velazquez without informing Cascadia. After completing the work, Velazquez filed a lien for labor and materials without giving prelien notice, which resulted in a dispute over whether prelien notice was required for labor liens under Chapter 60.04 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW). The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled that, based on the plain language of the relevant statutes and legislative history, prelien notice is not required for labor liens. The court noted that while Velazquez could not lien for its materials and equipment without providing prelien notice, it could lien for its labor. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the value of the labor performed. The court's decision reversed the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, both of which had concluded that prelien notice was required. View "Velazquez Framing, LLC v. Cascadia Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington found that the initiation fees charged by Royal Oaks Country Club, a nonprofit corporation, are fully deductible from the business and occupation (B&O) tax under RCW 82.04.4282. The statute permits taxpayers to deduct "bona fide" initiation fees, among other things, from their B&O tax. The court held that these initiation fees were "bona fide" as they were paid solely for the privilege of membership, and did not automatically entitle a member to use any service or facility of the club. The court differentiated between dues and initiation fees, noting that the statute treats these two terms separately. The court rejected the Washington Department of Revenue's argument that a portion of the initiation fee was for access to facilities and thus not subject to the exemption, stating that there is a difference between access and use. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that Royal Oaks' initiation fees qualify as bona fide initiation fees and are therefore wholly deductible. View "Royal Oaks Country Club v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered two questions certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding a university's duty of care towards its students. The plaintiff, a student, alleged that the defendant university was negligent in failing to protect her from being raped by a fellow student, who had prior complaints of sexual misconduct, at an off-campus party. The first question asked whether under Washington law a university has a special relationship with its students that gives rise to a duty to use reasonable care to protect them from foreseeable harm caused by other students. The Court answered yes, indicating that such a relationship exists as defined by the common law principles laid out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344. This duty applies when a student is on campus or participating in university-sponsored activities. The second question asked about the scope of this duty. The Court determined that the duty applies within the confines of the university campus or at university-controlled events, and is based on a student's enrollment and presence on campus. The Court did not extend this duty to off-campus situations or situations not under the university's control. Therefore, the Court concluded that the university was not liable for the plaintiff's off-campus assault. View "Barlow v. State" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, a minor and her parents, sued their health insurer, Premera Blue Cross, for denying coverage for the minor’s stay in a wilderness therapy program, claiming that the denial violates mental health parity laws. The plaintiffs also alleged breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and violation of the Consumer Protection Act.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim based on alleged violation of federal parity laws does not form a viable common law action. The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that a violation of federal parity law would give rise to a viable common law action for breach of contract.Furthermore, the Court held that the breach of contract action based on Premera's alleged violation of state parity laws could not succeed based on the statutory language that was in place at the time.However, the Court did affirm the lower court’s finding that the plaintiffs were not required to produce evidence of objective symptomatology to support their insurance bad faith claim for emotional distress damages. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the bad faith and Consumer Protection Act claims. View "P.E.L. v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that detained workers at a privately owned and operated immigration detention center are considered "employees" under Washington's Minimum Wage Act (MWA), and are thus entitled to receive the state's minimum wage for their work. The court rejected arguments from the detention center operator, The GEO Group, that the detained workers should be exempt from the MWA because they resided and slept at their place of employment. The court also disagreed with GEO's claim that the MWA's government-institutions exemption applied to the detainees because the facility was operated under contract with the federal government. The court found the government-institutions exemption only applies to detainees in public, government-run institutions, and not in privately owned and operated facilities. Finally, the court ruled that a damages award to one party (a class of detainees) does not prevent another party (the State of Washington) from seeking equitable relief in the form of an unjust enrichment award. The case stemmed from lawsuits brought by the State and a class of detainees alleging that GEO's practice of paying detainees less than Washington's minimum wage violated the MWA. After a lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, GEO appealed, leading to the certification of questions to the Washington Supreme Court. View "Nwauzor v. The GEO Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

In Washington, a couple, the Lewises, moved into a rental property owned by another couple, the Ridgways. After the Lewises moved out, a dispute arose over the return of their security deposit. The Ridgways claimed the Lewises caused damage to the property and deducted repair costs from the deposit. The Lewises disputed these charges, and the case was sent to arbitration. During arbitration, the Lewises were awarded the full amount of their security deposit, but the Ridgways were given attorney fees under the small claims statute. The Lewises attempted to appeal the arbitration award and a pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. However, the Lewises did not personally sign their request for a trial de novo, a requirement under court rules and the arbitration statute.The Washington Supreme Court held that the Lewises' request for a trial de novo was ineffective because they did not personally sign the request, as required by the court rule and the arbitration statute. The court also held that, absent a valid request for a trial de novo, the Lewises could not appeal the pre-arbitration order granting partial summary judgment to the Ridgways. The court further stated that the question of who should be considered the prevailing party for the purpose of any attorney fee award needed further consideration, and remanded the case back to the lower court for determination of attorney fees. View "Crossroads Mgmt., LLC v. Ridgway" on Justia Law

In the State of Washington, a man named Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery. He was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel, during which the judge set bail among other things. Heng argued that counsel should have been present at this hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed, noting that a person charged with a crime has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions and under court rules. However, the court found that Heng did not demonstrate that the hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and it believed that the absence of counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.The facts of the case reveal that Heng was implicated in a robbery at Sifton Market during which Amy Hooser was killed. Surveillance footage showed Heng at the scene with a blood-stained shirt and a lighter in his hands. He was charged the next day with first degree murder, first degree robbery, and first degree arson. Heng was held in jail for 31 months before his trial, during which time he made inconsistent statements during recorded phone calls about the events of the night of the crime. He was eventually convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson and was sentenced to 374 months in prison.Heng appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while Heng should have had counsel present at his preliminary hearing, this did not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. The court also noted that in order for an error to be considered structural and thus necessitate automatic reversal, it must have substantively affected the outcome of the case. The court determined that Heng’s case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. As such, the court applied constitutional harmless error analysis, which requires the court to reverse unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that the failure to have counsel present at Heng’s preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "State v. Heng" on Justia Law

Michael Shawn Charlton was arrested and charged with third-degree child rape, third-degree child molestation, and indecent liberties. He appeared in preliminary hearings without counsel, which he argued on appeal was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel at critical stages of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the absence of counsel was indeed a constitutional error, it did not constitute a critical stage of litigation requiring automatic reversal. The court reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that Charlton's rights were lost, defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or that the outcome of the case was otherwise substantially affected by the absence of counsel. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in not having counsel present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because there was no evidence to suggest that the lack of counsel affected the verdict in any way. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Charlton" on Justia Law