Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved interpretation of chapter 7.90 RCW, the Sexual Assault Protection Order (SAPO) Act. In this case, the commissioner granted petitioner Megan Roake's temporary SAPO, and it was served. Respondent Maxwell Delman moved to dismiss, challenging both the assertion of nonconsensual assault and the claim of reasonable fear of future dangerous conduct. At the later hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that Roake's petition was legally insufficient because the petition failed to allege a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. Roake appealed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that the final order statute, RCW 7.90.090, did not require proof of a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. It further held that the SAPO Act provided no basis for considering the validity of the temporary order in determining whether to grant a final protection order. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCW 7.90.130(2)(e) provided the procedure and opportunity to contest the sufficiency and validity of the petition and temporary order, and that the trial court correctly held that Roake's petition was legally insufficient under RCW 7.90.020(1). View "Roake v. Delman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the invited error doctrine applied to Hector Serano Salinas's personal restraint petition (PRP), which argued for the first time on collateral review that his public trial right was violated by private questioning of some potential jurors in chambers and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the public trial right violation on direct review. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held Salinas invited the courtroom closure error that he now argued on appeal, and was precluded from raising that error. Further, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Weaver v. Massachusetts, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), the Washington Court held Salinas's assertion of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed because he did not meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the courtroom closure error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Serano Salinas" on Justia Law

Landowners Harlan and Maxine Douglass (Douglass) brought a private right of action against Shamrock Paving Inc. under the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA), chapter 70.105DRCW, to recover costs incurred from an alleged remedial action. Shamrock trespassed onto Douglass' vacant property and spilled an unknown amount of lube oil.Douglass paid for soil testing and soil removal to clean up his property and sought recovery of those costs under the MTCA. At issue for the Washington Supreme Court's consideration was the interpretation of "remedial action" within the statute, whether the lube oil on Douglass' property created a "potential threat" to human health or the environment, in addition to which party would thus be considered the "prevailing party." The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that Douglass' soil testing was a remedial action, but the soil removal was not. The Court also reversed the appellate court's prevailing party designation because it was premature. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Douglass v. Shamrock Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth Wright received an unsolicited text message that appeared to come from an acquaintance inviting him to download Lyft's cellphone application. Wright sued as a putative class member. The federal district court has certified questions of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court pertaining to the Washington Consumer Electronic Mail Act (CEMA) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The questions centered on whether (1) the recipient of a text message that violates the CEMA has a private right of action for damages (as opposed to injunctive relief) directly under the statute; and (2) whether the liquidated damages provision of CEMA establish a causation and/or injury elements of a claim under the CPA, or must a recipient of a text in violation of CEMA prove injury-in-fact before s/he can recover the liquidated amount. The Washington Supreme Court answered "no" to the first question, and "yes" to the second. View "Wright v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2015, the city of Spokane (City) enacted an ordinance that granted a local property tax exemption to senior citizens and disabled veterans. Relying on a letter by the Washington Department of Revenue (DOR), the Spokane County assessor and treasurer (collectively County) refused to implement the ordinance, believing it to violate the Washington Constitution, Article VII, Sections 1, 9 and 10. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court in this case was whether the City's ordinance indeed violated the Washington Constitution's uniform property tax requirement. The trial court ruled that the ordinance was constitutional and issued a writ requiring the County to apply it. DOR filed a motion to intervene, and both DOR and the County appealed the trial court's ruling. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the City's ordinance was unconstitutional. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Spokane v. Horton" on Justia Law

Following a search of Marco Wences' car in 2003, the State charged him with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to manufacture or deliver. The State also alleged that Wences was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crime. A jury convicted Wences of all charges in 2005. The trial court instructed the jury that a firearm was a deadly weapon, and the jury answered "yes" to a special verdict form that asked whether Wences was "armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime." The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the rule announced in Washington v. Williams-Walker, 225 P.3d 913 (2010), applied to appellate review of Wences' 2015 sentence. Williams-Walker held that the Washington Constitution prohibited a sentencing court from imposing a firearm enhancement based on a deadly weapon special verdict finding. In 2005, Wences did not appear for a scheduled sentencing hearing. Concluding that Wences "should not benefit from changes in the law that apply to him solely because he absconded and delayed his sentencing," the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court's decision to impose the firearm enhancement based on pre-Williams-Walker law. The Washington Supreme Court held, however, that this result was impermissible under settled law. The Court therefore reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for resentencing consistent with Williams-Walker. View "Washington v. Wences" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on application of RCW 9.73.030 of the Washington privacy act to an inadvertent recording on a cell phone voice mail of a domestic violence assault. The Court held that the recording in this case did not contain a "conversation" within the meaning of the privacy act. Further, even if the recorded verbal exchange here could be considered a private conversation within the privacy act, nevertheless an exception contained in the privacy act applies, rendering the recording admissible. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals to the extent it held otherwise. View "Washington v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Joseph was convicted of second degree criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of second degree vehicle prowling. He challenged his conviction on the ground that unlawful entry into a vehicle is not a trespass "in or upon premises of another." This case presented a “challenging” question of statutory interpretation because of the overlapping and intersecting definitions of "building" and "premises" in Title 9A RCW. The Court of Appeals affirmed Joseph's conviction, concluding that a vehicle was a "premises" for the purpose of the second degree trespass statute because a vehicle is a type of "building" and "premises" includes "any building." The Washington Supreme Court concluded the legislature plainly intended second degree criminal trespass to encompass trespass into any "building" as defined in the criminal code, RCW 9A.04.110(5), save for trespass into a building in its ordinary sense. This interpretation properly restricts first degree trespass to unlawful entries into ordinary "buildings," a descriptor that needed no further definition. The more severe charge (a gross misdemeanor) was justified by the increased likelihood of trespass into a home or business. All other trespasses fall under the term "premises" and are treated as simple misdemeanors. RCW 9A.52.080. This includes trespasses into premises that are "buildings" broadly conceived, but are not ordinarily thought of as buildings—as relevant here, vehicles. View "Washington v. Joseph" on Justia Law

In 2015, a Chelan County deputy sheriff arrested Robert Bowie for driving while under the influence (DUI). Bowie received appropriate RCW 46.20.308 warnings about his right to refuse a breath test, signed the implied consent form, and agreed to take that breath test. But 20 minutes later, just before administering the test, the deputy asked Bowie if he would provide a "voluntary" sample. This time Bowie declined. The State charged Bowie with DUI plus a refusal enhancement. The district court granted Bowie's motion to suppress evidence of his refusal. It ruled that the deputy's statement that the test was "voluntary" was "inaccurate[]" and "potentially" misleading. The Superior Court then denied the State's interlocutory petition for a writ of review. The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review of that decision and affirmed. The Supreme Court held RCW 7.16.040 governed the availability of the writ of review in superior court. This statutory writ of certiorari is an "extraordinary remedy." Superior court review via writ was not available in this case. View "Washington v. Chelan County Dist. Court" on Justia Law

At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in ruling that 29A.80.061 was invalid under the First Amendment. Also at issue was whether the bill containing the statute violated the single subject or subject in title requirements of article II, section 19 of the Washington Constitution. RCW 29A.80.061 requires political parties to elect, rather than appoint, legislative district chairs for each legislative district. Appellant Andrew Pilloud, acting pro se, sought to enforce the statute against the King County Republican Central Committee (Committee), which, by bylaw, had long chosen to appoint its legislative district chairs. The superior court concluded that the statute violated a political party's right to free association under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Pilloud appealed this decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding RCW 29A.80.061 violated the Committee's freedom of association. View "Pilloud v. King County Republican Cent. Comm." on Justia Law