Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Erik Petterson has been serving a term of community custody under a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) for over 15 years. After Petterson successfully completed treatment, the court removed most of his community custody conditions. The Washington State Department of Corrections (Department) sought to ensure that while Petterson was on community custody, he was required to comply with department-imposed conditions. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether trial courts had to require this condition and whether courts had authority to modify community custody conditions after terminating treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ultimate holding that the superior court did not have the authority to remove the department-compliance condition. However, the Supreme Court held: (1) the hearing in 2008 was an extended part of the treatment termination hearing that began in 2005; and (2) after imposing a SSOSA, courts retain jurisdiction and may modify discretionary community custody conditions even after treatment is terminated. View "Washington v. Petterson" on Justia Law

Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman sought to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw was a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he had to show that his plea was involuntary, and actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old (Buckman's age at the time of the offense). But the Court also held he was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he failed to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, the Supreme Court denied the motion to withdraw and remanded for resentencing only. View "Washington v. Buckman" on Justia Law

In 2002, Heidi Fero called emergency responders seeking help for an injured child. Minutes later, paramedics arrived and found fifteen-month-old Brynn Ackley unconscious and limp, with bruising on her face. Brynn's treating physicians later determined that she had suffered severe and debilitating injuries consistent with shaken baby syndrome. Fero was charged and convicted of first degree child assault. In 2014, many years after her judgment became final, she filed a personal restraint petition contending that the medical community's evolving understanding of shaken baby syndrome was newly discovered evidence that would undermine the expert evidence as to the causes and timing of Brynn's injuries. The Washington Supreme Court held that this evidence would not have changed the result at trial, and therefore dismissed Fero's petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Fero" on Justia Law

The Spokane Valley Fire Department (SVFD) fired Captain Jonathan Sprague for persistently including religious comments in e-mails that he sent through the SVFD computer systems and items he posted on the SVFD electronic bulletin board. Sprague sued the Department for violating his First Amendment free speech rights. The trial court and Court of Appeals declined to address the merits of Sprague's claims, instead concluding that his earlier, unsuccessful appeal to the Spokane County Civil Service Commission (Commission) collaterally estopped his lawsuit. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding Sprague met his initial burden to show that SVFD's restrictions on his speech violated the First Amendment. On remand, the burden will shift to SVFD to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's employment termination even in the absence of the protected conduct. View "Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

This case involved an issue of whether the purchaser of a lien release bond was an indispensable party in an action under chapter 60.04 RCW by a lien claimant against the surety of the release bond. Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Company entered into an agreement to supply drywall materials to Eastern Washington Drywall & Paint (EWD&P). EWD&P contracted with Fowler General Construction to work on an apartment complex in Richland, Washington. Inland Empire claims EWD&P never paid it for the materials supplied. To pursue payment, Inland Empire filed a preclaim notice and timely recorded a mechanics' lien against the construction project under RCW 60.04.091. To release the project property from the lien. Fowler obtained a lien release bond in the amount of $186,979.57 from Western Surety Company. The lien release bond identified Fowler as the "Principal," Western as the "Surety," and Inland Empire as the "Obligee." The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the surety and held that a claim against a lien release bond could be pursued solely against the surety. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Inland Empire Dry Wall Supply Co. v. W. Sur. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner Eduardo Sandoval was a member of the Tacoma-based Eastside Lokotes Surefios (ELS) gang. In a stolen van, ELS members pulled up to a car and fired no less than 12 gunshots from at least two firearms into the passenger door. The driver, Camilla Love, was hit three times and died from her injuries. The passenger, Joshua Love, was hit two times but survived. The van occupants targeted the Loves on the mistaken belief that Joshua Love was a Pirus gang member. At the time, the van occupants were seeking out rival Pirus members to retaliate for an earlier driveby shooting targeting ELS members, including Sandoval. In this personal restraint petition (PRP) concerning complicity charges based on murder by extreme indifference, the Washington Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s contentions that accomplice liability for murder by extreme indifference and conspiracy to commit murder by extreme indifference were not cognizable offenses. Furthermore, the Court held the trial court erred in failing to give a requested lesser included instruction on manslaughter, and on this limited basis the Court granted the PRP and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Sandoval" on Justia Law

This case involved interpretation of chapter 7.90 RCW, the Sexual Assault Protection Order (SAPO) Act. In this case, the commissioner granted petitioner Megan Roake's temporary SAPO, and it was served. Respondent Maxwell Delman moved to dismiss, challenging both the assertion of nonconsensual assault and the claim of reasonable fear of future dangerous conduct. At the later hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, holding that Roake's petition was legally insufficient because the petition failed to allege a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. Roake appealed the dismissal, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that the final order statute, RCW 7.90.090, did not require proof of a reasonable fear of future dangerous acts. It further held that the SAPO Act provided no basis for considering the validity of the temporary order in determining whether to grant a final protection order. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that RCW 7.90.130(2)(e) provided the procedure and opportunity to contest the sufficiency and validity of the petition and temporary order, and that the trial court correctly held that Roake's petition was legally insufficient under RCW 7.90.020(1). View "Roake v. Delman" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the invited error doctrine applied to Hector Serano Salinas's personal restraint petition (PRP), which argued for the first time on collateral review that his public trial right was violated by private questioning of some potential jurors in chambers and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the public trial right violation on direct review. Based on the particular circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held Salinas invited the courtroom closure error that he now argued on appeal, and was precluded from raising that error. Further, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Weaver v. Massachusetts, U.S. , 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017), the Washington Court held Salinas's assertion of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel failed because he did not meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the courtroom closure error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Serano Salinas" on Justia Law

Landowners Harlan and Maxine Douglass (Douglass) brought a private right of action against Shamrock Paving Inc. under the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA), chapter 70.105DRCW, to recover costs incurred from an alleged remedial action. Shamrock trespassed onto Douglass' vacant property and spilled an unknown amount of lube oil.Douglass paid for soil testing and soil removal to clean up his property and sought recovery of those costs under the MTCA. At issue for the Washington Supreme Court's consideration was the interpretation of "remedial action" within the statute, whether the lube oil on Douglass' property created a "potential threat" to human health or the environment, in addition to which party would thus be considered the "prevailing party." The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that Douglass' soil testing was a remedial action, but the soil removal was not. The Court also reversed the appellate court's prevailing party designation because it was premature. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Douglass v. Shamrock Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

Kenneth Wright received an unsolicited text message that appeared to come from an acquaintance inviting him to download Lyft's cellphone application. Wright sued as a putative class member. The federal district court has certified questions of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court pertaining to the Washington Consumer Electronic Mail Act (CEMA) and the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The questions centered on whether (1) the recipient of a text message that violates the CEMA has a private right of action for damages (as opposed to injunctive relief) directly under the statute; and (2) whether the liquidated damages provision of CEMA establish a causation and/or injury elements of a claim under the CPA, or must a recipient of a text in violation of CEMA prove injury-in-fact before s/he can recover the liquidated amount. The Washington Supreme Court answered "no" to the first question, and "yes" to the second. View "Wright v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law