Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff James Bearden sued Dolphus McGill after they were involved in a car accident. They went to mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded plaintiff Bearden $44,000.00 in damages. Bearden moved for statutory costs under RCW 4.84.010 as the prevailing party. The arbitrator, consistent with MAR 6.4(d), filed an amended award granting the fee request. The amended award granted $1,187.00 in costs to the plaintiff, amounting to a total award of $45,187.00. Defendant McGill requested a trial de novo. At trial, the jury awarded Bearden $42,500.00 in damages and $3,296.39 in RCW 4.84.010 costs for a total award of $45,796.39. Bearden moved for attorney fees under MAR 7.3, arguing that McGill had not improved his position at trial because the trial award of $45,796.39 exceeded the arbitral award of $45,187.00. The trial judge agreed and awarded Bearden $71,800.00 in attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the trial. McGill appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including trial costs in the MAR 7.3 comparison. The Court of Appeals vacated the award of attorney fees and costs to Bearden, holding that the proper comparison was between the common elements of the awards in both proceedings, including only "those costs and fees litigated before both the arbitrator and trial court." The Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed that the determination of whether a requesting party's position was improved should follow the reasoning of an ordinary person. Accordingly, the Court held that statutory costs should be included. The Court of Appeals was therefore reversed. View "Bearden v. McGill" on Justia Law

This case concerned a recent law school graduate's application to sit for the Washington State Bar Examination. Tarra Denelle Simmons had a history involving long-term substance abuse, multiple criminal convictions, and two bankruptcies. However, in the approximately five and a half years preceding her application to sit for the bar exam, Simmons successfully engaged in treatment for her substance abuse and childhood trauma. She maintained her sobriety since September 2011 and was not accused of any criminal or unethical behavior since then. The Washington Supreme Court found Simmons was entirely candid about her past when she applied to sit for the summer 2017 bar exam, and she readily provided further information as requested by counsel for the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA). Bar counsel referred Simmons' application to the WSBA Character and Fitness Board (Board), which recommended by a vote of six to three that Simmons' application be denied. The Supreme Court then reviewed her application and the Board's recommendation, heard oral argument, and granted Simmons' application in a unanimous order later that day. In this opinion, the Washington Court explained the reasons for its decision. View "In Bar Application of Simmons" on Justia Law

This case concerned a recent law school graduate's application to sit for the Washington State Bar Examination. Tarra Denelle Simmons had a history involving long-term substance abuse, multiple criminal convictions, and two bankruptcies. However, in the approximately five and a half years preceding her application to sit for the bar exam, Simmons successfully engaged in treatment for her substance abuse and childhood trauma. She maintained her sobriety since September 2011 and was not accused of any criminal or unethical behavior since then. The Washington Supreme Court found Simmons was entirely candid about her past when she applied to sit for the summer 2017 bar exam, and she readily provided further information as requested by counsel for the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA). Bar counsel referred Simmons' application to the WSBA Character and Fitness Board (Board), which recommended by a vote of six to three that Simmons' application be denied. The Supreme Court then reviewed her application and the Board's recommendation, heard oral argument, and granted Simmons' application in a unanimous order later that day. In this opinion, the Washington Court explained the reasons for its decision. View "In Bar Application of Simmons" on Justia Law

This case required the Washington Supreme Court to consider the "independent source doctrine," a recognized exception to the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. The superior court admitted into evidence Ray Betancourth's cell phone records, which were initially obtained under a jurisdictionally invalid district court warrant. In 2012, Betancourth assembled a group of friends to look for Terrance Frank, whom Betancourth suspected of breaking his car windows a few days earlier. Betancourth drove the group around in his pickup truck until they located Frank walking down the sidewalk with two other men, Jordan Lemus and Jose Rodriguez. Betancourth's group exited the truck and chased after Frank, Lemus, and Rodriguez. Betancourth turned back after realizing he had left his truck running, while his friends chased Lemus and Rodriguez into an alley. Betancourth's friend, Marco Cardenas, pulled out a pistol and fired twice, killing Rodriguez. Almost a year after Betancourth's arrest, a superior court judge ruled in a separate case that RCW 10.96.060 authorized only superior courts to issue warrants for the records of out-of-state companies. Based on this ruling, police obtained a new warrant for Betancourth’s Verizon phone records. Though a valid superior court warrant was subsequently issued, police did not physically return and reseize the evidence. In upholding admission of the cell phone records, the Court of Appeals fashioned what it deemed an "invalidity correction corollary" to the independent source doctrine Betancourth argued this corollary improperly interjected reasonableness or good faith considerations that were incompatible with Washington constitutional privacy rights. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: “[w]hile we do not embrace the notion of an ‘invalidity correction corollary,’ we agree with the lower courts that the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case. We hold that Betancourth's cell phone records were admissible under our existing independent source doctrine.” View "Washington v. Betancourth" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of Washington law to the Washington Supreme Court. The underlying case involved an insurance coverage dispute between two authorized foreign insurers, Ohio Security Insurance Company and AXIS Insurance Company. Ohio Security tried to serve AXIS at its office in Chicago, Illinois, rather than through the Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner. The United States District Court asked whether Washington law established service through the Washington State Insurance Commissioner (Insurance Commissioner) as the exclusive means of service for authorized foreign insurers in Washington. The answer to the certified question was yes: RCW 4.28.080(7)(a) provided the exclusive means of service on authorized foreign insurers. View "Ohio Sec. Ins. Co. v. AXIS Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether there were any limitations on the scope of a community corrections officer’s search. “It is well established that an individual on probation has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a community corrections officer (CCO) may conduct a warrantless search if he or she suspects the individual has violated a probation condition.” The Washington Supreme Court held article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution required a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. There was no nexus in the search at issue here. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and petitioner Curtis Cornwell’s convictions. View "Washington v. Cornwell" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of whether and to what extent superior courts have authority to intervene in the administration of nonintervention estates. Todd Rathbone was named personal representative of his mother's estate in her nonintervention will. Glen Rathbone, Todd's' brother and beneficiary of the will, took issue with Todd's administration of the estate and filed a petition requesting an accountancy under RCW 11.68.110. He then filed an action under chapter 11.96A RCW, the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), requesting the trial court construe the will in his favor. The trial court held it had the authority to construe the will under RCW 11.68.070 and, in the alternative, TEDRA itself gave the trial court authority to construe the will. The court ruled in favor of Glen's construction of the will and overrode the interpretation of Todd. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the trial court had authority to construe the will but on the separate basis that Glen had invoked authority under RCW 11.68.110 when he filed his petition for an accounting. The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutory provisions under TEDRA did not give the trial court authority to construe the will in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the authority invoked under the nonintervention statutes, such as RCW 11.68.110 and .070, was limited to resolving issues provided under each statute. View "In re Estate of Rathbone" on Justia Law

FutureSelect Portfolio Management Inc. sought to challenge a 2011 Superior Court order granting KPMG LLP's motion to compel arbitration. Lead plaintiff FutureSelect was headquartered in Washington state, and managed a number of investment funds. The second named defendant, Tremont Partners Inc., was headquartered in New York and served as the general partner to the Rye Funds, whose status as feeder funds to Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS) was at the heart of this dispute. Tremont allegedly offered FutureSelect a valuable opportunity to invest with BMIS, and made assurances regarding its oversight and understanding of BMIS's operation. Relying on these assurances and the audit opinions of the accounting firm hired by Tremont, FutureSelect decided to invest in the Rye Funds in 1998. Between 1998 and late 2008, when BMIS's Ponzi scheme finally came to light, FutureSelect continued investing additional funds in the Rye Funds allegedly based on the representations it regularly received from Tremont and its auditors. In all, FutureSelect invested $195 million with Tremont. FutureSelect argued that the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing its appeal as untimely because either the relevant law changed after 2011 in the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Hill V. Garda CL Northwest, Inc., 308 P.3d 635 (2013), the 2016 appeal followed entry of a final judgment against another defendant, or discretionary review was appropriate. Because none of these rationales provided a basis for FutureSelect's untimely appeal, the Washington Court upheld the Court of Appeals' order of dismissal. View "Futureselect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Fletcher was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault and related crimes in 2013. The judge ordered him committed. Fletcher initiated the process for obtaining release in 2015 by mailing a motion for release directly to the superior court judge. The court directed Fletcher to file with Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) instead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s consideration centered on the self-petition process. If a criminal defendant was acquitted due to insanity, the judge must then decide what to do with him or her. An acquitted person who constitutes a substantial danger to others, or who presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under further control of the court, other persons, or institutions, "shall" be committed under Washington’s involuntary commitment statute, RCW 10.77.110(1). If those safety concerns disappear, the insanity acquittee must be released. Either DSHS or the insanity acquittee may initiate the process for obtaining such release. The Court held that the insanity acquittee may petition the court directly for conditional release. Furthermore, he or she is entitled to legal counsel once a petition for conditional release is filed with the court or an application for release is submitted to DSHS. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Fletcher" on Justia Law