Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed lower courts' decisions in four cases which all presented the same issue: whether Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority could condemn Seattle's electrical transmission line easements located in the city of Bellevue to extend the Transit's regional light rail system. The Supreme Court held that Sound Transit had the statutory authority to condemn the easement, and the condemnation met public use and necessity requirements. The Court remanded the cases back to the trial court, however, for consideration of the prior public use doctrine, and for a finding on whether the two public uses were compatible. View "Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. v. WR-SRI 120th N. LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statutory interpretation of the portion of RCW 9.41.040 dealing with the requirements for restoration of firearm rights. In 1991, Edgar Dennis, III was convicted of second degree robbery, third degree assault and two counts of felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. In 1998, Dennis was convicted on third degree assault. The 1991 convictions disqualified him from possessing a firearm. After serving his sentence, he lived in the community for over fifteen years without a conviction. Then in 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor first degree negligent driving. In 2016, Dennis petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights without disclosing the 2014 conviction. The State objected, informing the trial court of the 2014 conviction. The State argued the statutory requirement of a five-year conviction-free period had to immediately precede a petition for restoration. The superior court denied the petition. In moving for reconsideration, Dennis argued the trial court erred by not following the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute that any conviction-free five-year period satisfies the requirement. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that any five-year conviction-free period satisfied the requirement for eligibility to petition for restoration of firearm rights. View "Washington v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Washington State charged Christopher Blair with one count of theft of a motor vehicle, a Ford truck, that Blair purportedly stole in October 2011. Pursuant to that charge, he entered a drug court personal recovery program. Blair was terminated from the program in 2015. According to the record, Blair had five prior felony convictions in Washington, including second degree theft, second degree burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, and two counts of theft of a motor vehicle at issue here. At sentencing, Blair argued for a "downward departure[from] the standard range" sought by the State and requested an exceptional sentence. Blair argued that although he had pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of a motor vehicle, both of those vehicles were snowmobiles, and therefore not "motor vehicles" as contemplated by RCW 9A.56.065. Blair asserted that his plea to the two counts were accordingly facially invalid. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Dennis should have alleged a constitutional defect of once of his prior convictions to challenge that conviction's validity for purposes of offender score calculation in an otherwise unrelated proceeding. The trial court declined to engage in statutory construction here and counted the two prior convictions at issue here for taking a motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, and the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Blair" on Justia Law

Specialty Asphalt & Construction, LLC and its majority owner, Lisa Jacobsen (Specialty), brought suit against Lincoln County, Washington (County) for gender discrimination, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract arising out of the County's bidding and contracting process for a paving project. Specialty lost all three claims it brought at the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Specialty petitioned for review by the Washington Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court affirmed with respect to the appellate court's holding that an injunction was the exclusive remedy for Specialty's contract claim. The Court reversed with respect to the gender discrimination and negligent misrepresentation claims: Some elements of Specialty's evidence, standing alone, might not create a reasonable inference of discrimination, but when viewed together, the inference of discrimination "becomes quite strong;" Specialty also provided evidence of its recoverable reliance damages to defeat summary judgment on its negligent misrepresentation claim. View "Specialty Asphalt & Constr., LLC v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Matthew Schley was sentenced under the a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) after pleading guilty to first degree theft and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to 29.75 months of incarceration with chemical dependency treatment services, and 29.75 months of community custody that included a substance abuse treatment program. The DOSA statute provided that if a DOSA recipient fails to complete the treatment program or is administratively terminated from the program, the Department of Corrections shall revoke the DOSA. If revoked, the term of community custody is struck and the offender would serve the remainder of his or her sentence in prison. One week in, Schley received a fighting infraction, which set the stage for his DOSA revocation. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on what evidentiary standard due process requires when revoking that sentence. Schley filed a personal restraint petition alleging the DOSA revocation hearing violated his due process rights because the Department failed to prove the fighting infraction by the higher proof standard required at revocation hearings, preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that a DOSA revocation indeed must be proved by a preponderance. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schley" on Justia Law

Respondent-petitioner Brandon Afoa was severely injured in an accident while working at the Port of Seattle for a cargo company. He sued the Port on a theory that the Port retained sufficient control over his work to have a duty to provide him a safe place to work. The Port argued in its defense that several airlines that were not parties to the lawsuit were at fault. A jury found Afoa suffered $40 million in damages and apportioned fault between him, the Port and the airlines. Notwithstanding Washington tort law in which tortfeasors are usually liable only for their proportionate share of the damages they cause, Aofa argued the Port was liable for both its portion and the airlines' portion. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) preserved joint and several liability when a defendant is vicariously liable for another's fault, but the jury's findings did not support the conclusion that the Port was vicariously liable for the airlines' fault. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

Joaquin Garcia was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA) in the first degree. He moved for dismissal, arguing that the predicate offense was invalid because the convicting court did not notify him of his ineligibility to possess firearms. The trial court dismissed the charge, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Garcia had "otherwise had actual knowledge" of the firearm prohibition. This case presented two issues for the Washington Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed the UPFA charge on the basis that Garcia was not advised of the firearm prohibition flowing from Garcia's conviction at the time of his conviction, despite his later acquired knowledge that he was prohibited from possessing firearms; and (2) whether pretrial dismissal of a UPFA charge was proper where a defendant was not given notice of the firearm prohibition. The Court held that Garcia had "otherwise acquired actual knowledge" of his ineligibility to possess firearms, and whether a defendant received statutory notice that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm may properly be resolved pretrial. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Jose Reyes died after a course of treatment for tuberculosis. Judith Reyes alleged that her husband did not have tuberculosis and that the treatment prescribed to him for that disease caused him fatal liver damage due to an undiagnosed, underlying, liver disease. Judith alleged that the Yakima Health District and Christopher Spitters, M.D., were negligent in treating Jose. A year after filing suit, her expert witness submitted an affidavit alleging as much. But because allegations of misdiagnosis without deviation from the proper standard of care was not the basis for liability, the Washington Supreme Court held that the expert witness' affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material face, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "In so holding, we do not require talismanic words, but the words... the want of the right word makes lightning from lightening bugs." View "Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant Cynthia Stewart appealed after she was found ineligible for unemployment benefits. Stewart suffered from migraine headaches and took prescription medication to help manage her symptoms. Her former employer fired Stewart after she "came to work impaired due to prescription narcotics for the second time in a six-month period." Stewart's application for unemployment benefits was initially granted, but her former employer appealed, and an administrative law judge reversed. Stewart petitioned for review by the BSD commissioner, who affirmed that Stewart was ineligible for benefits. Stewart's petition was not subject to the procedural statutes in the Employment Security Act (ESA), Title 50, RCW; instead, her petition for judicial review was governed by the procedures listed in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW. And pursuant to the APA, Stewart did not timely serve her petition on the ESD. She therefore failed to invoke the superior court's appellate jurisdiction, and the Washington Supreme Court determined the superior court correctly recognized that it was required to dismiss this case. View "Stewart v. Emp't Sec. Dep't" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the pattern jury instruction on attempted first-degree robbery. Petitioner Edward Nelson argued the State had to prove that the employee he attempted to rob had ownership, representative or possessory interest in the property. Specifically, he argued the "essential element" of representative or possessory interest should have been included in the "to convict" instruction to the jury. The Court of Appeal agreed this essential element was missing, but that the error was harmless. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the outcome of the appellate court's decision, finding that the "to convict" instruction in this case was constitutionally adequate. View "Washington v. Nelson" on Justia Law