Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sixteen-year-old Tyler Watkins was charged with first degree burglary as an adult. The former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) provided that juvenile courts had to automatically decline jurisdiction over 16- and 17-year-olds charged with certain offenses. Watkins argued his due process rights were violated because the automatic decline component of the statute applied without him first having a hearing on whether the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held the automatic decline did not violate due process because juveniles did not have a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. View "Washington v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Kenneth Linville, Jr. was charged with leading a wave of burglaries throughout Thurston County, Washington. The State charged Linville with one count of "leading organized crime," in addition to 137 other offenses. Some of those 127 were listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4) as predicate offenses, which when combined, formed the requisite "pattern of criminal profiteering" on which "leading organized crime" was based. Some of the 127 were not listed in the statute as predicate crimes at all. The issue for the Washington Supreme Court's contemplation was whether the "joinder bar" rule of RCW 9A.80.085, permitted both predicate and nonpredicate crimes to be joined in a single "leading organized crime" information. Linville argued the State was barred from joining charges outside of the predicated offenses listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4). Linville also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to sever the unlisted offenses. The Supreme Court determined the Criminal Profiteering Act supported Linville's interpretation. However, the Court did not find Linville showed counsel was ineffective for choosing to defend against these crimes in one prosecution rather than several. The Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Linville" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully representing himself at trial, Jerome Curry Jr. appealed his drug convictions to the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's decision to allow Curry to represent himself. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should not have granted Curry's request to proceed pro se. The State appealed. Before the Washington Supreme Court could determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Curry's request for self-representation, it first had to determine whether Curry's request to represent himself was unequivocal. The Court held that it was, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding to the appellate court to resolve the remaining outstanding issues. View "Washington v. Curry" on Justia Law

The central issue in this case was whether the administrative exhaustion rule found in the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) applies to all tort claims that arise during the land use decision-making process. In late 2009, Maytown purchased real property in Thurston County, Washington from the Port of Tacoma (Port) for the express purpose of operating a mine. The property came with an approved 20-year special use permit (permit) from Thurston County (County) for mining gravel. Maytown and the Port claimed the County's board of commissioners (Board) succumbed to political pressure from opponents to the mine and directed the County's Resource Stewardship Department to impose unnecessary procedural hurdles meant to obstruct and stall the mining operation. Because the property had been designated by the County as "mineral land of long term commercial significance," the County was obligated to balance the protection of the mineral land with the protection of critical areas. Other issues raised by this case centered on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of a substantive due process violation 42 U.S.C. 1983; whether an aggrieved party can recover prelitigation, administrative fora attorney fees intentionally caused by the tortfeasor under a tortious interference claim; and, whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding a request under RAP 18.1(b) for appellate attorney fees that was not made in a separate section devoted solely to that request. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on all but the third issue raised: the tortious interference claims pled in this case did not authorize recovery of prelitigation, administrative fora attorney fees. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed in part, and reversed in part. View "Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston County" on Justia Law

Sheila Rosenberg was invited to the home of Igor Lukashevich, her high school basketball coach. Lukashevich drank shots of vodka with Rosenberg, then shortly after leaving Lukashevich's home, Rosenberg was killed along with her boyfriend in a car accident. Michele Anderson, Rosenberg's mother sued Lukashevich's employer Soap Lake School District, but the trial court determined she failed to present sufficient evidence to support her claims. Therefore, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the school district. View "Anderson v. Soap Lake Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Robert Tyler challenged his conviction for possessing a stolen vehicle. He contended the State was required to prove he engaged in all the actions that constitute "possession" of a stolen vehicle because these were listed in the to-convict jury instruction. Further arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove he "disposed of a stolen vehicle, Tyler contended his conviction had to be reversed and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Tyler's conviction, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals, which viewed the jury instructions as setting alternative means of possessing stolen property, which became the “law of the case” under Washington v. Hickman, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). The appellate court held Hickman was abrogated by Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709 (2016). The Washington Supreme Court determined that was error in light of the Washington Court’s decision in Washington v. Johnson, 399 P.3d 507 (2017). In Johnson, the Washington Court confirmed Hickman remained good law. Because it was undisputed that the evidence established possession, the jury's verdict stood, and the Court affirmed Tyler's conviction. View "State v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2006, William Schorr pled guilty to first degree murder, first degree robbery, second degree arson, and first degree theft. Eleven years later, he filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the convictions of both first degree murder and first degree robbery on double jeopardy grounds. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP as untimely and treated the double jeopardy claim as waived. The Washington Supreme Court adhered to its decisions in prior cases holding that challenges to sentences that exceed the court's authority (like the double jeopardy challenge to the sentence in this case) cannot be waived. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that double jeopardy claims were exempt from the one- year time bar on collateral challenges. Schorr's simultaneous convictions of first degree murder and first degree robbery did not violate double jeopardy clause protections: even though first degree felony murder predicated on first degree robbery would merge with the first degree robbery on which it is predicated, that was not the only means of first degree murder to which Schorr pleaded guilty. He also pleaded guilty to the alternative means of premeditated murder. “A first degree robbery conviction certainly does not merge with a first degree premeditated murder conviction.” The Supreme Court therefore dismissed Schorr’s personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schorr" on Justia Law

At Gary Meredith's trial, the trial court mistakenly gave the State and defense counsel one less peremptory challenge than they were entitled to under CrR 6.4(e)(1) and CrR 6.5. Meredith claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the peremptory challenge violation on direct review. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with Meredith, reversing his convictions and remanding for a new trial. However, under RAP 2.5(a), the appellate court could have refused to hear the claim of error because it was not objected to at trial and it is not a type of structural error that requires automatic reversal. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held Meredith's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that claim of error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith" on Justia Law

Kevin Light-Roth was convicted of second degree murder in 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to 335 months' confinement. In an untimely personal restraint petition (PRP), Light-Roth argued Washington v. O'Dell, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), constituted a significant and material change in the law that applied retroactively to his sentence, excepting him from RCW 10.73.100’s time bar. The Court of Appeals granted Light-Roth's PRP and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that O'Dell did not provide an exception to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth" on Justia Law

This case concerns the admissibility of expert testimony about whether the subject individual suffers from a mental abnormality. In 2011, the State filed a petition to civilly commit 40-year-old Mark Black as an sexually violent predator (SVP) prior to his scheduled release from prison. In support of its petition, the State included the evaluation of Dr. Dale Arnold, who diagnosed Black with sexual sadism; paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, nonexclusive; and personality disorder NOS with antisocial and narcissistic characteristics. Prior to trial. Black moved to exclude evidence of hebephilia and paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, arguing that hebephilia is inadmissible pursuant to Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923). The trial court excluded the expert testimony regarding "hebephilia" on the basis that such a diagnosis was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The parties did not challenge that portion of the court's decision. However, Black argued the court committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony on a diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, non-exclusive." The Court of Appeals affirmed Black's civil commitment in an unpublished opinion. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds and held that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it admitted expert testimony on paraphilia NOS, nor did it abuse its discretion when it allowed an expert to describe Black's specific paraphilic focus as "persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females." View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law