Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At Gary Meredith's trial, the trial court mistakenly gave the State and defense counsel one less peremptory challenge than they were entitled to under CrR 6.4(e)(1) and CrR 6.5. Meredith claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the peremptory challenge violation on direct review. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with Meredith, reversing his convictions and remanding for a new trial. However, under RAP 2.5(a), the appellate court could have refused to hear the claim of error because it was not objected to at trial and it is not a type of structural error that requires automatic reversal. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held Meredith's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that claim of error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith" on Justia Law

Kevin Light-Roth was convicted of second degree murder in 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to 335 months' confinement. In an untimely personal restraint petition (PRP), Light-Roth argued Washington v. O'Dell, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), constituted a significant and material change in the law that applied retroactively to his sentence, excepting him from RCW 10.73.100’s time bar. The Court of Appeals granted Light-Roth's PRP and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that O'Dell did not provide an exception to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth" on Justia Law

This case concerns the admissibility of expert testimony about whether the subject individual suffers from a mental abnormality. In 2011, the State filed a petition to civilly commit 40-year-old Mark Black as an sexually violent predator (SVP) prior to his scheduled release from prison. In support of its petition, the State included the evaluation of Dr. Dale Arnold, who diagnosed Black with sexual sadism; paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, nonexclusive; and personality disorder NOS with antisocial and narcissistic characteristics. Prior to trial. Black moved to exclude evidence of hebephilia and paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, arguing that hebephilia is inadmissible pursuant to Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923). The trial court excluded the expert testimony regarding "hebephilia" on the basis that such a diagnosis was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The parties did not challenge that portion of the court's decision. However, Black argued the court committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony on a diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, non-exclusive." The Court of Appeals affirmed Black's civil commitment in an unpublished opinion. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds and held that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it admitted expert testimony on paraphilia NOS, nor did it abuse its discretion when it allowed an expert to describe Black's specific paraphilic focus as "persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females." View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed lower courts' decisions in four cases which all presented the same issue: whether Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority could condemn Seattle's electrical transmission line easements located in the city of Bellevue to extend the Transit's regional light rail system. The Supreme Court held that Sound Transit had the statutory authority to condemn the easement, and the condemnation met public use and necessity requirements. The Court remanded the cases back to the trial court, however, for consideration of the prior public use doctrine, and for a finding on whether the two public uses were compatible. View "Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth. v. WR-SRI 120th N. LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statutory interpretation of the portion of RCW 9.41.040 dealing with the requirements for restoration of firearm rights. In 1991, Edgar Dennis, III was convicted of second degree robbery, third degree assault and two counts of felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. In 1998, Dennis was convicted on third degree assault. The 1991 convictions disqualified him from possessing a firearm. After serving his sentence, he lived in the community for over fifteen years without a conviction. Then in 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor first degree negligent driving. In 2016, Dennis petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights without disclosing the 2014 conviction. The State objected, informing the trial court of the 2014 conviction. The State argued the statutory requirement of a five-year conviction-free period had to immediately precede a petition for restoration. The superior court denied the petition. In moving for reconsideration, Dennis argued the trial court erred by not following the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute that any conviction-free five-year period satisfies the requirement. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that any five-year conviction-free period satisfied the requirement for eligibility to petition for restoration of firearm rights. View "Washington v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Washington State charged Christopher Blair with one count of theft of a motor vehicle, a Ford truck, that Blair purportedly stole in October 2011. Pursuant to that charge, he entered a drug court personal recovery program. Blair was terminated from the program in 2015. According to the record, Blair had five prior felony convictions in Washington, including second degree theft, second degree burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, and two counts of theft of a motor vehicle at issue here. At sentencing, Blair argued for a "downward departure[from] the standard range" sought by the State and requested an exceptional sentence. Blair argued that although he had pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of a motor vehicle, both of those vehicles were snowmobiles, and therefore not "motor vehicles" as contemplated by RCW 9A.56.065. Blair asserted that his plea to the two counts were accordingly facially invalid. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Dennis should have alleged a constitutional defect of once of his prior convictions to challenge that conviction's validity for purposes of offender score calculation in an otherwise unrelated proceeding. The trial court declined to engage in statutory construction here and counted the two prior convictions at issue here for taking a motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, and the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Blair" on Justia Law

Specialty Asphalt & Construction, LLC and its majority owner, Lisa Jacobsen (Specialty), brought suit against Lincoln County, Washington (County) for gender discrimination, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract arising out of the County's bidding and contracting process for a paving project. Specialty lost all three claims it brought at the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and Specialty petitioned for review by the Washington Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court affirmed with respect to the appellate court's holding that an injunction was the exclusive remedy for Specialty's contract claim. The Court reversed with respect to the gender discrimination and negligent misrepresentation claims: Some elements of Specialty's evidence, standing alone, might not create a reasonable inference of discrimination, but when viewed together, the inference of discrimination "becomes quite strong;" Specialty also provided evidence of its recoverable reliance damages to defeat summary judgment on its negligent misrepresentation claim. View "Specialty Asphalt & Constr., LLC v. Lincoln County" on Justia Law

Matthew Schley was sentenced under the a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) after pleading guilty to first degree theft and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to 29.75 months of incarceration with chemical dependency treatment services, and 29.75 months of community custody that included a substance abuse treatment program. The DOSA statute provided that if a DOSA recipient fails to complete the treatment program or is administratively terminated from the program, the Department of Corrections shall revoke the DOSA. If revoked, the term of community custody is struck and the offender would serve the remainder of his or her sentence in prison. One week in, Schley received a fighting infraction, which set the stage for his DOSA revocation. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on what evidentiary standard due process requires when revoking that sentence. Schley filed a personal restraint petition alleging the DOSA revocation hearing violated his due process rights because the Department failed to prove the fighting infraction by the higher proof standard required at revocation hearings, preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that a DOSA revocation indeed must be proved by a preponderance. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schley" on Justia Law

Respondent-petitioner Brandon Afoa was severely injured in an accident while working at the Port of Seattle for a cargo company. He sued the Port on a theory that the Port retained sufficient control over his work to have a duty to provide him a safe place to work. The Port argued in its defense that several airlines that were not parties to the lawsuit were at fault. A jury found Afoa suffered $40 million in damages and apportioned fault between him, the Port and the airlines. Notwithstanding Washington tort law in which tortfeasors are usually liable only for their proportionate share of the damages they cause, Aofa argued the Port was liable for both its portion and the airlines' portion. The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 4.22.070(1)(a) preserved joint and several liability when a defendant is vicariously liable for another's fault, but the jury's findings did not support the conclusion that the Port was vicariously liable for the airlines' fault. View "Afoa v. Port of Seattle" on Justia Law

Joaquin Garcia was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA) in the first degree. He moved for dismissal, arguing that the predicate offense was invalid because the convicting court did not notify him of his ineligibility to possess firearms. The trial court dismissed the charge, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Garcia had "otherwise had actual knowledge" of the firearm prohibition. This case presented two issues for the Washington Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed the UPFA charge on the basis that Garcia was not advised of the firearm prohibition flowing from Garcia's conviction at the time of his conviction, despite his later acquired knowledge that he was prohibited from possessing firearms; and (2) whether pretrial dismissal of a UPFA charge was proper where a defendant was not given notice of the firearm prohibition. The Court held that Garcia had "otherwise acquired actual knowledge" of his ineligibility to possess firearms, and whether a defendant received statutory notice that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm may properly be resolved pretrial. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law