Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Protect Pub. Health v. Freed
Proposed Initiative 27 (I-27) would have allowed King County, Washington voters to decide whether to ban public funding for community health engagement location (CHEL) sites, colloquially known as safe injection sites, and to create civil liability for any person or entity who operates a site. The King County Superior Court granted respondent Protect Public Health's ("PPH") motion for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and enjoined King County from placing I-27 on the ballot. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the proposed initiative was beyond the scope of the local initiative power. The Court affirmed the superior court, holding I-27 was outside the scope of local initiative power because it improperly interfered with the budgetary authority of the King City Council. View "Protect Pub. Health v. Freed" on Justia Law
Murray v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.
In 2006, the Washington legislature enacted legislation establishing a state health technology assessment program. Part of that legislation formed the Health Technology Clinical Committee ("HTCC") as an independent committee to judge selected medical technology and procedures by their safety, efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and health outcomes. In 2010, the HTCC began its review of a controversial procedure - femoroacetabular impingement (FAI) syndrome hip surgery. Michael Murray sustained a hip injury while at work in August 2009. L&I allowed his claim and provided medical treatment. Murray's physician, Dr. James Bruckner, asked the Washington Department of Labor and Industries ("L&I") to authorize surgery regarding Murray's hip condition, FAI syndrome. L&I denied payment for FAI surgery because the HTCC disallowed coverage for that procedure. Dr. Bruckner performed the surgery on Murray without authorization from L&I. The FAI surgery purportedly successfully rehabilitated Murray's hip injury. Murray appealed L&I's decision denying payment for the surgery to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board or BIIA), which affirmed L&I. Murray appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board. Murray appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the superior court. Murray then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed. The Supreme Court "harmonized" the HTCC legislation with the Industrial Insurance Act, and in doing so, determined that applying L&I's Medical Aid Rules, HTCC determinations were one of several sources of information L&I used to make medical coverage decisions. "While HTCC determinations are given considerable weight, the Medical Aid Rules do not afford such determinations preclusive effect. Under Medical Aid Rules, L&I, not the HTCC, remains responsible for medical treatment coverage decisions. Accordingly, such Department medical coverage decisions are then subject to review before the BIIA and in superior court, pursuant to chapter 51.52 RCW." Murray's reimbursement claim to L&I was remanded for further proceedings. View "Murray v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law
Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp.
A trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Microsoft Corporation after Dawn Cornwell, a former employee, alleged the company retaliated against her. While working for Microsoft, Cornwell believed that her then-supervisor was discriminating against her on the basis of sex, engaging in romantic favoritism, and taking retaliatory action against her. She hired an attorney and settled the case with Microsoft.The settlement was confidential, and Cornwell was no longer required to work under her then-manager, Todd Parsons. Seven years later, Cornwell's new manager, Mary Anne Blake, asked Cornwell to mentor under another Microsoft employee. After learning that the employee reported to Parsons, Cornwell told Blake that she could not mentor under the employee. Blake asked Cornwell why, and Cornwell responded that it was because she had filed a "lawsuit" against Microsoft and could not report to Parsons. Cornwell also told Blake that the suit involved a review score issue and was confidential. Blake sought more information about the lawsuit from human resources and her direct supervisor, Nicole McKinley. Human resources did not have any information on file about the lawsuit and promised to follow up on the issue. Shortly after Cornwell told her about the suit, Blake conducted a mandatory performance review of Cornwell. Though Cornwell previously received high scores in her reviews, at this particular review, she received the lowest possible score. Human resources told Blake to not inform Cornwell of her review score "unless she asked about it." Cornwell would be laid off as part of a larger reduction in force. Cornwell did not learn about her low score until several years later when she was told that she could not be rehired at Microsoft because her final performance rating was so poor. Based on these events, Cornwell filed suit against Microsoft, alleging retaliation in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The Washington Supreme Court found Cornwell presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the issues of knowledge and causation, reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law
Harper v. Washington
Scottye Miller murdered his longtime girlfriend, Tricia Patricelli, 15 days after he was released from prison on Department of Corrections (DOC)-supervised probation. Patricelli, Patricelli's family and friends, and DOC—knew that Miller had physically abused Patricelli in the past and would likely do so again if they resumed their relationship. Patricelli hid the renewed relationship from her friends, family members, and DOC. In fact, Patricelli explicitly assured DOC that she was not in a relationship with Miller, that she was moving to a place where he could not find her, and that she would call the police if she saw him. Miller's mother also verified in writing that he was sleeping at her home, though it turns out that he was actually living with Patricelli. The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether DOC was liable for Patricelli's death, despite Patricelli's, Miller's, and his mother's active and successful efforts to prevent DOC from knowing that Miller was in contact with Patricelli. The parties agree that DOC had a duty to supervise Miller while he was on probation and that DOC was not liable unless its supervision constituted “gross negligence.” The parties disagreed on whether DOC’s actions rose to the level of gross negligence. The trial court dismissed on summary judgment, finding the DOC’s failure to take additional steps to verify Patricelli’s statement’s or Miller’s housing arrangements could qualify as gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment for DOC. Tricia Patricelli’s Estate failed to produce sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the question of gross negligence. View "Harper v. Washington" on Justia Law
Washington v. Scherf
While in prison serving a life without parole sentence, Byron Scherf murdered a prison guard. He was tried, convicted of aggravated murder, and sentenced to death. In his appeal, he raised multiple claims of error: procedural, statutory, and constitutional. Based on the holding of Washington v. Gregory, No. 88086-7 (Wash. Oct. 11, 2018), the Washington Supreme Court vacated the sentence, but affirmed the conviction. View "Washington v. Scherf" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Washington v. Hand
The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether detaining an incompetent defendant in jail for 76 days before providing competency restoration treatment violates his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court found Anthony Hand incompetent to stand trial and ordered Western State Hospital (WSH) to admit Hand within 15 days for competency restoration treatment. Hand remained in county jail for 61 days after the court's 15 day deadline, for a total of 76 days of confinement. Hand's competency was eventually restored through treatment at WSH. He was subsequently convicted on both charges. Hand argued the State violated his substantive due process rights by detaining him in jail for 76 days before admitting him to WSH for treatment, and that the proper remedy was dismissal with prejudice. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that detaining Hand in county jail for 76 days violated his due process rights but that dismissal with prejudice, the only relief Hand requested, was not warranted. View "Washington v. Hand" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist
In 1995, Derek Gronquist was sentenced to three consecutive, 114-month terms of total confinement for three counts of attempted first-degree kidnapping with a special finding of sexual motivation. On petition to the Washington Supreme Court, Gronquist claimed his sentence expired in 2016, so his continued confinement was unlawful. The Department of Corrections contended Gronquist’s sentence was to expire in 2022. The Supreme Court determined the DOC sentence tracking system was “complicated, its explanations have been confusing and contradictory, and it has not pointed to clear legal authority directly supporting its position.” However, the Court concluded Gronquist had not shown his continued confinement was unlawful either. “DOC has no authority to change the length of Gronquist’s sentence or to run any portion of his consecutive terms concurrently. Gronquist’s proposed sentence structure, however, would require it to do so.” The Court therefore denied relief on Gronquist’s personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Washington v. Jefferson
Tyree Jefferson was convicted by jury of first degree murder, first degree assault, and first degree unlawful possession of a firearm. On appeal, he challenged the State's use of a peremptory strike against the only African-American juror on the jury venire, contending the strike was exercised in a racially discriminatory manner. Further, Jefferson challenged the current Batson test, arguing it failed to address racial discrimination in jury selection. The Washington Supreme Court found the trial court did not err in finding no purposeful discrimination in the strike of the juror. The Court found, however, Jefferson's argument about the Batson test was well taken, modifying the Washington three-step inquiry with a new third step. View "Washington v. Jefferson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Washington v. Hubbard
In 2004, Waylon Hubbard pled guilty to second degree possession of stolen property. He was sentenced to a short term of confinement and 120 hours of community service. He was also ordered to pay legal financial obligations. By 2011, Hubbard had fulfilled his community service, and in 2013, he paid off his financial obligations. In 2016, Hubbard petitioned for a certificate and order of discharge (COD), with the effective date of February 25, 2013, the date he satisfied all the terms of his sentence. The State objected, arguing the court did not have the authority to enter an effective date that predated the date on which the court received notice that Hubbard completed his sentence. The Washington Supreme Court held the effective date of a certificate of discharge must be the state the offender completed all the terms of the sentence. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
Rublee v. Carrier Corp.
The Washington Supreme Court was presented an issue of first impression: whether Washington should adopt the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine for common law product liability claims predating the 1981 product liability and tort reform act (WPLA). By this opinion, the Court joined the clear majority of states that formally adopted the apparent manufacturer doctrine. Applying that doctrine to the particular facts of this case, the Court held genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a reasonable consumer could have believed Pfizer was a manufacturer of asbestos products that caused Vernon Rublee's illness and death. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Rublee v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law