Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Clark, M.D., the Pierce County, Washington medical examiner, attempted to subpoena a video held by BNSF Railway Company of a fatal train-pedestrian collision. The parties disputed whether Dr. Clark properly began a coroner's inquest, and the extent of the subpoena power granted by the applicable statute. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Dr. Clark exceeded his authority in issuing the subpoena. The Court held that because Dr. Clark never began an inquest, he lacked the authority to subpoena. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a writ of prohibition. View "BNSF Ry. Co. v. Clark" on Justia Law

This case involved statutory interpretation concerning application of the reporting requirements contained in the Washington Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), chapter 42.17A RCW. The specific issue presented was how the FCPA reporting requirements in RCW 42.17A.255 and the definition in RCW 42.17A.005(4) ("ballot proposition") were to be applied in the context of local initiatives. In 2014, Evergreen Freedom Foundation (EFF) staff created sample municipal ordinances and ballot propositions for citizens to use to advance certain causes to their local city councils or commissions. Local residents in the cities of Sequim, Chelan, and Shelton used those samples in filing two ballot propositions in each city, one to require collective bargaining negotiation sessions to be publicly conducted and the second to prohibit union security clauses in city collective bargaining agreements. The proponents submitted the proposed measures to their local city clerks along with signatures they had gathered in support of the measures, and asked their respective city councils or commissions either to pass the measures as local ordinances or, if the councils or commissions did not agree, to alternatively place each measure on the local ballot for a vote. None of the cities passed the measures as ordinances or placed the ballot propositions on the local ballots. In response, EFF employees, who were attorneys, participated in lawsuits against each jurisdiction on behalf of the local resident proponents, each suit seeking a judicial directive to the respective city to put each measure on the local ballot. Each lawsuit ended in a superior court dismissing the case, and those decisions were not appealed. EFF did not file any campaign finance disclosure reports identifying the value of the legal services it provided to the resident proponents in support of the local ballot propositions. The State conducted an investigation and then filed a civil regulatory enforcement action against EFF alleging EFF failed to report independent expenditures it made in support of the noted local ballot propositions. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of the State's regulatory enforcement action under the FCPA: under the circumstances of this case, EFF's pro bono legal services were reportable. The applicable reporting statutes were not unconstitutionally vague, nor did their application here violate EFF's First Amendment rights. View "Washington v. Evergreen Freedom Found." on Justia Law

Jennifer Dreewes was the victim of property theft when a laptop, an iPhone, checks, credit cards, and other items were stolen from her truck. She reported the theft to law enforcement. After one of her credit cards was used at a store, Dreewes contacted the store to get a description of the person who had used her card. A store employee described the person as a skinny white girl with pink hair and a black eye. Dreewes contacted the detective working on her case to give him the description and also informed him that she had put the information on Facebook and communicated it through her nephew and his friends to see if anyone knew the pink-haired girl. Through her social media connections, Dreewes gave police the name and license plate number of the alleged pink-haired girl. Dreewes' and her Facebook tipster, Michelle Thomas, exchanged over 170 messages about retrieving the stolen property and bringing the pink-haired girl to Dreewes so Dreewes could harm her. Dreewes offered Thomas money to track down the pink-haired girl. Thomas and her boyfriend Don Parrish forcefully entered the house at which the pink-haired girl was staying: Parrish carrying a semi-automatic rifle, and Thomas carrying a pistol, duct tape and zip ties. The occupants of the house resisted Parrish and Thomas' attempts to subdue the pink-haired girl. Immediately after the incident, Thomas called Dreewes and told her that everything had gone wrong. Dreewes told Thomas to go to Dreewes's mother's home and wait for her, and to delete all of their communications from her phone. Instead, Thomas contacted law enforcement. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay of the law of the case doctrine and accomplice liability: specifically, whether the State's assumption of the burden to prove an element added to the "to convict" instruction for second degree assault also altered the State's burden of proof as to accomplice liability. The trial court instructed the jury that Dreewes was guilty as an accomplice and legally accountable for the conduct of another person in the commission of the crime if, with knowledge, she solicited, promoted, or facilitated the commission of the crime. The jury found Dreewes guilty as an accomplice to first degree burglary and as an accomplice to second degree assault. By special verdict, the jury found Dreewes was armed with a firearm. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals improperly applied the State's assumed burden under the law of the case context to the State's burden to prove accomplice liability, and reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated defendant's conviction for accomplice to second degree assault. View "Washington v. Dreewes" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Chacon sought reversal of an unpublished Court of Appeals opinion affirming his conviction for second degree assault and criminal trespass. At trial, the judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt, using 11 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 4.01, at 93 (4th ed. 2016) (WPIC), but omitted the last sentence of that instruction, which stated, "The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists." Chacon failed to object to the instruction at trial, but argued the omission was a manifest constitutional error, which could be reviewed for the first time on appeal pursuant to RAP 2.5(a)(3). After review, the Washington Supreme Court found the instruction was not manifest constitutional error, and affirmed Chacon's conviction. View "Washington v. Chacon" on Justia Law

End Prison Industrial Complex (EPIC) argued that the ballot title for a King County property tax increase lacked information required by former RCW 84.55.050 (2012). The Washington Supreme Court found that RCW 29A.36.090 required ballot title objections be raised within 10 days of the public filing of that ballot title. EPIC's claim was brought nearly 4 years after the ballot title at issue in this case was filed, was was therefore deemed untimely. The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the superior court. View "End Prison Indus. Complex v. King County" on Justia Law

In November 2009, Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four Lakewood, Washington police officers. Respondent Darcus Allen drove Clemmons to and from the crime scene. Allen was charged as an accomplice with four counts of aggravated first-degree murder. This case presented an issue of whether the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 10.95.020 were "elements" of the offense of aggravated first-degree murder for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. The Washington Supreme Court previously vacated Allen's convictions and remanded for a new trial; the question now was whether Allen could be tried a second trial on the RCW 10.95.020 aggravating circumstances. The trial court ruled he could not, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The Supreme Court held the retrial on the aggravating circumstances is barred by double jeopardy, and thus affirmed the lower courts. View "Washington v. Allen" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether full faith and credit required Washington courts to enforce an Illinois class action judgment by dismissing subsequent local cases based on the same facts. An Illinois medical provider brought a nationwide consumer protection class action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in Illinois. The suit was settled and approved by an Illinois trial court. Chan Healthcare group, a Washington provider, received reasonable notice of the suit, but neither opted out of the class nor objected to the settlement. Chan sought to collaterally challenge the Illinois judgment in Washington courts, arguing the interests of Washington class members were not adequately represented in Illinois. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Chan failed to show its due process rights were violated, thus full faith and credit required Washington courts to enforce the Illinois judgment. View "Chan Healthcare Grp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Michael Henderson shot and killed Abubakar Abdi during an argument. Henderson was charged with felony murder based on second degree assault with a deadly weapon. Henderson contended that while acting in self-defense, he accidentally killed Abdi. The jury was instructed on justifiable homicide as a defense; it was not instructed on excusable homicide. The jury found the shooting was neither self-defense nor an accident, and found Henderson guilty of felony murder predicated on second degree assault. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on excusable homicide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the State that the excusable homicide instruction was properly rejected: Henderson was able to adequately argue his theory of the case under the instructions that were given. The appellate court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Henderson" on Justia Law

This case concerned whether a prosecutor properly aggregated numerous offenses that would, individually, constitute theft in the second degree into two counts of theft in the first degree. Washington's common law standard for bringing multiple aggregated counts differed from that created under RCW 9A.56.010(21)(c). At issue in this appeal was whether the statutory standard or the common law standard for aggregating theft charges applied in this case and whether the State properly aggregated charges under that standard. The superior court allowed the State to aggregate charges against Gary Farnworth, II into two counts of theft in the first degree, but in a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to vacate one count and resentence Farnworth. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding under the facts of this case, the State acted within its discretion when it aggregated Farnworth's offenses into two counts. View "Washington v. Farnworth" on Justia Law

At issue was the geographic scope of the permitting authority delegated to the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife over hydraulic projects. A coalition of counties challenged the Department's statutory authority to regulate the construction or performance of work to occur exclusively above the ordinary high-water line. The Washington Supreme Court held the plain language of the statute at issue looked to the "reasonably certain" (not "absolutely certain") effects of hydraulic projects on state waters in determining the scope of the Department's permitting authority, and at least some projects above the ordinary high-water line were reasonably certain to affect those waters. An examination of relevant legislative history confirmed that the legislature intended the Department's regulatory jurisdiction to include projects above the ordinary high-water line that affected state waters. View "Spokane County v. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law