Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Two Tonasket voters petitioned to recall City Council member Jill Ritter from office. The petition made six allegations relating to improper influence over a police investigation of a relative’s son, improperly reviewing police personnel records, certain public statements made about Tonasket police, and conspiracy to disband the police force. The superior court determined all allegations were insufficient to warrant a recall election; finding no reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed that decision. View "In re Recall of Ritter" on Justia Law

Two Tonasket voters petitioned to recall City Council member Christia “Teagan” Levine from office. The petition alleged Levin committed five violations relating to certain city personnel actions, conspiracy to remove the City Attorney and cause the Mayor to resign as part of an illegal quorum, withholding public records, and conspiring to disband the city police force. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed all charges, finding them factually and legally insufficient to sustain further action. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Recall of Levine" on Justia Law

A recall petition was filed against the Mayor and three Cathlamet council members; charges stemmed from Cathlamet’s purchase of a parcel of property at 20 Butler street. The petition alleged a violation of the Washington Constitution as a gift of public funds to the seller of the Butler Street property, Bernadette Goodroe. One additional charge against one town counselor alleged violation of RCW 42.23.070(2), prohibiting municipal officials from giving or receiving gifts related to their official capacities. The Washington Supreme Court determined the charges in the recall petition was legally insufficient, because acquisition of real property is a fundamental government purpose and discretionary act that was not manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "In re Recall of Burnham" on Justia Law

Petitioner Freedom Foundation filed a public records request for documents relating to union organizing by several University of Washington (UW) faculty members. The UW asked one of the faculty to search his e-mail accounts for responsive records, and after reviewing those records, gave notice that it intended to release many of them in the absence of an injunction. Respondent Service Employees International Union 925 sued to enjoin release of any union-related records, arguing they were not "public records" under 42.56 RCW, the Washington Public Records Act. The trial court granted the injunction and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Foundation petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, arguing that the "scope of employment test" employed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal, only applied to records stored on an employee's personal device, and should not have been extended to records on public agencies' e-mail servers. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 925 v. Univ. of Wash." on Justia Law

The federal district court in Washington State certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. Plaintiffs Valerie Sampson and David Raymond (collectively, Sampson) were Washington residents who worked as commercial truck drivers for defendants Knight Transportation Inc., Knight Refrigerated, LLC, and Knight Port Services LLC (collectively, Knight). Plaintiffs brought this putative class action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated for several alleged violations of Washington wage and hour laws. At issue here was Sampson's claim that piece-rate drivers must receive separate hourly compensation for all time spent "on-duty not- driving." The question the federal court posed to the Supreme Court was whether the Washington Minimum Wage Act required non-agricultural employers to pay their piece-rate employees per hour for time spent performing activities outside of piece-rate work. The Supreme Court responded: no. "All workers must be compensated for all hours worked in a work week in accordance with the Minimum Wage Act (MWA). For nonagricultural workers, WAC 296-126-021 validly allows employers to demonstrate compliance with the MWA's guaranty that Washington workers receive a minimum wage for each hour worked by ensuring that the total wages for the week do not fall below the statutory minimum wage for each hour worked. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in this case fail to demonstrate as a matter of law that they were uncompensated for time spent "loading and unloading, pre-trip inspections, fueling, detention at a shipper or consignee, washing trucks, and other similar activities." View "Sampson v. Knight Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Group Health Cooperative (GHO) provided health insurance benefits to Nathaniel (Joel) Coon, who suffered a serious fungal infection and amputation following knee surgery at the Everett Clinic (TEC). The Coon family later settled potential negligence claims against TEC, and GHO initiated this lawsuit seeking reimbursement of its payments from the settlement proceeds. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether genuine issues of material fact remained to preclude summary judgment in favor of GHO regarding whether the settlement constituted full compensation to Coon, and whether GHO suffered prejudice from the Coons’ failure to provide notice prior to finalizing the settlement. The Supreme Court concurred with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that genuine issues of fact still remained, making summary judgment inappropriate. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Grp. Health Coop. v. Coon" on Justia Law

Four defendants’ cases were consolidated for review by the Washington Supreme Court. In each case, the defendant had been labeled a “persistent offender” under RCW 9.94A.570 and was sentenced. Under the Washington Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), the third time a person is convicted of a “most serious offense,” they were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (the so-called “three strikes and you’re out” law). The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether it was constitutional to apply the POAA to people who were in their 30 or 40s when they committed their third strike, but were young adults when they committed their first strike. The Supreme Court held it was constitutional: Article I, section14 of the Washington Constitution did not require a categorical bar on sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for fully developed adult offenders who committed one of their prison strikes as young adults. Furthermore, the Court did not find the sentences each defendant received was grossly disproportionate to their respective crimes. View "Washington v. Moretti" on Justia Law

In 2014, Matthew McCarthy approached a stranger's home under a mistaken belief that he would find his ex-wife inside. He forced his way in and pushed the occupant against the wall. He returned twice the next evening: the first time once again looking for his ex-wife and the second time looking for his cell phone. Out of these events, the State charged McCarthy with first-degree burglary predicated on assault.The State notified him that this was a most serious offense and that he was facing life in prison without parole due to his criminal history. Prior to McCarthy's arraignment, his public defender expressed her concerns to the court that regarding McCarthy's competency to stand trial. The trial court ordered a competency evaluation and stayed the proceedings. McCarthy objected to the initiation of competency proceedings against his will because he believed himself to be competent. McCarthy was diagnosed with bipolar disorder with nonbizarre delusions, and various substance abuse disorders. While the physician-evaluator initially found McCarthy had a detailed understanding of the legal proceedings, on second review McCarthy was deemed incompetent, and a 90-day restoration was ordered. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was: (1) whether under RCW 10.77.060(1)(a), the trial court erred during trial, in not ordering a third competency hearing after a jury had previously found McCarthy competent; and (2) what deference, if any, is given to a trial court when it does not sua sponte order a competency hearing. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, finding the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not sua sponte order a competency evaluation based on the evidence presented during the criminal proceedings. The matter was remanded for the appellate court to decide the remaining issues raised in McCarthy's personal restraint petition. View "Washington v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Franklin County Washington was an early adopter of an electronic filing system for superior court cases. The county clerk and the superior court judges largely cooperated with the transition to "Odyssey" and anticipated that court files would be paperless by 2018. To facilitate this transition, the clerk gave the superior court judges wireless access devices and expressed his willingness to accommodate other requests. Shortly after the clerk's transition to a paperless file system was fully implemented, the superior court judges of Franklin County directed the Franklin County clerk to continue making and maintaining paper files. The clerk declined to do so as his budget was insufficient to allow him to maintain duplicate paper files. The clerk also deemed it unnecessary to maintain duplicate paper files once Odyssey had been implemented. Declaring an emergency, the judges adopted a local rule requiting the clerk to maintain paper files for all file types. When the Franklin County Clerk continued to resist creating duplicate paper files, the judges threatened legal action. The Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney appointed a special deputy prosecuting attorney pursuant to RCW 36.27.040 to represent the clerk with respect to any contempt or other legal action the judges threatened to pursue. The issue presented to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the judges validly issued an order of appointment under RCW 36.27.030, securing their own special deputy prosecuting attorney to pursue their legal action against the clerk. The Supreme Court determined the judges' appointment order was invalid: "while the judges are free to sue the clerk, they must do it at their own expense." View "In re Appointment of Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney" on Justia Law

Widower, 82-year-old Leroy Bagnell met 57-year-old defendant Theresa Scanlan in a bar. At first she was introduced to Bagnell's adult children as a friend, later he began referring to her as his girlfriend. In 2014, police responded to a 911 hang-up call made from Bagnell's house. Scanlan answered the door. Police saw Bagnell at the top of the stairs in his underwear, head and forearm bleeding, and a "big, bloody, and bruised lump" on his leg. As a result of that contact, a domestic violence no contact order was issued prohibiting Scanlan from coming within 1,000 feet of Bagnell's house. Bagnell did not seek medical care for his injuries. Months after the no contact order, Bagnell's children checked on their father at the house: they found blood in the entryway, along the walls, and found shattered glass and ceramic on the kitchen floor. They discovered Bagnell in the family room severely bruised from head to toe. The children called 911. Scanlan was found in the garage underneath a blanket in her car with the doors locked. Scanlan was taken into custody; Bagnell was taken to the emergency room, where providers determined in addition to the extensive bruising, Bagnell had two broken fingers, and several skin tears on his legs and arms. Scanlan was charged with second degree assault, felony violation of a no contact order, unlawful imprisonment, and fourth degree assault. Neither Bagnell nor Scanlan testified at trial, but the court admitted several statements Bagnell made to his medical providers. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether a crime victim's statements to his medical providers were testimonial, and if so, whether their admission at trial violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court held the victim's statements were nontestimonial in this case, because they were not made with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for testimony. View "Washington v. Scanlan" on Justia Law