Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Franklin County Washington was an early adopter of an electronic filing system for superior court cases. The county clerk and the superior court judges largely cooperated with the transition to "Odyssey" and anticipated that court files would be paperless by 2018. To facilitate this transition, the clerk gave the superior court judges wireless access devices and expressed his willingness to accommodate other requests. Shortly after the clerk's transition to a paperless file system was fully implemented, the superior court judges of Franklin County directed the Franklin County clerk to continue making and maintaining paper files. The clerk declined to do so as his budget was insufficient to allow him to maintain duplicate paper files. The clerk also deemed it unnecessary to maintain duplicate paper files once Odyssey had been implemented. Declaring an emergency, the judges adopted a local rule requiting the clerk to maintain paper files for all file types. When the Franklin County Clerk continued to resist creating duplicate paper files, the judges threatened legal action. The Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney appointed a special deputy prosecuting attorney pursuant to RCW 36.27.040 to represent the clerk with respect to any contempt or other legal action the judges threatened to pursue. The issue presented to the Washington Supreme Court was whether the judges validly issued an order of appointment under RCW 36.27.030, securing their own special deputy prosecuting attorney to pursue their legal action against the clerk. The Supreme Court determined the judges' appointment order was invalid: "while the judges are free to sue the clerk, they must do it at their own expense." View "In re Appointment of Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney" on Justia Law

Widower, 82-year-old Leroy Bagnell met 57-year-old defendant Theresa Scanlan in a bar. At first she was introduced to Bagnell's adult children as a friend, later he began referring to her as his girlfriend. In 2014, police responded to a 911 hang-up call made from Bagnell's house. Scanlan answered the door. Police saw Bagnell at the top of the stairs in his underwear, head and forearm bleeding, and a "big, bloody, and bruised lump" on his leg. As a result of that contact, a domestic violence no contact order was issued prohibiting Scanlan from coming within 1,000 feet of Bagnell's house. Bagnell did not seek medical care for his injuries. Months after the no contact order, Bagnell's children checked on their father at the house: they found blood in the entryway, along the walls, and found shattered glass and ceramic on the kitchen floor. They discovered Bagnell in the family room severely bruised from head to toe. The children called 911. Scanlan was found in the garage underneath a blanket in her car with the doors locked. Scanlan was taken into custody; Bagnell was taken to the emergency room, where providers determined in addition to the extensive bruising, Bagnell had two broken fingers, and several skin tears on his legs and arms. Scanlan was charged with second degree assault, felony violation of a no contact order, unlawful imprisonment, and fourth degree assault. Neither Bagnell nor Scanlan testified at trial, but the court admitted several statements Bagnell made to his medical providers. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether a crime victim's statements to his medical providers were testimonial, and if so, whether their admission at trial violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court held the victim's statements were nontestimonial in this case, because they were not made with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for testimony. View "Washington v. Scanlan" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Washington State Housing Finance Commission (“Commission”) had standing to challenge the National Homebuyers Fund’s (“NHF”) authority to provide down payment assistance to Washington residents in conjunction with federally insured mortgages. The Commission alleged NHF was falsely claiming governmental authority when it provided down payment assistance in Washington, impermissibly competing with the Commission’s own activities. The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the Commission on the basis that the Commission lacked standing. The Washington Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Commission indeed had standing. View "Wash. State Hous. Fin. Comm'n v. Nat'l Homebuyers Fund, Inc." on Justia Law

Teresa Banowsky filed a claim for medical malpractice in Washington district court on the last day of the statute of limitations, seeking over $100,000. District courts could exercise jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims, but not over claims seeking over $100,000. CRLH 14A(b) directs district courts to remove or transfer cases to superior court when any party asserts a claim in excess of the district court’s jurisdiction, or seeks a remedy beyond the court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held CRLJ 14A(b) validly and unambiguously required the district court to transfer Banowsky’s case to superior court. View "Banowsky v. Backstrom" on Justia Law

Brendan Taylor was charged with felony violation of a no-contact order. Before trial, Taylor offered to stipulate to the fact that a domestic violence no-contact order was in place, and that he knew of the order. The trial court rejected the stipulation, and admitted the no-contact order into evidence. The trial court reasoned that Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) did not apply to the admission of a domestic violence no-contact order. The jury convicted Taylor, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Old Chief applied, and required the trial court exclude the no-contact order from evidence. In an issue of first impression, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Old Chief did not apply, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Taylor" on Justia Law

A jury convicted petitioner Tomas Berhe of murder and assault. After the trial, juror 6 came forward, alleging that racial bias during jury deliberations influenced the verdict. The trial court denied Berhe's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing, instead relying solely on written declarations prepared with the aid of counsel. The Washington Supreme Court recognized that when allegations of juror misconduct arise after the verdict, trial courts have discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. “However, there are limits to that discretion, particularly in cases of alleged racial bias that deprives a defendant of his or her constitutional right to a. fair trial by an impartial jury.” In this case, the Supreme Court determined the trial court: (1) did not exercise sufficient oversight of the process, allowing counsel to taint several jurors with inappropriate questions about their deliberations; and (2) the court did not conduct a sufficient inquiry before determining that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The Supreme Court therefore vacated the trial court's order denying Berhe's motion for a new trial and remanded for further inquiry and other proceedings as necessary. View "Washington v. Berhe" on Justia Law

Jared Karstetter worked for labor organizations representing King County, Washington corrections officers for over 20 years. In 1987, Karstetter began working directly for the King County Corrections Officers Guild (Guild). Throughout his employment with the Guild, Karstetter operated under successive 5-year contracts that provided for just cause termination. Eventually, Karstetter formed his own law firm and worked primarily for the Guild. He offered services to at least one other client. His employment contracts remained substantially the same. Karstetter's wife, Julie, also worked for the Guild as Karstetter's office assistant. In 2016, the King County ombudsman's office contacted Karstetter regarding a whistleblower complaint concerning parking reimbursements to Guild members. The Guild's vice-president directed Karstetter to cooperate with the investigation. The Guild sought advice from an outside law firm, which advised the Guild to immediately terminate Karstetter. In April 2016, the Guild took this advice and, without providing the remedial options listed in his contract, fired Karstetter. In response, Karstetter and his wife filed suit against the Guild, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Guild moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim. The trial court partially granted the motion but allowed Karstetter's claims for breach of contract and wrongful termination to proceed. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, directing the trial court to dismiss Karstetter's remaining breach of contract and wrongful termination claims. The Washington Supreme Court found that “the evolution in legal practice has uniquely affected the in-house attorney employee and generated unique legal and ethical questions unlike anything contemplated by our Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs).” In this case, the Court found in-house employee attorneys should be treated differently from traditional private practice lawyers under the RPCs. “Solely in the narrow context of in-house employee attorneys, contract and wrongful discharge suits are available, provided these suits can be brought without violence to the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.”Karstetter alleged legally cognizable claims and pleaded sufficient facts to overcome a CR 12(b)(6) motion of dismissal. The Court of Appeals' ruling was reversed. View "Karstetter v. King County Corr. Guild" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) generally prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because the employee has a disability. The question posed centered on whether obesity qualified as an "impairment" under the WLAD. In 2007, Casey Taylor received a conditional offer of employment as an electronic technician for BNSF Railway Company, contingent on a physical exam and medical history questionnaire. The medical exam found Taylor met the minimum physical demands of the essential functions of his would-be job. Taylor self-reported his height and weight as 5'7" and 250 pounds, making his BMI 39.2. The medical exam revealed he was 5'6" and 256 pounds, with the resulting BMI of 41.3. BNSF treated a BMI over 40 as a "trigger" for further screening in its employment process. Because Taylor's BMI was over 40, the results were reviewed by BNSF's chief medical officer. Ultimately, BNSF told Taylor it was unable to determine whether he was medically qualified for the job "due to significant health and safety risks associated with extreme obesity, and uncertain status of knees and back." BNSF offered to reconsider Taylor's employment offer if he paid for additional medical testing, including a sleep study, blood work, and an exercise tolerance test. In short, BNSF told Taylor it was company policy not to hire anyone who had a BMI of over 35, and if he could not afford testing, his option was to lose 10 percent of his weight and keep it off for six months. Thereafter, Taylor sued. The Washington Supreme Court responded to the certified question that obesity "always qualifies as an impairment under the plain language of RCW 49.60.040(7)(c)(i) because it is recognized by the medical community as a 'physiological disorder, or condition' ... therefore, if an employer refuses to hire someone because the employer perceives the applicant to have obesity, and the applicant is able to properly perform the job in question, the employer violates this section of the WLAD." View "Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

A drunk driver hit and disabled another vehicle, then fled. A Good Samaritan stopped to help the struck vehicle; while helping, the Good Samaritan was fatally injured when a second vehicle did not see the disabled vehicle in time to avoid striking it, pushing the disabled vehicle into the Good Samaritan, ultimately killing him. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the drunk driver's acts were too attenuated from the Good Samaritan's death for criminal liability to attach. The Supreme Court concluded the drunk driver's (Joshua Frahm) acts were the legal cause of the Good Samaritan's death, because those acts were criminal, cause direct harm as well as risk of further harm, and occurred close in time and location to the ultimate harm that befell the Good Samaritan. Furthermore, the Court concluded the issue of intervening, superseding cause was proper for the jury to determine as a matter of actual cause using a reasonable foreseeability standard, and that the vehicular homicide conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. Frahm's conviction was affirmed. View "Washington v. Frahm" on Justia Law

Seattle voters approved the "Democracy Voucher Program," intending to increase civic engagement. Recipients could give their vouchers to qualified municipal candidates, who could redeem those vouchers for campaign purposes. The city would find the program through property taxes. Mark Elster and Sarah Pynchon sued, arguing the taxes funding the program was unconstitutional. Because the program did not violate the First Amendment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Elster v. City Of Seattle" on Justia Law