Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Krista Peoples and Joel Stedman filed Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") suits against their insurance carriers for violating Washington claims-handling regulations and wrongfully denying them personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law relating to whether Peoples and Stedman alleged an injury to "business or property" to invoke their respective policies' PIP benefits. Peoples alleged her insurance carrier refused, without any individualized assessment, to pay medical provider bills whenever a computerized review process determined the bill exceeded a predetermined limit, and that the insurance company's failure to investigate or make individualized determinations violated WAC 284-30-330(4) and WAC 284-30-395(1). Due to this practice of algorithmic review, the insurance carrier failed to pay all reasonable medical expenses arising from a covered event, in violation or RCW 48.22.005(7). Stedman alleged his carrier terminate PIP benefits whenever an insured reached "Maximum Medical Improvement," which he alleged violated WAC 284-30-395(1). The Washington Supreme Court held an insurance carrier's wrongful withholding of PIP benefits injures the insured in their "business or property." An insured in these circumstances may recover actual damages, if proved, including out-of-pocket medical expenses that should have been covered, and could seek injunctive relief, such as compelling payment of the benefits to medical providers. Other business or property injuries, apart from wrongful denial of benefits, that are caused by an insurer's mishandling of PIP claims are also cognizable under the CPA. View "Peoples v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Gildardo Vargas was working on a construction project when a concrete-carrying hose hit him in the head, and caused a severe traumatic brain injury. Vargas and his family sued the general contractor, the concrete supplier, and the concrete pumper for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the general contractor was directly liable for providing a safe workplace, and whether any breach proximately caused Vargas’ injury. View "Vargas v. Inland Washington, LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2015, two men severely beat and killed 89-year-old Robert Hood. The two men, respondents Robert Pry and Robert Davis, forced their way into Hood's home, tied him up, and beat and robbed him. Pry and Davis contacted respondent Arnold Cruz for assistance. Cruz was not involved in the murder or robbery of Hood's home. Sometime later, Hood's caretaker visited Hood's home and, after noticing that. Hood was gone and someone had rifled through the house, alerted the police. Hood's body was eventually discovered stuffed in a blue plastic barrel. The police released Cruz's name to the press as a person of interest, and Cruz surrendered himself to law enforcement. At issue in this case was whether the information charging Cruz with rendering criminal assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Specifically, he contended the charging document had to include additional statutory elements from RCW 9A.76.050. The Washington Supreme Court held that because section .050 provided essential elements for rendering criminal assistance and Cruz's information lacked those elements, the information was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, dismissed the charge of rendering criminal assistance without prejudice, and remanded Cruz's case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pry" on Justia Law

First Student, Inc., a school bus contractor, sought to reverse a Court of Appeals decision to affirm dismissal of its business and occupation ("B&O") tax refund action. At issue was whether First Student's transporting of students qualified as transporting persons "for hire" such that it made First Student subject to the public utility tax ("PUT") rather than the general B&O tax. The Washington Supreme Court found the meaning of "for hire" was ambiguous as used in the PUT, but resolved the ambiguity in favor of the long-standing interpretation that school buses were excluded from the definitions of "motor transportation business" and "urban transportation business" under RCW 82.16.010(6) and (12). The Court found that WAC 458-20-180 was a valid interpretation of the statute, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "First Student, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Broadly speaking, Seattle's First-In-Time ("FIT") rule requires Seattle landlords when seeking to fill vacant tenancies to provide notice of rental criteria, screen all completed applications in chronological order, and to offer the tenancy to the first qualified applicant (subject to certain exceptions). Plaintiffs were Seattle landlords who claimed the FIT rule facially violated their state constitutional rights. The trial court ruled the FIT rule was unconstitutional on its face because: (1) the rule facially effected a per se regulatory taking for private use; (2) the rule facially infringed on plaintiffs' substantive due process rights; and (3) the rule facially infringed plaintiffs' free speech rights. The Washington Supreme Court determined the FIT rule was constitutional, "[t]he FIT rule is unquestionably an experiment." The Court adopted the definition of regulatory takings set forth in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) for the purposes of Washington Constitution article I, section 16, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing the FIT rule facially met this definition. The Court also clarified the rational basis review applied in substantive due process challenges to laws regulating the use of property, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the FIT rule failed rational basis review on its face. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that on its face, the FIT rule required only factual disclosures, and the City met its burden of showing the rule survived deferential scrutiny. View "Yim v. Seattle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bisir Muhammad was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first degree rape. His victim, 69 years old at the time of her death; the jury found Muhammad knew or should have known his victim was particularly vulnerable. He received an exceptional sentence of two terms totaling 866 months to be served consecutively. The main issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying Muhammad's motion to suppress physical evidence collected from his vehicle after police located it via a warrantless cell phone "ping." Muhammad contended the location information provided by the cell phone ping was protected from warrantless searches under both the Washington and federal Constitutions. The majority of a divided Supreme Court agreed the ping was a search, permissible, and Muhammad's convictions for both felony murder predicated on rape and first degree rape violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court agreed with ping was permissible. By a vote of five to four, the Court held felony murder and rape violated double jeopardy, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to dismiss the lesser-included offense. View "Washington v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

This case began with the theft of a backpack from a vehicle: the backpack contained cash and checks obtained for a school fundraiser. Several days after the vehicle prowl, defendant Jose Barboza-Cortes was video recorded at an ATM (automated teller machine) depositing four checks in his bank account, three of which had been in the stolen backpack. The fourth check listed "Dava Construction Company" in the top left comer. Police obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence for the backpack. During the search, police found methamphetamine in defendant's basement apartment and a shotgun under the mattress in the bedroom. There was no testimony that defendant owned the shotgun. A jury found defendant guilty of nine crimes, including second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second degree identity theft. In this case the issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm statute, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), and the second degree identity theft statute, RCW 9.35.020(1), were each alternative means statutes, and, if so, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to give a unanimity instruction addressing the alternative means. The Supreme Court held that neither statute was an alternative means statute. Accordingly, the absence of a specific unanimity instruction regarding counts based on these statutes did not result in error. The Court of Appeals was reversed with respect to its holding that the second degree identity theft statute was an alternative means statute. View "Washington v. Barboza-Cortes" on Justia Law

Respondent Evergreen Freedom Foundation (Foundation) filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request for the names and addresses of individuals who provided subsidized childcare under Washington's Working Connections Child Care program (WCCC). After the Foundation filed its request, but before any records were released, voters passed an initiative exempting those names and addresses from PRA coverage and prohibiting agencies from releasing them. The question presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review in this case was whether that initiative barred release even though it did not take effect until after the Foundation made its public records request. The Supreme Court held that the answer was yes. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 925 v. Dep't of Early Learning" on Justia Law

Arthur West appealed a judgment finding the charges in his petition to recall Washington Governor Jay Inslee to be legally and factually insufficient to submit to voters. In his recall petition, West alleged the governor was absent from Washington too frequently and failed to properly notify the lieutenant governor of these absences, failed to declare homelessness a statewide emergency, and improperly campaigned for a ballot initiative. The trial court held that the charges were factually and legally insufficient. The Washington Supreme Court found that while West's petition may have stated reasons to disagree with Governor Inslee, but they were not proper reasons to support a recall. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

In May 2013, a clear and sunny day, William Scott, a driver for Mullen Trucking 2005 Ltd., was transporting an oversize load on Interstate 5 from Canada to Vancouver, Washington. Scott's truck had a pilot vehicle driven by Tammy Detray. Along the route was the Skagit River Bridge. As they entered and crossed the bridge in the right lane, Detray was distracted, talking to her husband on a handsfree cell phone device. Affixed to the right front of Detray's pickup was a 16-foot 2-inch tall clearance pole. Detray stated she did not strike the bridge with the pole, but this was contradicted by at least one witness who said the clearance pole hit the bridge four or five times. Detray was only 4.12 seconds and approximately 300 feet ahead of Scott. As Scott neared the bridge, he noticed a truck behind him quickly approaching. About a half mile before they entered the bridge, the approaching truck, owned by codefendant Motorways Transport Ltd. and driven by Amandeep Sidhu, was "virtually beside" Scott on his left, confining Scott to the right side of the bridge. Scott's oversize load struck the lower right curvature portion of 11 sway braces. By striking the trusses, Scott caused the north bridge section to collapse into the river. The State sued Mullen Trucking and Motorways Transport for negligence. The trucking companies counterclaimed, claiming the State was also negligent. The trucking companies conceded the State could not be held liable, but they sought to allocate fault to the State under Washington’s comparative fault statute to offset any damage award that may be entered against them. The Washington Supreme Court was asked to decide whether fault may be allocated to the State under the comparative fault statute when the maximum height statute stated "no liability may attach" to the State under these circumstances. The Court determined no fault could be allocated to the State and affirmed. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Mullen Trucking 2005, Ltd." on Justia Law