Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John and Michelle Strauss challenged the Court of Appeals decision affirming summary dismissal of their action against Premera Blue Cross, which arose out of the denial of coverage for proton beam therapy (PBT) to treat John's prostate cancer. At issue was whether the Strausses established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding PBT's superiority to intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT), thereby demonstrating that proton beam therapy was "medically necessary" within the meaning of their insurance contract. The Washington Supreme Court determined they did, and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and remanded for a jury trial on the disputed facts. View "Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

In a moot case of substantial and continuing public interest, a juvenile offender challenges whether her need for treatment was an appropriate basis for imposing a manifest justice disposition. B.O.J. pled guilty to two counts of third degree theft for shoplifting from a grocery store. These offenses subjected her to a "local sanctions" standard sentencing range. In exchange for a plea, the prosecution promised to recommend 6 months of community supervision, 8 hours of community service, credit for time served, release at her sentencing disposition, and no contact with the victims. One month later, the State contended B.O.J. violated the conditions of her release by running away from placement. The State thereafter recommended a manifest justice disposition with confinement in a Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration facility. The trial court stated its findings that both B.O.J.'s need for treatment and the standard sentencing range as too lenient supported the manifest injustice disposition. The Washington Supreme Court determined the trial court's findings were not an appropriate basis for imposing a manifest injustice disposition. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding that B.O.J.'s need for treatment supported the trial court's finding that a standard range disposition would effectuate a manifest injustice. View "Washington v. B.O.J." on Justia Law

While driving his truck, Moun Keodalah and an uninsured motorcyclist collided. After Keodalah stopped at a stop sign and began to cross the street, the motorcyclist struck Keodalah's truck. The collision killed the motorcyclist and injured Keodalah. Keodalah's insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Keodalah requested Allstate pay him his UIM policy limit of $25,000. Allstate refused, offering $1,600 based on its assessment Keodalah was 70% at fault for the accident. After Keodalah asked Allstate to explain its evaluation, Allstate increased its offer to $5,000. Keodalah sued Allstate asserting a UIM claim. The ultimate issue before the Washington Supreme Court in this case was whether RCW 48.01.030 provided a basis for an insured's bad faith and Consumer Protection Act claims against an insurance company's claims adjuster. The Supreme Court held that such claims were not available, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Keodalah v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the 2007-2009 financial crisis and recession. In 2005 and 2007, Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle purchased for residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from investment bank Credit Suisse. Federal Home Loan also bought certificates from Barclays Bank. In 2009, Federal Home Loan separately brought suit under the Securities Act against Credit Suisse and Barclays. Federal Home Loan alleged Credit Suisse and Barclays each had made untrue or misleading statements relating to the certificates it purchased. n each case, the investment banks moved for summary judgment, which was granted. Federal Home Loan sought review of each case, arguing that reliance on the statements wasn't an element under the Act. The Washington Supreme Court concurred and concluded a plaintiff need not prove reliance under the Act. the Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Fed. Home Loan Bank of Seattle v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC" on Justia Law

Frank Wallmuller pleaded guilty in 2014 to first degree rape of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor. He successfully appealed on grounds of sentencing error and imposition of improper community custody conditions, and the Court of Appeals remanded for correction of those errors. On remand, the trial court struck the challenged community custody conditions, which related to pornography and businesses selling liquor, but reimposed three of the original conditions relating to contact with children. The Court of Appeals held that a community custody condition barring a defendant from "places where children congregate" was inherently vague, in violation of due process, unless it was “cabined” by an exclusive list of specific prohibited places. The Washington Supreme Court held that this was error: “While an illustrative list of prohibited places serves to clarify and define such a condition, crafting an exclusive list is neither constitutionally required nor practically possible.” The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the challenged condition. View "Washington v. Wallmuller" on Justia Law

In January 2016, Michael Peck and Clark Tellvik were seen on a security camera, burglarizing a home. The owner of the home was demonstrating her home's new surveillance system to a friend on her phone when she saw the crime in progress. She called 911, and officers arrived at the home within minutes. When officers arrived, a Dodge Dakota pickup truck was stuck in the snow in front of the house. Peck and Tellvik were outside the truck, trying to free it from the snow. The officers contacted Peck and Tellvik, frisked them, and detained them. Additional responding officers arrived within minutes, ran the registration of the vehicle, and discovered it was stolen. Officers arrested Peck and Tellvik for possession of a stolen vehicle. During the inventory search of the vehicle that was ultimately impounded, an officer discovered a "black zippered nylon case" that seemed to hold CDs (compact disks), and opened it. Inside the black zippered nylon case was packaged methamphetamine, an electronic scale, and a smoking pipe. The State charged Peck and Tellvik with several crimes, including possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Peck and Tellvik moved to suppress the contents of the black zippered nylon case. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding the inventory search to be proper and finding no evidence of pretext. Peck and Tellvik were subsequently convicted. Both appealed their controlled substance convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The issues this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on: (1) whether defendants had standing to challenge the scope of a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle when that vehicle was stolen; and (2) whether a proper inventory search extends to opening an innocuous, unlocked container of unknown ownership found in a stolen vehicle associated with defendants who were apprehended while burglarizing a home. The Supreme Court held that defendants had automatic standing to challenge the search and that the search of the innocuous container was lawful under these circumstances. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "Washington v. Peck" on Justia Law

Pepper and Clarice Kirkendoll hired loggers to harvest their trees. But Pepper Kirkendoll misrepresented the boundaries of his and Clarice's land, and the loggers harvested trees belonging to the neighbors, Jerry Porter and Karen Zimmer. Porter and Zimmer sued the Kirkendolls and the loggers. The loggers settled with Porter and Zimmer and assigned to them their indemnity and contribution claims against the Kirkendolls as part of that settlement. The remaining parties then filed separate motions for summary judgment. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that the settlement released the Kirkendolls from liability and that Porter and Zimmer had no valid contribution or indemnity claims. The Court of Appeals reversed, making a series of holdings. It held that the settlement did not release the Kirkendolls from potential liability for their own tort of directing the timber trespass. It held that Porter and Zimmer could proceed with their assigned indemnity claims, but not with their assigned contribution claims. And it held that Porter and Zimmer were precluded from recovering under the waste statute because relief was available under the timber trespass statute. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's holdings that the settlement did not release the Kirkendolls from liability and that Porter and Zimmer were precluded from recovering under the waste statute. But the Court reversed the appellate court's holding on the indemnity and contribution claims. View "Porter v. Kirkendoll" on Justia Law

In 2015, Petitioner Randall Hoffman submitted a public records request to the Kittitas County Sheriff’s Office seeking police reports referencing an individual, Erin Schnebly. The clerk at the sheriff’s office did not locate any photos or videos, though the office’s electronic case management system indicted there were 95 photographs and 2 videos related to responsive reports. The clerk, telephoning Hoffman for clarification, stated she could not find any involvement by Hoffman in the incidents, and had not found any photos or videos. Based on an erroneous interpretation of RCW 42.56.050 which the parties agreed was indeed, erroneous, the clerk told Hoffman that because he was not a party involved in the reports, she could not release a majority of the documents found. Hoffman sued respondents Kittitas County and the Kittitas County Sheriff’s Office (hereinafter collectively County), alleging that the clerk’s initial response violated the Public Records Act. Hoffman argued the trial court's finding that the agency respondents lacked bad faith was reviewable de novo. But the Washington Supreme Court reviewed for abuse of discretion when imposing a penalty pursuant to the PRA, in line with the prevailing case law. The Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a $15,498 penalty. View "Hoffman v. Kittitas County" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of state law to the Washington Supreme Court. Money Mailer, LLC and Wade Brewer entered into a franchisor/franchisee relationship. In 2015, Money Mailer sued Brewer alleging breach of contract and for nearly $2 million in damages. Brewer counterclaimed, arguing among other things that Money Mailer violated the Franchise Investment Protection Act (FIPA) by selling him "products and services ... at more than a fair and reasonable price," contrary to RCW 19.100.180(2)(d). Brewer moved for partial summary judgment on the alleged FIPA violation. The district court found undisputed Money Mailer sold printed advertisements to Brewer at twice the price at which Money Mailer obtained and/or produced them. The court determined this markup violated RCW 19.100.180(2)(d) as a matter of law, and on this ground, granted in part Brewer's motion. In concluding Money Mailer's behavior violated the FIPA, the district court relied on two conclusions regarding Washington law: (1) the Court impliedly found that a franchisee may generally rely on the price at which a franchisor purchased a particular good or service to show what the "fair and reasonable price" for that service is; and (2) that selling a franchisee a particular good or service for twice what it cost the franchisor was not a "fair and reasonable price" and violated FlPA as a matter of Washington law. The federal court certified those conclusions as questions, asking the Washington Supreme Court to clarify whether those two rules of law were correct. After review, the Supreme Court answered "no" to both. A "fair and reasonable price" in RCW 19.100.180(2)(d) was a question of fact involving what prudent franchisors and franchisees in similar circumstances would regard as an appropriate price. "The circumstances must take into account the forces of the marked...whether Money Mailer violated the FIPA remains a question of fact to be determined by the district court." View "Money Mailer, LLC v. Brewer" on Justia Law

This case concerned whether the city of Tacoma (City) could be held liable for damages for imposing an unlawful condition on a building permit. The Church of the Divine submitted an application to the City to build a parsonage on property it owned. A single-family residence had previously been located on the property, but it had been demolished in 2012. City staff reviewed the permit application and placed a number of conditions on it, including, at issue here, a requirement that the Church dedicate a 30-foot-wide strip of land for right-of-way improvements to a street abutting the property. While the existing street was generally 60 feet wide in other areas, it was 30 feet wide next to the Church's property. This lack of uniformity had existed for around 100 years. The Church challenged the permit conditions, and the City eventually removed most of them but kept the requirement for a dedication. The Church appealed the decision to the City's hearing examiner, and the hearing examiner granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Church appealed under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), in which it challenged the hearing examiner's decision and also sought damages under RCW 64.40.020. In addressing the propriety of the dedication, the court confined its review to the administrative record that had been before the hearing examiner and acknowledged that, in that record, the stated purpose by the City for imposing the dedication requirement was to create a uniform street. The court held that this reason was insufficient to justify the requirement and reversed the hearing examiner, invalidating the condition. A trial court denied the Church’s request for damages and the Church appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Washington Supreme Court revered however, finding that the City's subjective belief that the dedication was lawful did not determine what it objectively should reasonably have known. The Court of Appeals erred in reasoning otherwise. The matter was remanded for a new trial. View "Church of the Divine Earth v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law