Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

First Student, Inc., a school bus contractor, sought to reverse a Court of Appeals decision to affirm dismissal of its business and occupation ("B&O") tax refund action. At issue was whether First Student's transporting of students qualified as transporting persons "for hire" such that it made First Student subject to the public utility tax ("PUT") rather than the general B&O tax. The Washington Supreme Court found the meaning of "for hire" was ambiguous as used in the PUT, but resolved the ambiguity in favor of the long-standing interpretation that school buses were excluded from the definitions of "motor transportation business" and "urban transportation business" under RCW 82.16.010(6) and (12). The Court found that WAC 458-20-180 was a valid interpretation of the statute, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "First Student, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

Broadly speaking, Seattle's First-In-Time ("FIT") rule requires Seattle landlords when seeking to fill vacant tenancies to provide notice of rental criteria, screen all completed applications in chronological order, and to offer the tenancy to the first qualified applicant (subject to certain exceptions). Plaintiffs were Seattle landlords who claimed the FIT rule facially violated their state constitutional rights. The trial court ruled the FIT rule was unconstitutional on its face because: (1) the rule facially effected a per se regulatory taking for private use; (2) the rule facially infringed on plaintiffs' substantive due process rights; and (3) the rule facially infringed plaintiffs' free speech rights. The Washington Supreme Court determined the FIT rule was constitutional, "[t]he FIT rule is unquestionably an experiment." The Court adopted the definition of regulatory takings set forth in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) for the purposes of Washington Constitution article I, section 16, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing the FIT rule facially met this definition. The Court also clarified the rational basis review applied in substantive due process challenges to laws regulating the use of property, and held plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving the FIT rule failed rational basis review on its face. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that on its face, the FIT rule required only factual disclosures, and the City met its burden of showing the rule survived deferential scrutiny. View "Yim v. Seattle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Bisir Muhammad was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first degree rape. His victim, 69 years old at the time of her death; the jury found Muhammad knew or should have known his victim was particularly vulnerable. He received an exceptional sentence of two terms totaling 866 months to be served consecutively. The main issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred in denying Muhammad's motion to suppress physical evidence collected from his vehicle after police located it via a warrantless cell phone "ping." Muhammad contended the location information provided by the cell phone ping was protected from warrantless searches under both the Washington and federal Constitutions. The majority of a divided Supreme Court agreed the ping was a search, permissible, and Muhammad's convictions for both felony murder predicated on rape and first degree rape violated double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals was affirmed in part, and reversed in part. By a vote of six to three, the Supreme Court agreed with ping was permissible. By a vote of five to four, the Court held felony murder and rape violated double jeopardy, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to dismiss the lesser-included offense. View "Washington v. Muhammad" on Justia Law

This case began with the theft of a backpack from a vehicle: the backpack contained cash and checks obtained for a school fundraiser. Several days after the vehicle prowl, defendant Jose Barboza-Cortes was video recorded at an ATM (automated teller machine) depositing four checks in his bank account, three of which had been in the stolen backpack. The fourth check listed "Dava Construction Company" in the top left comer. Police obtained a warrant to search defendant's residence for the backpack. During the search, police found methamphetamine in defendant's basement apartment and a shotgun under the mattress in the bedroom. There was no testimony that defendant owned the shotgun. A jury found defendant guilty of nine crimes, including second degree unlawful possession of a firearm and second degree identity theft. In this case the issue defendant’s appeal presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm statute, RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), and the second degree identity theft statute, RCW 9.35.020(1), were each alternative means statutes, and, if so, whether, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court was required to give a unanimity instruction addressing the alternative means. The Supreme Court held that neither statute was an alternative means statute. Accordingly, the absence of a specific unanimity instruction regarding counts based on these statutes did not result in error. The Court of Appeals was reversed with respect to its holding that the second degree identity theft statute was an alternative means statute. View "Washington v. Barboza-Cortes" on Justia Law

Respondent Evergreen Freedom Foundation (Foundation) filed a Public Records Act (PRA) request for the names and addresses of individuals who provided subsidized childcare under Washington's Working Connections Child Care program (WCCC). After the Foundation filed its request, but before any records were released, voters passed an initiative exempting those names and addresses from PRA coverage and prohibiting agencies from releasing them. The question presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review in this case was whether that initiative barred release even though it did not take effect until after the Foundation made its public records request. The Supreme Court held that the answer was yes. View "Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 925 v. Dep't of Early Learning" on Justia Law

Arthur West appealed a judgment finding the charges in his petition to recall Washington Governor Jay Inslee to be legally and factually insufficient to submit to voters. In his recall petition, West alleged the governor was absent from Washington too frequently and failed to properly notify the lieutenant governor of these absences, failed to declare homelessness a statewide emergency, and improperly campaigned for a ballot initiative. The trial court held that the charges were factually and legally insufficient. The Washington Supreme Court found that while West's petition may have stated reasons to disagree with Governor Inslee, but they were not proper reasons to support a recall. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court. View "In re Recall of Inslee" on Justia Law

In May 2013, a clear and sunny day, William Scott, a driver for Mullen Trucking 2005 Ltd., was transporting an oversize load on Interstate 5 from Canada to Vancouver, Washington. Scott's truck had a pilot vehicle driven by Tammy Detray. Along the route was the Skagit River Bridge. As they entered and crossed the bridge in the right lane, Detray was distracted, talking to her husband on a handsfree cell phone device. Affixed to the right front of Detray's pickup was a 16-foot 2-inch tall clearance pole. Detray stated she did not strike the bridge with the pole, but this was contradicted by at least one witness who said the clearance pole hit the bridge four or five times. Detray was only 4.12 seconds and approximately 300 feet ahead of Scott. As Scott neared the bridge, he noticed a truck behind him quickly approaching. About a half mile before they entered the bridge, the approaching truck, owned by codefendant Motorways Transport Ltd. and driven by Amandeep Sidhu, was "virtually beside" Scott on his left, confining Scott to the right side of the bridge. Scott's oversize load struck the lower right curvature portion of 11 sway braces. By striking the trusses, Scott caused the north bridge section to collapse into the river. The State sued Mullen Trucking and Motorways Transport for negligence. The trucking companies counterclaimed, claiming the State was also negligent. The trucking companies conceded the State could not be held liable, but they sought to allocate fault to the State under Washington’s comparative fault statute to offset any damage award that may be entered against them. The Washington Supreme Court was asked to decide whether fault may be allocated to the State under the comparative fault statute when the maximum height statute stated "no liability may attach" to the State under these circumstances. The Court determined no fault could be allocated to the State and affirmed. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Mullen Trucking 2005, Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2016, the Freedom Foundation sent Public Records Act (PRA) requests to several state agencies seeking disclosure of records for union-represented employees, including their full names, associated birth dates, and agency work email addresses. The agencies determined that all of the requested records were disclosable and, absent a court order, they intended to release the requested records. Several unions moved courts for preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent disclosure of the requested records. While a temporary injunction was granted as to most of the requested records, ultimately a permanent injunction was rejected. This case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review the issue of whether state employees had a protected privacy interest against disclosure of public records containing their birth dates associated with their names. The Supreme Court concluded the PRA did not exempt these records from disclosure, nor did the Washington Constitution, given that names and birth dates were widely available in the public domain. View "Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness & Hearing Loss" on Justia Law

Michael Weaver, a former City of Everett firefighter, contracted melanoma. He filed a temporary disability claim, which the Washington Department of Labor & Industries (Department) denied, finding the melanoma was not work related. The melanoma spread to Weaver's brain, for which he filed a permanent disability claim. The Department denied it as precluded by the denial of the temporary disability claim. The issue his case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata properly precluded Weaver's permanent disability claim. The Court found collateral estoppel did not apply because the doctrine would work an injustice in this situation, given that Weaver did not have sufficient incentive to fully and vigorously litigate the temporary disability claim in light of the disparity of relief between the two claims. Likewise, the Court held that res judicata did not apply because the two claims did not share identical subject matter, given that the permanent disability claim did not exist at the time of the temporary disability claim. View "Weaver v. City of Everett" on Justia Law

Sergeant Paul Snyder stopped a jeep driven by defendant Joel Villela for speeding late one night in January 2018. The officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath, and after defendant declined a roadside sobriety test, he was arrested on suspicion of driving while under the influence. The officer impounded the jeep under RCW 46.55.360. Pursuant to the statute, the officer did not consider whether there was a reasonable alternative to impounding the jeep, such as releasing it to one of defendant's two passengers. After the jeep was impounded, an inventory search was conducted whereby police found sandwich bags, digital scales, black cloth, pipes and cash, all of which were believed to have been associated with drug dealing. A search incident to arrest discovered cocaine on defendant himself; a possession with intent to deliver controlled substances charge was added to the DUI charge. Defendant moved to suppress fruits of the inventory search on grounds the search was not a lawful seizure under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. At issue before the Washington Supreme Court was whether RCW 46.55.360 was an unconstitutional expansion of what article I, section 7 allowed in only limited circumstances. To this, the Supreme Court agreed: "[o]ur constitution cannot be amended by statute, and while the legislature can give more protection to constitutional rights through legislation, it cannot use legislation to take that protection away." View "Washington v. Villela" on Justia Law