Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Between January 25 and July 26, 2017, members of the news media submitted 163 ublic Records Act ("PRA") requests to the Washington senate, house of representatives and the Washington legislature as a whole as well as to offices of individual state senators and representatives. In response to some requests, senate and house counsel stated that the legislature did not possess responsive records; in response to other requests, senate and house counsel and some individual legislators voluntarily provided limited records. Some records that were provided contained redactions, though no exemptions were identified. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the state legislative branch was subject to the general public records disclosure mandate of the PRA. The Court determined that under the plain meaning of the PRA, individual legislators were "agencies" subject in full to the PRA's general public records disclosure mandate because they were expressly included in the definitional chain of "agency" in a related statute. Furthermore, the Court held the institutional legislative bodies were not "agencies" because they were not included in that definitional chain, but they were, instead, subject to the PRA's narrower public records disclosure mandate by and through each chambers' respective administrative officer. View "Assoc. Press v. Wash. State Legislature" on Justia Law

Washington charged Ken Wu with "felony DUI," violating an ignition interlock requirement, and first-degree driving with a suspended license. The felony DUI charge was based on Wu having, within 10 years of his present arrest, four "prior offenses" as defined by the applicable statute. By this case, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the required elements for felony DUI, and who must determine whether such required elements are med: a judge or a jury. The Court held that the essential elements of felony DUI were set forth in RCW 46.61.5055(14)(a), and following a trial court's determination of admissibility, a jury should determine whether the essential elements of felony DUI have been met based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt provided by the State. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Wu" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court centered on whether a superior court could conduct preliminary appearance hearings for misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors originally filed in district court. Because Washington court rules authorized the superior court to conduct these hearings regardless of which court files these misdemeanors, and because there are no statutory or constitutional restrictions on this authority, the Supreme Court held a superior court could conduct preliminary appearance hearings for misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors that were originally filed in district court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case to the Stevens County Superior Court to issue a writ of mandamus against the Stevens County District Court to accept and file cases from the superior court. View "Washington v. Stevens County Dist. Court Judge" on Justia Law

Brandon Cate was found guilty by jury of burglary, theft and malicious mischief. At sentencing, the State calculated Cate's offender score as 9+, the highest category, based on numerous alleged prior convictions. In proving the alleged prior convictions, the State failed to provide copies of the relevant judgment and sentence forms, relying instead on a prosecutor's summary of Cate's criminal history. Cate did not object, the 9+ score was thus used to calculate his present sentence. On appeal, Cate challenged the sentence as erroneous because the State failed to meet its burden of proving his criminal history at sentencing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: relying on a portion of RCW 9.94A.530(2) risked shifting the burden to prove criminal history from the State to the defendant. Thus, the matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Washington v. Cate" on Justia Law

In 2015, Edward Kilduff filed a two-part Public Records Act ("PRA") request stemming from a wetlands classification dispute a subsequent investigation into improper government action ("IGA"). The public records clerk acknowledged the request and indicated a response would follow "within the next 5-10 business days." A San Juan County, Washington Prosecuting Attorney called Kilduff to discuss his records request. The attorney had previously directed a code enforcement officer to segregate the IGA file from the code enforcement file, and according to the attorney, Kilduff agreed to accept the final redacted IGA report in lieu of his records request. Kilduff disputed he agreed to limit his request, and claims he never received anything in writing memorializing the alleged modification of his request. Forty-five pages of documents responsive to the request were produced, as was an emailed copy of the redacted IGA report. No exemption log was included that would indicated any additional responsive records existed but were withheld. Thereafter, Kilduff sued San Juan County, alleging it violated the PRA by failing to conduct a reasonable search for responsive records, and silently withholding records without an exemption. The county denied the allegations and raised the affirmative defense that Kilduff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court ultimately ruled in the County's favor, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed. "[T]he people 'do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them' or 'give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not for them to know.'" The Court determined nothing in the PRA gave local governments the right to create another layer of administrative review or to require administrative exhaustion before the public may seek judicial review. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Kilduff's PRA claim and held public records requesters were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a PRA lawsuit. Furthermore, although Kilduff lacked standing to bring an ouster claim, the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed fees and sanctions. View "Kilduff v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

Shelly Arndt was convicted by jury for first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson. She received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Arndt appealed, arguing her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and her right to be free from double jeopardy were violated. After a careful review of the record, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial court's rulings limiting the testimony of Arndt's expert witness did not violate Arndt's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and were well within the court's discretion. Furthermore, the Court concluded Arndt's convictions for both first degree aggravated murder and first degree arson did not offend double jeopardy as the two crimes had separate purposes and effects, thus multiple punishments were allowed. View "Washington v. Arndt" on Justia Law

King County, Washington enacted a first-of-its-kind ordinance that required electric, gas, water and sewer utilities to pay for the right to use the county's rights-of-way (franchise). The associated planned charge was called "franchise compensation," and was based on an estimate of a franchise's value. If the county and utility couldn't agree on an amount, the county barred the utility from using its rights-of-way. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the County's authority to collect franchise compensation. Secondarily, the issue was whether water-sewer districts or private utilities could use the rights-of-way without a franchise from the County. The superior court ruled King County lacked authority to collect franchise compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that generally, King County could collect franchise compensation. Water-sewer districts and private utilities had no general right to use King County's rights-of-way without a franchise. View "King County v. King County Water Dists." on Justia Law

Krista Peoples and Joel Stedman filed Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA") suits against their insurance carriers for violating Washington claims-handling regulations and wrongfully denying them personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. The federal district court for the Western District of Washington certified a question of law relating to whether Peoples and Stedman alleged an injury to "business or property" to invoke their respective policies' PIP benefits. Peoples alleged her insurance carrier refused, without any individualized assessment, to pay medical provider bills whenever a computerized review process determined the bill exceeded a predetermined limit, and that the insurance company's failure to investigate or make individualized determinations violated WAC 284-30-330(4) and WAC 284-30-395(1). Due to this practice of algorithmic review, the insurance carrier failed to pay all reasonable medical expenses arising from a covered event, in violation or RCW 48.22.005(7). Stedman alleged his carrier terminate PIP benefits whenever an insured reached "Maximum Medical Improvement," which he alleged violated WAC 284-30-395(1). The Washington Supreme Court held an insurance carrier's wrongful withholding of PIP benefits injures the insured in their "business or property." An insured in these circumstances may recover actual damages, if proved, including out-of-pocket medical expenses that should have been covered, and could seek injunctive relief, such as compelling payment of the benefits to medical providers. Other business or property injuries, apart from wrongful denial of benefits, that are caused by an insurer's mishandling of PIP claims are also cognizable under the CPA. View "Peoples v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Gildardo Vargas was working on a construction project when a concrete-carrying hose hit him in the head, and caused a severe traumatic brain injury. Vargas and his family sued the general contractor, the concrete supplier, and the concrete pumper for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the general contractor. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the general contractor was directly liable for providing a safe workplace, and whether any breach proximately caused Vargas’ injury. View "Vargas v. Inland Washington, LLC" on Justia Law

In late 2015, two men severely beat and killed 89-year-old Robert Hood. The two men, respondents Robert Pry and Robert Davis, forced their way into Hood's home, tied him up, and beat and robbed him. Pry and Davis contacted respondent Arnold Cruz for assistance. Cruz was not involved in the murder or robbery of Hood's home. Sometime later, Hood's caretaker visited Hood's home and, after noticing that. Hood was gone and someone had rifled through the house, alerted the police. Hood's body was eventually discovered stuffed in a blue plastic barrel. The police released Cruz's name to the press as a person of interest, and Cruz surrendered himself to law enforcement. At issue in this case was whether the information charging Cruz with rendering criminal assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Specifically, he contended the charging document had to include additional statutory elements from RCW 9A.76.050. The Washington Supreme Court held that because section .050 provided essential elements for rendering criminal assistance and Cruz's information lacked those elements, the information was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, dismissed the charge of rendering criminal assistance without prejudice, and remanded Cruz's case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Pry" on Justia Law