Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Ehrhart died within days of contracting hantavirus near his Issaquah, Washington home in early 2017. His widow, Sandra Ehrhart, sued King County’s public health department, Swedish Medical Center, and an emergency room physician, arguing all three had negligently caused Brian's death. King County asserted public duty as an affirmative defense, arguing it was not liable for Brian’s death because it did not owe him any duty as an individual. Ehrhart moved for partial summary judgment asking the court to dismiss this defense and others. The trial court granted Ehrhart’s motion but conditioned its ruling on the jury finding particular facts. King County appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court accepted direct discretionary review. The issues presented were: (1) whether the trial court could properly grant summary judgment conditioned on the jury finding particular facts; and (2) whether the regulations governing King COunty's responsibility to issue health advisories created a duty owed to Brian individually as opposed to a non actionable duty owed to the public as a whole. The Supreme Court determined the trial court could not properly grant summary judgment conditioned on the jury finding particular facts; summary judgment was appropriate only when there were no genuine issues of material fact. The Court concluded King County did not owe an individualized duty to Brian, and no exception to the public duty doctrine applied in this case. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of King County on its public duty doctrine defense. View "Ehrhart v. King County" on Justia Law

In August 2004, the Askinses purchased a used car by entering into a retail installment contract with East Sprague Motors & R.V.'s, Inc. for $13,713.44 at an interest rate of 18.95% per year. The contract was contemporaneously assigned to Fireside Bank (formerly known as Fireside Thrift Co.). The Askinses made two years of regular payments, then returned the car to Fireside in an attempt to satisfy the loan. However, the loan was never satisfied. Fireside sold the car for less than the remaining balance owed, leaving the Askinses with an ongoing obligation. Fireside then sued the Askinses for the remaining balance of the loan. The Askinses did not appear, and the court entered a default judgment against them, which included prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees. Fireside assigned the debt to Cavalry Investments, LLC, in 2012. For the next 8 years, the Askinses were subjected to 14 writs of garnishment and several unsuccessful attempts at garnishment by Fireside and Cavalry. Approximately $10,849.16 was collected over the course of the garnishment proceedings. Fireside and Cavalry did not file any satisfactions of the garnishment judgments or partial satisfactions of the underlying judgment. Cavalry’s final writ of garnishment, obtained on August 3, 2015, stated that the Askinses still owed $11,158.94. This case presented an opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court to discuss the limits of CR60, in cases where a creditor uses the garnishment process to enforce a default judgment against a debtor. The Court held CR 60 may not be used to prosecute an independent cause of action separate and apart from the underlying cause of action in which the original order or judgment was filed. The Court held the trial court properly considered argument and evidence relevant to the questions of what was still owed on the underlying existing judgment and whether that judgment had been satisfied. The trial court correctly ruled that the judgment had been satisfied and ordered that the Askinses were entitled to prospective relief. View "Fireside Bank v. Askins" on Justia Law

John Whitaker was convicted of aggravated first degree murder based on the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping. He unsuccessfully sought to argue to the jury that he committed the kidnapping under duress. "Faced with such grave danger, a person may be excused for choosing the lesser evil. But because killing an innocent person is never the lesser of two evils, a duress defense is not available when a person is charged with murder." Because Whitaker was charged with murder and not kidnapping, the Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to assert a duress defense. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The judges of Benton and Franklin Counties (Washington) superior court issued local rules ordering the county clerk to maintain paper files of court documents. Believing electronic files were preferable, Michael Killian, the clerk of Franklin County, refused, and the judges sought a writ of mandamus to compel him to comply. The superior court issued the writ. After review, the Washington Supreme Court vacated the writ. The judges responded with an alternative plan, asking for a declaratory judgment. The Washington Supreme Court determined the writ of mandamus should have never been issued because the judges had an adequate alternative remedy available to them. Regardless, the Supreme Court determined the county clerk, not the judges, got to select the open, accessible format in which court documents were safely and accessibly maintained. View "Judges of Benton and Franklin Counties v. Killian" on Justia Law

The district court dismissed the criminal case against Mikhail Karpov on the ground that the State had failed to prove jurisdiction. Karpov was tried in the district court of Spokane County, Washington for five counts of indecent exposure. After the State rested, Karpov moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the State had provided insufficient evidence of jurisdiction. The court granted the motion because no witness had expressly stated that the alleged crimes took place in Spokane County, to which the district court's jurisdiction was statutorily limited. The question this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was whether the State could appeal that dismissal and retry Karpov upon reversal. Karpov argued that jurisdiction was an essential element of every crime and thus that the dismissal for the State's failure to prove jurisdiction resulted in an acquittal, meaning double jeopardy barred the State's initial appeal and prohibited retrial. The State countered that jurisdiction was not an essential element of every crime and thus that double jeopardy did not apply here. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was not an essential element of every crime but, rather, was the power of the court to hear and determine a case. However, the Court reversed the superior court and remanded for the reinstatement of the trial court's dismissal with prejudice. “When the trial court substantively treated jurisdiction as an essential element of the crime, the dismissal for failure to prove jurisdiction was no different than if jurisdiction were actually an essential element. The trial court therefore judicially acquitted Karpov when it dismissed the case against him, and double jeopardy barred the State's appeal from the district court and prohibits retrial of Karpov on these charges.” View "Washington v. Karpov" on Justia Law

In January 2017, petitioner Jamie Hugdahl was the target of two controlled drug buys executed by a confidential informant in the vicinity of a Safeway parking lot in Ellensburg, Washington. Hugdahl was subsequently charged by an information in 2017, which was amended twice. All three versions of the information alleged four counts of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(1). Count I was based on the first delivery of heroin. Counts II, III, and IV arose out of the second delivery involving methamphetamine, alprazolam, and ecstasy. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review concerned the adequacy of the charging document in alleging statutory sentence enhancements for delivering controlled substances within a protected zone under RCW 69.50.435(l)(c). The statutory sentence enhancement applied where a delivery of a controlled substance occurred within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. Hugdahl's information alleged that she delivered controlled substances "within one thousand feet of a school bus route.'" Hugdahl first challenged the adequacy of the information on appeal, and a divided Court of Appeals affirmed finding that the information provided constitutionally adequate notice of the enhancement. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, finding that the charging document omitted the facts necessary to charge the statutory enhancement. The sentencing enhancement was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Washington v. Hugdahl" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Washington Supreme Court. In 2011, Phonsavanh Phongmanivan was convicted of two counts of first degree assault with two firearm enhancements, and he was sentenced to 306 months' imprisonment. Phongmanivan appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and denied his motion for reconsideration. Phongmanivan's judgment and sentence becamse final on March 11, 2014 when his window to file a petition for certiorari review by the Washington Supreme Court expired. This marked the beginning of Phongmanivan’s one-year statute of limitations to file a federal habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). On February 4, 2015, 329 days later, Phongmanivan filed a PRP with the Washington Court of Appeals, thereby tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations for the pendency of that proceeding. The acting chief judge dismissed Phongmanivan s PRP as frivolous; the Washington Supreme Court’s commissioner denied further review. Phongmanivan then filed a timely motion to modify the commissioner's decision, which the Supreme Court denied on February 10, 2016. On April 1, 2016, the clerk of the Court of Appeals issued Phongmanivan's certificate of finality. Acting pro se, Phongmanivan filed his federal habeas petition 8 days later. However, following the federal magistrate's recommendation, the federal district court denied Phongmanivan’s petition as untimely, holding AEDPA's one-year tolling period had ceased on February 10, 2016, when the Supreme Court denied his motion to modify. By such reasoning, 388 total untolled days had elapsed prior to Phongmanivan's filing, rendering his habeas petition untimely by 23 days. Having reviewed the certified question from the Ninth Circuit relating to the denial of the PRP and the appellate court’s clerk’s certification of finality. Adopting Phongmanivan's suggested reformulation, the Washington Supreme Court determined Phongmanivan's PRP proceeding did not become final until the date his certificate of finality was issued on April 1, 2016. View "Phongmanivan v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Grott was put on trial for a shooting incident in which he claimed he acted in self-defense. He appealed to the Washington Supreme Court contending the trial court erred in instructing his jury that Grott could not claim self-defense if the jury found "beyond a reasonable doubt that [Grott] was the aggressor, and that defendant's acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight." Grott maintained the instruction was improperly given because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Grott's brother and cousins were friends with Julian Thomas, and Thomas would sometimes spend the night at their house. In August 2015, one of Grott's handguns went missing. Grott and his brother came to believe that Thomas had stolen the gun, but they did not confront him about it. Thomas stopped coming by their house around that time. Then on Halloween night in 2015, Grott came home intoxicated. Thomas' younger sister was at the house with some friends. Grott began yelling at the sister, accusing Thomas of stealing the gun. A man standing at the end of the driveway shot through the house's front door, nearly missing Grott's head. After the Halloween incident, Grott became "paranoid" and bought another gun. Months later, Thomas was shot while sitting in a car parked in a convenience store parking lot. Forty-eight shell casings were retrieved from the scene. The medical examiner testified that based on Thomas' wounds, he must have been directly facing Grott rather than lying on the car floor. A loaded gun with the safety off was discovered beneath Thomas' body. The Court of Appeals concurred with Grott the first-aggressor instruction was not properly given, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court determined the jury was properly instructed, and Grott's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. The matter was remanded for the Court of Appeals to address other issues raised on appeal. View "Washington v. Grott" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Washington legislature enacted RCW 81.104.160(1) (MVET statute) authorizing Sound Transit to use two separate depreciation schedules to calculate motor vehicle excise taxes (MVET). Under the statute, Sound Transit could pledge revenue from a 1996 depreciation schedule for MVETs to pay off bond contracts; Sound Transit could use a 2006 depreciation schedule for all other MVETs. Though each schedule is referenced, the MVET statute did not restate in full either schedule. Taylor Black and other taxpayers alleged the MVET statute violated article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution, stating "no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length." The Washington Supreme Court held the MVET statute is constitutional because (1) the statute was a complete act because it was readily ascertainable from its text alone when which depreciation schedule would apply; (2) the statute properly adopted both schedules by reference; and (3) the statute did not render a straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties established by other existing statutes erroneous because it did not require a reader to conduct research to find unreferenced laws that were impacted by the MVET statute. View "Black v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg'l Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Naziyr Yishmael, who was not an attorney, advised clients that they could "homestead" in apparently abandoned properties and, after a period of time, acquire title through adverse possession. After some of his clients were arrested for taking up residence in other people's houses, he was charged with and convicted of misdemeanor unlawful practice of law. On appeal, he contended: (1) the jury was improperly instructed that the unlawful practice of law was a strict liability offense; (2) the trial court's use of GR 24 to define the practice of law violated separation of powers was an inappropriate comment on the evidence; (3) the Statute was unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed Yishmael’s conviction. View "Washington v. Yishmael" on Justia Law