Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A class C felony "washes out" and is omitted from a defendant’s offender score as long as he or she is not convicted of any crime within five years of the last date of release from confinement. David Haggard was convicted of a misdemeanor offense within this five-year period, which was dismissed pursuant to RCW 3.66.067. When Haggard later pleaded guilty to burglary and arson, the trial court included prior class C felonies in his criminal history, finding that the dismissed misdemeanor conviction interrupted the washout period for those offenses. Haggard contended on appeal this was error. The Washington Supreme Court determined that because a dismissed conviction constituted a “conviction” under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), and misdemeanor dismissal and vacation were distinct processes, so Haggard's offender score was properly calculated. View "Washington v. Haggard" on Justia Law

Alejandro Escalante was detained for hours in a secured area at a border crossing and, the State conceded, interrogated by federal agents without Miranda warnings. Statements he made during that interrogation were used by the State to convict him of drug possession. While a traveler briefly detained and questioned at the border was typically not "in custody" for Miranda purposes, "the government’s power to detain and question people at the border without implicating Miranda has limits." Here, the Washington Supreme Court determined those limits were reached. "This border detention created the type of inherently coercive environment that demands Miranda warnings to ensure an individual’s choice to speak is the product of free will." The Supreme Court held that Escalante was in custody when he was interrogated and reversed. View "Washington v. Escalante" on Justia Law

In November 2013, Washington voters rejected Initiative 522 (I-522), which would have required labels on packaged foods containing genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) opposed state-level GMO labeling laws, including I-522. Over the course of the 2013 election cycle, GMA solicited over $14 million in optional contributions from its member companies, $11 million of which went to support the “No on 522” political committee. The payments to No on 522 were attributed solely to GMA itself, with no indication of which companies had provided the funds. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, GMA was not registered as a political committee and did not make any reports to the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC). The State filed a complaint alleging that GMA intentionally violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA)'s registration and disclosure requirements and the FCPA’s prohibition on concealing the sources of election-related spending. GMA countered that it cannot be subject to the FCPA’s registration and disclosure requirements because those requirements violate the First Amendment as applied. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The trial court agreed with the State, imposed a $6 million base penalty on GMA, and trebled the penalty to $18 million after determining GMA;s violations were intentional. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, but revered the treble penalty, holding that one had to "subjectively intend to violate the law in order to be subject to treble damages." After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion that the FCPA, and that the FCPA was constitutional as applied. The Court reversed the appellate court on the treble penalty, holding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard to determine GMA intentionally violated the FCPA. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of GMA's claim that the penalty imposed violated the excessive fines clauses of the federal and Washington constitutions. View "Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2017, petitioner Johnny Ray Cyr pleaded guilty to three counts of sale of a controlled substance (heroin) for profit. Cyr stipulated to his prior convictions and to his offender score of 5. Based on his convictions and offender score, the standard sentence range provided by the SRA is 68+ to 100 months. The issue his case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the statutory maximum sentence Cyr could receive for those three convictions. The Court held that if Cyr had a prior conviction for violating the Uniform Controlled Substances At, " “or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drugs,” then his statutory maximum sentence is 120 months. In that case, he must be sentenced within the standard range provided by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW. However, the Court could not determine from the record whether Cyr had such a prior qualifying conviction. The matter was therefore remanded to the trial court to address that question and, depending on the answer, to conduct further proceedings. View "Washington v. Cyr" on Justia Law

More than 70 years ago, two railroad companies helped the United States Atomic Energy Commission build a track to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in return for the right to use the track without paying rent. After the nuclear reactors at Hanford were decommissioned, the United States transferred nearly 800 acres, including the track at issue, to the Port of Benton (Port), subject to existing agreements and potential reversion to the United States if certain conditions were not met. The Port continued to honor the agreements and operate the railroad. The Port’s decision not to charge rent was challenged by a taxpayer, Randolph Peterson, as an unconstitutional gift of public funds. This challenge was dismissed at summary judgment. After review of the trial court record, the Washington Supreme Court found no constitutional violation and affirmed dismissal. View "Peterson v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law

This case involved claims against King County, Washington regarding jury selection and compensation. In 2016, petitioners filed a class action complaint in Pierce County, Washington Superior Court. They contended: (1) they had standing to file suit under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act; (2) jurors were employees entitled to minimum wage under Washington's Minimum Wage Act; and (3) RCW 2.36.080(3) created an implied cause of action for increased juror reimbursement based on economic status. Petitioners alleged that low rates of expense reimbursement have a greater impact on low-income jurors and asserted that this causes many jurors to seek excusal on the basis of financial hardship or to simply not respond to summons. Petitioners Nicole Bednarczyk and Catherine Selin sought reversal of a Court of Appeals decision affirming the superior court’s summary judgment dismissal of their declaratory relief, minimum wage, and disparate impact claims regarding jury service in King County. The Washington Supreme Court found standing was satisfied, but that jurors were not employees entitled to minimum wage, and there was no implied cause of action for requiring increased pay for jurors under RCW 2.36.080(3). "While we do not reach the inherent authority arguments, we take this opportunity to comment that low juror reimbursement is a serious issue that has contributed to poor juror summons response rates. The concerns raised by amici and petitioners as to the impact of low juror reimbursement on juror diversity, low-income jurors, and the administration of justice as a whole are valid points. While we should continue to cooperate with the other branches of government in an effort to address the long-standing problems identified by petitioners and amici, these concerns are best resolved in the legislative arena." View "Rocha v. King County" on Justia Law

Brian Ehrhart died within days of contracting hantavirus near his Issaquah, Washington home in early 2017. His widow, Sandra Ehrhart, sued King County’s public health department, Swedish Medical Center, and an emergency room physician, arguing all three had negligently caused Brian's death. King County asserted public duty as an affirmative defense, arguing it was not liable for Brian’s death because it did not owe him any duty as an individual. Ehrhart moved for partial summary judgment asking the court to dismiss this defense and others. The trial court granted Ehrhart’s motion but conditioned its ruling on the jury finding particular facts. King County appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court accepted direct discretionary review. The issues presented were: (1) whether the trial court could properly grant summary judgment conditioned on the jury finding particular facts; and (2) whether the regulations governing King COunty's responsibility to issue health advisories created a duty owed to Brian individually as opposed to a non actionable duty owed to the public as a whole. The Supreme Court determined the trial court could not properly grant summary judgment conditioned on the jury finding particular facts; summary judgment was appropriate only when there were no genuine issues of material fact. The Court concluded King County did not owe an individualized duty to Brian, and no exception to the public duty doctrine applied in this case. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of King County on its public duty doctrine defense. View "Ehrhart v. King County" on Justia Law

In August 2004, the Askinses purchased a used car by entering into a retail installment contract with East Sprague Motors & R.V.'s, Inc. for $13,713.44 at an interest rate of 18.95% per year. The contract was contemporaneously assigned to Fireside Bank (formerly known as Fireside Thrift Co.). The Askinses made two years of regular payments, then returned the car to Fireside in an attempt to satisfy the loan. However, the loan was never satisfied. Fireside sold the car for less than the remaining balance owed, leaving the Askinses with an ongoing obligation. Fireside then sued the Askinses for the remaining balance of the loan. The Askinses did not appear, and the court entered a default judgment against them, which included prejudgment interest, costs and attorney fees. Fireside assigned the debt to Cavalry Investments, LLC, in 2012. For the next 8 years, the Askinses were subjected to 14 writs of garnishment and several unsuccessful attempts at garnishment by Fireside and Cavalry. Approximately $10,849.16 was collected over the course of the garnishment proceedings. Fireside and Cavalry did not file any satisfactions of the garnishment judgments or partial satisfactions of the underlying judgment. Cavalry’s final writ of garnishment, obtained on August 3, 2015, stated that the Askinses still owed $11,158.94. This case presented an opportunity for the Washington Supreme Court to discuss the limits of CR60, in cases where a creditor uses the garnishment process to enforce a default judgment against a debtor. The Court held CR 60 may not be used to prosecute an independent cause of action separate and apart from the underlying cause of action in which the original order or judgment was filed. The Court held the trial court properly considered argument and evidence relevant to the questions of what was still owed on the underlying existing judgment and whether that judgment had been satisfied. The trial court correctly ruled that the judgment had been satisfied and ordered that the Askinses were entitled to prospective relief. View "Fireside Bank v. Askins" on Justia Law

John Whitaker was convicted of aggravated first degree murder based on the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping. He unsuccessfully sought to argue to the jury that he committed the kidnapping under duress. "Faced with such grave danger, a person may be excused for choosing the lesser evil. But because killing an innocent person is never the lesser of two evils, a duress defense is not available when a person is charged with murder." Because Whitaker was charged with murder and not kidnapping, the Court of Appeals held he was not entitled to assert a duress defense. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

The judges of Benton and Franklin Counties (Washington) superior court issued local rules ordering the county clerk to maintain paper files of court documents. Believing electronic files were preferable, Michael Killian, the clerk of Franklin County, refused, and the judges sought a writ of mandamus to compel him to comply. The superior court issued the writ. After review, the Washington Supreme Court vacated the writ. The judges responded with an alternative plan, asking for a declaratory judgment. The Washington Supreme Court determined the writ of mandamus should have never been issued because the judges had an adequate alternative remedy available to them. Regardless, the Supreme Court determined the county clerk, not the judges, got to select the open, accessible format in which court documents were safely and accessibly maintained. View "Judges of Benton and Franklin Counties v. Killian" on Justia Law