Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On September 10, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court in part and reversing in part a recall petition filed against Snohomish County Sheriff Adam Fortney. Sheriff Fortney challenged the trial court’s finding that four of five recall charges filed against him were factually and legally sufficient. Fortney’s first four months in office were beset by multiple controversies. In January 2020, Fortney rehired three deputies who had been terminated by the former sheriff for serious misconduct. In March 2020, Fortney wrote a Facebook post to justify a deputy’s use of physical force on a woman after a jaywalking incident. Then in April 2020, Fortney publicly accused Governor Jay Inslee of mishandling the COVID-19 crisis and stated that he would refuse to enforce the governor’s “Stay Home – Stay Healthy” proclamation. In May 2020, four voters responded to Fortney’s actions by filing multiple recall charges against him, initiating Washington’s recall process pursuant to RCW 29A.56.110-.270. After a hearing at the superior court, the trial court found four of the recall charges were factually and legally sufficient. The court rejected the charge related to the Snohomish County Jail, concluding that the petitioners had not met their burden to allege specific facts and legal standards to show Fortney violated his duties. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the incitement charge and the rehiring charge were factually and legally sufficient. Those charges, along with the unchallenged refusal-to-enforce charge, were permitted to proceed to the signature gathering phase. View "In re Recall of Fortney" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the state legislature could impose a duty to register as a sex offender in Washington where an individual would be required to register in the state of conviction. In 1984, respondent Benjamin Batson pleaded guilty in an Arizona court to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. As a result of his conviction, Arizona law required Batson to register as a sex offender for life. At some point prior to April 6, 2009, Batson moved to Washington. At that time, the State required individuals to register as sex offenders only if their out-ofstate offense would have been classified as a sex offense in Washington. Since Batson’s Arizona conviction arose from sexual contact with a 16-year-old, his offense would not have been a crime in Washington. But in June 2010, the state legislature amended the sex registry statute to require registration for “[a]ny federal or out-of-state conviction for: [a]n offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the state of conviction.” The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.44.128(10)(h) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: "the legislature permissibly identified circumstances under which Washington sex offender registration requirements become operative as to individuals with out-of-state convictions." View "Washington v. Batson" on Justia Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected. View "In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S." on Justia Law

Todd McLaughlin was riding his bicycle on a Seattle street when the door of a parked vehicle opened right into him. McLaughlin fell, suffered injuries, and sought insurance coverage for various losses, including his medical expenses. McLaughlin’s insurance policy covered those expenses if McLaughlin was a “pedestrian” at the time of the accident. McLaughlin argued a bicyclist was a pedestrian, relying on the definition of “pedestrian” found in the Washington laws governing casualty insurance. The trial court held a bicyclist was not a pedestrian, reasoning that the plain meaning of "pedestrian" excluded bicyclists. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying largely on its view that the Washington statute defined pedestrian for purposes of casualty insurance, excluded bicyclists. The Washington Supreme Court reversed. The Washington legislature defined “pedestrian” for purposes of casualty insurance in Washington broadly in RCW 48.22.005(11). The Supreme Court found that definition included bicyclists and applied to the insurance contract at issue here. "Even if we were to hold otherwise, at the very least, the undefined term 'pedestrian' in the insurance contract at issue must be considered ambiguous in light of the various definitions of 'pedestrian' discussed in this opinion. Being ambiguous, we must construe the insurance term favorably to the insured. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings." View "McLaughlin v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved cross appeals regarding a petition to recall Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan based on events that occurred at protests following the killing of George Floyd. The recall petition alleged Mayor Durkan failed to adequately control the Seattle Police Department’s (SPD) response to the protests, allowing the police to use unnecessary force and causing significant harm to nonviolent protesters, local residents, media representatives, and medical aid workers. Of the seven recall charges, six were dismissed by the trial court and one was allowed to move forward. Mayor Durkan appealed the charge that was allowed to move forward, and the recall petitioners appealed the dismissal of two other charges. On October 8, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court’s dismissal of two recall charges and reversing the finding that one charge was sufficient for recall. View "In re Recall of Durkan" on Justia Law

Simon Martinez sexually abused his daughter, Y.M., for nearly a decade, starting when she was about 5 years old. Martinez raped and sexually abused Y.M. regularly until she moved out of the family home in 2014, when she was about 14. Around that time, she told several people about the sexual abuse, including authorities. The State charged Martinez with one count of first degree rape of a child, which required it to prove Martinez raped Y.M. when she was no more than 12 years old. The State limited the charging period to three years: July 2009 to July 2012, even though there was considerable evidence the abuse continued until Y.M. was 14. The State elected not to add a charge of second degree rape. During trial, over Martinez’s objection, Y.M.’s two friends, her mother, and a friend’s mother were all permitted to testify that in 2014, Y.M. told them she had been sexually abused; this was long after the charging period, but contemporaneous with the ongoing abuse. Martinez moved to exclude Y.M.’s complaints to these witnesses as untimely since they happened so long after the charging period. The trial judge denied the motion, concluding that complaints were no longer required to be timely to be admissible. Based on those complaints, Y.M.’s testimony, and other evidence, the jury found Martinez guilty. Martinez received an indeterminate sentence of 123 months to life. Martinez largely argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the four witnesses to testify. Finding no such abuse of discretion, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Washington v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review related to the boundaries of the corporate attorney-client privilege and how it operated when in conflict with a plaintiff’s physician-patient privilege. In 2015, Doug Hermanson sideswiped an unoccupied vehicle and crashed into a utility pole. Hermanson was transported to Tacoma General Hospital, which was owned by MultiCare Health System Inc. Hermanson was treated by several MultiCare employees, including two nurses and a crisis intervention social worker. However, the physician who treated Hermanson, Dr. Patterson, was an independent contractor of MultiCare pursuant to a signed agreement between MultiCare and Trauma Trust, his employer. Trauma Trust was created by MultiCare; Dr. Patterson had his own office at Tacoma General Hospital and was expected to abide by MultiCare’s policies and procedures. During Hermanson’s treatment, an unidentified person at Tacoma General Hospital conducted a blood test on Hermanson that showed a high blood alcohol level. As a result, someone reported this information to the police, and the police charged Hermanson with first degree negligent driving and hit and run of an unattended vehicle. Based on this disclosure of his blood alcohol results, Hermanson sued MultiCare and multiple unidentified parties for negligence, defamation/false light, false imprisonment, violation of Hermanson’s physician-patient privilege, and unauthorized disclosure of Hermanson's confidential health information. MultiCare retained counsel to jointly represent MultiCare, Dr. Patterson, and Trauma Trust, reasoning that while Dr. Patterson and Trauma Trust were not identified parties, Hermanson’s initial demand letter implicated both parties. Hermanson objected to this joint representation and argued that MultiCare’s ex parte communications with Dr. Patterson violated Hermanson’s physician-patient privilege. The Supreme Court determined that Dr. Patterson still maintained a principal-agent relationship with MultiCare, and served as the "functional equivalent" of a MultiCare employee; therefore MultiCare could have ex parte communications with the doctor. The nurse and social worker privilege were "essentially identical in purpose" to the physician-patient privilege, making ex parte communications permissible between MultiCare and the nurse and social worker. View "Hermanson v. Multicare Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue before the Washington Supreme Court in this matter was whether trial courts had discretion to impose remedial sanctions under RCW 7.21.030(3) in the absence of ongoing, continuing contempt. Derek Gronquist was convicted of violent sexual offenses in 1988. While confined, he participated in a sex offender treatment program until 1991. That same year, former participants of the program brought a class action against the Department of Corrections (Department) to enjoin the release of their treatment files, which contained extensive medical and personal information. Gronquist was not a named class member. The case resulted in a permanent injunction in 1993 that prohibited the Department from releasing certain documents from any class member’s file. Though not a named party, Gronquist fell within the class of persons protected by the injunction. As Gronquist approached his earned early release date, the Department referred him to the King County prosecutor for possible commitment as a sexually violent predator. Under then-current statutory law, the prosecutor sought all records relating to Gronquist’s treatment. Gronquist filed a civil contempt motion against the Department and the King County prosecutor for releasing his treatment records. He also sought an accounting for all breaches of the injunction, an order transferring him to community custody, destruction of all improperly disclosed confidential information, at least $500 a day per contemnor, disqualification of a potential expert witness, and attorney fees and costs under RCW 7.21.030(3). The Department and the prosecutor may have shared some of Gronquist’s files in direct contravention of a valid injunction. On the Department's motion, but before considering Gronquist's contempt motion, the trial court prospectively invalidated the injunction as to Gronquist. The Department them moved to dismiss the contempt motion as moot. The Washington Supreme Court determined courts had discretion to impose remedial sanctions in the absence of contempt, but in this case, Gronquist failed to establish he suffered any compensable losses. With no ongoing contempt, any claim for sanctions here was moot. View "Gronquist v. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

This case concerned the constitutionality of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g), the provision exempting agricultural workers from the overtime pay requirement set out in the Washington Minimum Wage Act, ch. 49.46 RCW. Jose Martinez-Cuevas and Patricia Aguilar worked for DeRuyter Brothers Dairy as milkers. DeRuyter milkers used mechanized equipment to milk close to 3,000 cows per shift, 24 hours a day, three shifts a day, 7 days a week. In 2016, Martinez-Cuevas and Aguilar filed the present class action suit along with about 300 fellow DeRuyter dairy workers, claiming that DeRuyter failed to pay minimum wage to dairy workers, did not provide adequate rest and meal breaks, failed to compensate pre- and post-shift duties, and failed to pay overtime. The complaint also sought a judgment declaring RCW 49.46.130(2)(g) unconstitutional. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the class, finding the exemption violated article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution and the equal protection clause. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concurred with the trial court and affirmed that judgment. View "Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, Inc." on Justia Law

A trial court dismissed a recall petition filed against city of Yakima District 2 Councilman Jason White, wherein he purportedly committed acts of misfeasance and malfeasance, and violated his oath of office by using his position to undermine the State's and Yakima County's responses to the public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 virus. The petition also alleged Councilmember White committed a recallable offense by refusing to attend several city council meetings. In dismissing the petition, the trial judge found Councilmember White had a right to criticize other elected officials’ actions, and the petition failed to specifically identify the standard, law, or rule that Councilmember White allegedly violated. On August 6, 2020 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal by order with opinion to follow. The Court explained its order. View "In re Recall of White" on Justia Law