Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on the eligibility criteria of the special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which required offenders to have an established relationship with, or connection to, the victim such that the sole connection with the victim was not the commission of the crime. Petitioner Cory Pratt and his victim shared a family member in common, but did not have a direct relationship. In 2016, Pratt and his daughter attended his cousin’s birthday party. Several young girls spent the night after the party, including M.B., the 10-year-old daughter of Pratt’s aunt’s stepsister. Pratt slept in a backyard tent with the girls. The next day, M.B. told her grandmother and parents that Pratt touched her in the tent. Pratt was charged with one count of first-degree child molestation, and convicted after a two-day bench trial. Pratt requested the SSOSA sentence at issue here. The State contended he was not eligible because he did not have an “established relationship” with M.B. as required by statute: the State noted Pratt had met the child hours of the party; Pratt contended his connection was established through “familial ties.” The trial court sentenced Pratt according to SSOSA, reducing his sentence from 57 months of confinement to 12 months. The State appealed. Concluding Pratt was not “connected” to his victim as contemplated by the applicable statute, the Washington Supreme Court determined he was not eligible for a SSOSA sentence. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Washington v. Pratt" on Justia Law

Executing a search warrant, in 2011, eight Tacoma police officers broke open an apartment door with a battering ram. They expected for find Matthew Longstrom, a drug dealer. Instead, they awakened Petitioner Kathleen Mancini, a nurse who had been sleeping after working the night shift. Police nevertheless handcuffed Mancini and took her, without shoes and wearing only a nightgown, outside while they searched. Mancini sued these police for negligence in the performance of their duties. A jury found the police breached a duty of reasonable care they owed to Mancini when executing the search warrant. The Washington Supreme Court found substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals that held to the contrary (granting the officers sovereign immunity) and reinstated the jury’s verdict. View "Mancini v. City Of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Roger Leishman, an openly gay man, began employment with the Washington Attorney General’s office (AGO) as chief legal advisor to Western Washington University in 2015. Shortly after starting work, Leishman began exhibiting serious trichotillomania, anxiety, and other symptoms he disclosed to his employer. He would later be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, which was also disclosed to his employer. In January 2016, Leishman learned he did not receive a raise given to other assistant attorney generals, due to complaints his supervisor made about his conduct at work. Leishman contended his supervisor’s complaints were based on homophobic beliefs. Leishman made a formal request for reasonable accommodation of his disability, which the AGO denied. Leishman drafted a discrimination complaint. In response, the supervisor denied making the comments, accused Leishman of faking his disability, and refused to support his then-pending accommodation request. The AGO retained Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC (OMW) to conduct an independent investigation into Leishman’s discrimination complaint and his supervisor’s allegations. The OMW report concluded Leishman did not establish discrimination against him based on sexual orientation, and his conduct during a meeting with his supervisor violated expected standards of conduct for his position. The AGO thereafter terminated Leishman’s employment effective June, 2016. Leishman filed suit against the AGO. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which Leishman agreed to release his claims against the State and its officers. However, he also sued OMW, alleging the firm was not acting as the AGO’s agent, and his claims against the OMW were not barred by the settlement. The trial court granted OMW’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; the Court of Appeal reversed. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Leishman v. Ogden Murphy Wallace, PLLC" on Justia Law

In 2007, petitioner Alejandro Garcia Mendoza pled guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He moved to withdraw the plea on grounds his counsel did not advise him as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 356 (2010). Petitioner also argued he did not need to show prejudice under RCW 10.40.200. The Court of Appeals concluded petitioner was raising two claims: a constitutional claim that was exempt from the time bar, and a statutory claim that was not. It dismissed his challenge as mixed without reaching the merits. The Washington Supreme Court concluded petitioner made one claim for relief: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that under RCW 10.40.200 he did not need to show prejudice to bring this claim, but since he made a prima face showing of ineffective assistance in a challenge that is time exempt, the dismissal of his petition was vacated and this matter was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza" on Justia Law

A patient being treated for a sexual assault made statements to a sexual assault nurse examiner in the course of an exam with both medical and forensic purposes. The Washington Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, the primary purpose of nearly all of the statements was to guide the provision of medical care, not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Thus, the statements were not testimonial, so their admission did not violate the Sixth Amendment. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those statements under the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Finally, the Court found the trial court did err in admitting one statement describing the assailant, but the error was harmless. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Washington v. Burke" on Justia Law

On November 6, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court entered a unanimous order affirming the superior court’s decision to allow the recall effort against Benton County Sheriff Gerald Hatcher to proceed. Sergeant Jason Erickson filed the petition to recall Sheriff Hatcher after 90 percent of the Benton County Deputy Sheriff’s Guild (Guild) met and unanimously voted to pursue recall. The recall petition alleged 26 separate charges that, assuming the truth of the allegations, illustrated a toxic and authoritarian culture that Sheriff Hatcher created since his appointment in 2017. The Benton County Prosecutor’s Office (BCPO) categorized the 26 allegations into 8 charges for the purposes of the ballot synopsis. The superior court found all charges to be legally and factually sufficient. Sheriff Hatcher appealed this determination as to all charges. The Supreme Court found all charges were legally and factually sufficient. "Recall petitions are read broadly, as a whole, and in favor of the voter. The recall petitioner has alleged facts that, when viewed through that lens, establish a prima facie case of misfeasance, malfeasance, and unlawful conduct for each charge made against Sheriff Hatcher, for which there is no reasonable justification." Accordingly all eight charges contained in the ballot synopsis were allowed to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of Hatcher" on Justia Law

On September 10, 2020, the Washington Supreme Court issued an order affirming the trial court in part and reversing in part a recall petition filed against Snohomish County Sheriff Adam Fortney. Sheriff Fortney challenged the trial court’s finding that four of five recall charges filed against him were factually and legally sufficient. Fortney’s first four months in office were beset by multiple controversies. In January 2020, Fortney rehired three deputies who had been terminated by the former sheriff for serious misconduct. In March 2020, Fortney wrote a Facebook post to justify a deputy’s use of physical force on a woman after a jaywalking incident. Then in April 2020, Fortney publicly accused Governor Jay Inslee of mishandling the COVID-19 crisis and stated that he would refuse to enforce the governor’s “Stay Home – Stay Healthy” proclamation. In May 2020, four voters responded to Fortney’s actions by filing multiple recall charges against him, initiating Washington’s recall process pursuant to RCW 29A.56.110-.270. After a hearing at the superior court, the trial court found four of the recall charges were factually and legally sufficient. The court rejected the charge related to the Snohomish County Jail, concluding that the petitioners had not met their burden to allege specific facts and legal standards to show Fortney violated his duties. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the incitement charge and the rehiring charge were factually and legally sufficient. Those charges, along with the unchallenged refusal-to-enforce charge, were permitted to proceed to the signature gathering phase. View "In re Recall of Fortney" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether the state legislature could impose a duty to register as a sex offender in Washington where an individual would be required to register in the state of conviction. In 1984, respondent Benjamin Batson pleaded guilty in an Arizona court to two counts of sexual conduct with a minor. As a result of his conviction, Arizona law required Batson to register as a sex offender for life. At some point prior to April 6, 2009, Batson moved to Washington. At that time, the State required individuals to register as sex offenders only if their out-ofstate offense would have been classified as a sex offense in Washington. Since Batson’s Arizona conviction arose from sexual contact with a 16-year-old, his offense would not have been a crime in Washington. But in June 2010, the state legislature amended the sex registry statute to require registration for “[a]ny federal or out-of-state conviction for: [a]n offense for which the person would be required to register as a sex offender while residing in the state of conviction.” The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.44.128(10)(h) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed: "the legislature permissibly identified circumstances under which Washington sex offender registration requirements become operative as to individuals with out-of-state convictions." View "Washington v. Batson" on Justia Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected. View "In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S." on Justia Law

Todd McLaughlin was riding his bicycle on a Seattle street when the door of a parked vehicle opened right into him. McLaughlin fell, suffered injuries, and sought insurance coverage for various losses, including his medical expenses. McLaughlin’s insurance policy covered those expenses if McLaughlin was a “pedestrian” at the time of the accident. McLaughlin argued a bicyclist was a pedestrian, relying on the definition of “pedestrian” found in the Washington laws governing casualty insurance. The trial court held a bicyclist was not a pedestrian, reasoning that the plain meaning of "pedestrian" excluded bicyclists. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying largely on its view that the Washington statute defined pedestrian for purposes of casualty insurance, excluded bicyclists. The Washington Supreme Court reversed. The Washington legislature defined “pedestrian” for purposes of casualty insurance in Washington broadly in RCW 48.22.005(11). The Supreme Court found that definition included bicyclists and applied to the insurance contract at issue here. "Even if we were to hold otherwise, at the very least, the undefined term 'pedestrian' in the insurance contract at issue must be considered ambiguous in light of the various definitions of 'pedestrian' discussed in this opinion. Being ambiguous, we must construe the insurance term favorably to the insured. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings." View "McLaughlin v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co." on Justia Law