Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Commission on Judicial Conduct (Commission) ruled that Judge David Keenan, a King County Superior Court judge, violated the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC or Code) when he approved a bus advertisement for North Seattle College. The ad pictured him and stated, in part, “A Superior Court Judge, David Keenan got into law in part to advocate for marginalized communities.” North Seattle College was a nonprofit community college where Judge Keenan received both his high school and his associate’s degrees. The ad ran for three weeks as part of North Seattle College’s fall enrollment campaign. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Judge Keenan’s conduct did not violate Rules 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 of the Code. He did not violate his duty to be, and to appear, impartial, and he did not abuse the prestige of his office. The Court therefore reversed the Commission’s decision and dismissed the charges. View "In re Keenan" on Justia Law

Justin Jennings was convicted of felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for the killing of Chris Burton. At trial, the court held that a toxicology report showing Burton had methamphetamine in his system at the time of death was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and speculative. Jennings appealed, arguing the exclusion of the report violated his constitutional right to present a defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Jennings sought review of that decision and also challenged his sentence in light of the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in Washington v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial court’s exclusion of the toxicology report did not violate Jennings’ right to present a defense. However, the Court clarified the test that applied to a claimed constitutional violation of the right to present a defense. In addition, the Court vacated Jennings’ sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of Blake. View "Washington v. Jennings" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the amount of reimbursement that counties were entitled to from the State for costs associated with purchasing, installing, and operating additional ballot boxes. In order to answer that question, the Court first had to consider the relationship between RCW 29A.40.170 (the ballot box statute), RCW 29A.04.430 (the reimbursement statute, or "Section 430"), and RCW 43.135.060 (the unfunded mandate statute). The Supreme Court held Section 430 controlled over the unfunded mandate statute and provided reimbursement only of the State’s proportional share for the costs of compliance with the ballot box statute. Further, the Court held that the 2020 amendment of Section 430 did not violate article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution and that respondents Snohomish, Kittitas, and Whitman Counties could not claim any vested right that would require the Court to invalidate the retroactive effect of Section 430. The Court therefore reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wash. State Ass'n of Counties v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 2017, respondent Zachary Bergstrom was charged with possession of a controlled substance. He was later released on bail. For various reasons, among them, hospitalization, tardiness, and struggles with drug addiction and homelessness, Bergstrom missed three required court dates. Because of these failures to appear (FTAs), the State charged him with three counts of bail jumping. The jury acquitted Bergstrom of the underlying possession charge but convicted him of three counts of bail jumping under former RCW 9A.76.170 (2001) (the bail jumping statute). On appeal, Bergstrom argued: (1) the to-convict jury instructions were constitutionally infirm because they omitted an essential element; (2) the State’s evidence that Bergstrom knew of the required court dates was “equivocal” and therefore insufficient on two counts of bail jumping; and (3) defense counsel’s failures to object to certain evidence and to request an affirmative defense instruction amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing that the to-convict jury instructions were deficient but on the alternate ground that “the to-convict instructions did not require the State to prove an element of bail jumping - that Bergstrom knowingly failed to appear as required.” The court nonetheless determined the error was harmless, and he therefore knowingly failed to appear on those dates. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the court reversed Bergstrom’s bail jumping conviction for his FTA on January 12, 2018 due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in part because “knowingly failed to appear” was not an element of the 2001 bail jumping statute in effect at the time of Bergstrom’s FTAs because the legislature amended the bail jumping statute in 2001 to expressly replace this language with the broader knowledge requirement, “knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state.” Despite omission of the phrase “as required,” the to-convict jury instructions, as a whole, informed the jury of each essential element of bail jumping and were, therefore, constitutionally sound. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the Court of Appeals because the evidence that Bergstrom had knowledge of the April 18, 2018 court date was sufficient to convict. View "Washington v. Bergstrom" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether the penalty for intentionally concealing the source of political contributions could be based on the amount concealed. Washington voters proposed and passed Washington’s Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA or act), ch. 42.17A RCW. The FCPA compels disclosure and “compelled disclosure may encroach on First Amendment rights by infringing on the privacy of association and belief.” In 2012, California voters were presented with Proposition 37, which would have required some manufacturers to disclose whether packaged food contained genetically modified organisms (GMO). The Grocery Manufacturer’s Association (GMA) and many of its member companies successfully campaigned against Proposition 37, and some received negative responses from the public for doing so. In the wake of the Proposition 37 campaign, Washington sponsors filed Initiative 522, which also would have required GMO labels on packaged food. And like Proposition 37, GMA opposed it. GMA raised more than $14 million to oppose GMO labeling efforts. GMA in turn contributed $11 million to the “No on 522” campaign from the Defense of Brands strategic account. Despite its political activities in Washington, GMA did not register as a political committee with the Public Disclosure Commission (PDC) and did not make any PDC reports until after this lawsuit was filed. In response to the suit, GMA registered “under duress” but, as of the time of trial, still had not filed all of the required reports. The State sued, contending that GMA intentionally, flagrantly, and repeatedly violated the FCPA. The trial court specifically rejected testimony from GMA officers that they had not intended to violate the law, finding “it is not credible that GMA executives believed that shielding GMA’s members as the true source of contributions to GMA’s Defense of Brands Account was legal.” A majority of the Washington Supreme Court concluded GMA did not show that the trial court erred in imposing a punitive sanction under the FCPA based on the amount intentionally concealed. The Court thus affirmed the courts below and remanded for any further proceedings necessary. View "Washington v. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Wild Fish Conservancy (WFC) challenged the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife's (WDFW) approval of a permit that allowed Cooke Aquaculture Pacific LLC to change fish species to commercially farm steelhead trout in Puget Sound. The WFC alleged: (1) WDFW’s conclusion that an environmental impact statement (EIS) was not required was clearly erroneous; and (2) WDFW violated the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) by failing to consider and disclose appropriate alternatives to the proposal under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(e). The WFC asked the Washington Supreme Court to reverse the permit approval and order WDFW to complete an EIS. The superior court found WDFW’s SEPA analysis was not clearly erroneous and the steelhead permit application did not trigger RCW 43.21C.030(2)(e). Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wild Fish Conservancy v. Dep't of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

David Dodge was convicted of first degree murder, rape, and burglary for crimes he committed in 1997, when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to 50 years in prison. Twenty years later, the Washington legislature passed RCW 9.94A.730, giving people like Dodge who received lengthy sentences for crimes committed as juveniles, a chance for earlier release, after serving at least 20 years of their sentence. The statute: (1) required the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) to begin with a presumption of release after 20 years and to apply that presumption of release by considering “affirmative and other conditions” that could make release work; and (2) directed the ISRB to “give public safety considerations the highest priority when making all discretionary decisions regarding the ability for release and conditions of release.” In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Dodge challenged the ISRB’s application of this statute to his petition for early release after he had served more than 20 years of his 50-year sentence, arguing the ISRB erred by: (1) failing to apply the presumption of release contained in RCW 9.94A.730; (2) failing to consider conditions of release that could reduce his risk to an acceptable level, as the statute mandated; and (3) relying primarily on static historical facts about his crime rather than on evidence of his rehabilitation. In a matter of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court, it found that the ISRB placed singular weight on the duty to consider public safety, while failing to apply the presumption of release or meaningfully consider any conditions of release that might reduce risk to an appropriate level. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the ISRB for a new early release hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Dodge" on Justia Law

Glacier Northwest Inc. claimed the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local Union No. 174 (Local 174) was liable for concrete product loss during a strike and for an alleged misrepresentation by a union representative that Glacier claims interfered with its ability to service a concrete mat pour. The trial court ruled the strike-related claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and granted summary judgment for Local 174 on the misrepresentation claims. Glacier appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the preemption issue but affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the misrepresentation claims. The Washington Supreme Court granted review and accepted amicus curiae briefing from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, to address whether an employer’s state tort claims against its truck drivers’ union were preempted by the NLRA, and whether any claims that were not preempted were properly dismissed by the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded the NLRA preempted Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its concrete product because that loss was incidental to a strike arguably protected by federal law. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of Glacier’s misrepresentation claims because the union representative’s promise of future action was not a statement of existing fact on which those claims could be properly based, and because the statement was not a proximate cause of Glacier’s losses. View "Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174" on Justia Law

Petitioner Francisco Moreno was convicted of first degree burglary, which was defined by statute and required the State to prove that an accused: (1) entered or remained unlawfully in a building; (2) with an intent to commit a crime. On appeal, Moreno argued that both the charging document and jury instructions were constitutionally deficient because they omitted the implied essential element of knowledge of the unlawfulness of his entering or remaining. The Court of Appeals affirmed Moreno’s convictions, concluding that no implied essential element exists for first degree burglary. Finding no reversible error, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Moreno" on Justia Law

Jerry Lynn Peterson pleaded guilty to the sale of heroin in violation of RCW 69.50.410 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA). She petitioned the Washington Supreme Court to hold that RCW 69.50.410, if not all of the UCSA, was invalid and unconstitutional because, she contended, the statute had been impliedly repealed and, among other things, violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution. Accordingly, she argued, the charges against her had to be dismissed. Finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute, the Supreme Court rejected Peterson’s arguments and remanded for resentencing. View "Washington v. Peterson" on Justia Law