Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Sammamish passed an ordinance to condemn property rights in George Davis Creek, which runs through the petitioners' property, for stormwater management and fish passage protection. The city aimed to address storm drainage issues, improve traffic safety, provide flood protection, and remove barriers to fish passage. The petitioners argued that the city lacked authority to condemn their property for fish passage purposes, citing the salmon recovery act (SRA) and a previous case, Cowlitz County v. Martin.The Superior Court denied the city's motion for condemnation, agreeing with the petitioners that the city had no authority to condemn private property for fish passage purposes. The city appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the city had statutory authority under RCW 8.12.030 to condemn property for stormwater management. The court distinguished this case from Cowlitz County, noting that the project in question had multiple purposes, including stormwater management, which is explicitly authorized by the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case to determine the scope of the city's statutory condemnation authority. The court held that RCW 8.12.030 grants cities the authority to condemn property for stormwater management and other public uses. The inclusion of fish passage as one of the project's purposes did not divest the city of its authority to condemn property for stormwater management. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City of Sammamish v. Titcomb" on Justia Law

The Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) identified nitrogen pollution from wastewater treatment plants as a significant issue for Puget Sound. The Northwest Environmental Advocates (NWEA) petitioned Ecology to include nitrogen discharge limits in their regulations. Ecology denied the petition but committed to setting nutrient loading limits at current levels for all permitted dischargers in Puget Sound through the individual permitting process. Subsequently, Ecology issued permits with varying nitrogen discharge limits.The City of Tacoma and other municipalities operating wastewater treatment plants petitioned the Thurston County Superior Court for judicial review, arguing that Ecology's commitment constituted a "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and was adopted without following statutory rule-making procedures. The superior court agreed, holding that Ecology's commitment was a "rule" and invalidated it. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, finding that Ecology's actions amounted to a directive of general applicability, thus constituting a "rule" under the APA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that Ecology's commitment in the denial letter was not a directive of general applicability. The court found that Ecology's actions allowed for staff discretion and case-by-case analysis, rather than imposing a uniform standard. Therefore, the commitment did not meet the definition of a "rule" under RCW 34.05.010(16). The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the superior court for any further necessary proceedings. View "City of Tacoma v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Cody Hart filed a petition to recall Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney Richard A. Weyrich, Skagit County Auditor Sandra F. Perkins, and Skagit County Sheriff Donald L. McDermott. Hart alleged that the officials vacated their offices by failing to file their official bonds before their new term began on January 1, 2023, among other charges. The petition was certified and transmitted by the Skagit County auditor, and Deputy Solicitor General Karl Smith was appointed to prepare the ballot synopses. The Skagit County Superior Court found the charges legally and factually insufficient to support a recall and denied Hart’s motion to amend the ballot synopses.The Skagit County Superior Court approved the ballot synopses but found the charges against all three officials legally and factually insufficient. The court determined that the officials had obtained their bonds before the new term began, and their failure to file the bonds on time did not demonstrate intent to violate the law. Additionally, the court found that the officials' actions did not constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. Hart then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the charges were legally and factually insufficient, as Hart failed to show intent to violate the law or willful failure to secure a bond. The court also found that the officials' actions did not amount to misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of their oath of office. The court concluded that the officials' prior bonds were sufficient until their new bonds were filed, and their actions did not warrant removal from office. The court denied Hart’s various motions, including those for expedited declaratory judgment and recusal of the Chief Justice. View "In re Recall of Weyrich" on Justia Law

Clifford Porter and Peggy Huckstadt were married from 1977 to 1994, during which Porter served in the military. Upon their divorce, the trial court awarded Huckstadt a fractional share of Porter’s military retirement pay. Porter retired from the military in 2002 and later worked as a surgeon. In 2009, he was involuntarily recalled to active duty, served for three years, and was promoted, which increased his retirement pay. Porter retired again in 2012. In 2022, Porter sought to clarify that Huckstadt’s share should be based on his 2002 retirement rank and salary, not the increased benefits from his 2012 retirement.The trial court disagreed, ruling that the increased benefits from Porter’s recall service were community property subject to division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the salary increases during the recall period were based on 17 years of community efforts during the marriage.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that Porter’s rank and salary at his second retirement could not be used to calculate the community portion of the military pension. The court found that the “community efforts doctrine” did not apply under these specific circumstances, as the increased benefits were not a direct result of community effort and performance. The court also determined that the dissolution decree intended to value Huckstadt’s share based on Porter’s rank and salary at his first retirement in 2002, not his second retirement in 2012. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Porter" on Justia Law

A child, Baby Boy B (BBB), was removed from his mother, JB, shortly after birth and placed in shelter care with his maternal grandmother. The King County Superior Court held shelter care hearings in April, May, and June, finding no contested issues and maintaining prior orders. The court then decided not to hold additional hearings unless there was a motion alleging a change in circumstances, based on King County Superior Court Local Juvenile Court Rule (LJuCR) 2.5.The trial court found that JB's requests for 30-day shelter care hearings were unnecessary and a waste of judicial resources, as her visits were unsupervised. The court stated it would hear motions under LJuCR 2.5 if new issues arose. On discretionary review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, interpreting the statute to not require monthly review hearings for continued shelter care and finding that LJuCR 2.5 was not contrary to RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i).The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and concluded that RCW 13.34.065(7)(a)(i) requires trial courts to hold shelter care review hearings every 30 days while the dependency decision is pending, unless there is a valid waiver or agreed continuance. The court emphasized that ongoing judicial oversight is necessary to ensure the health, welfare, and safety of the child, and to hold parties accountable. The court found that King County LJuCR 2.5 was inconsistent with the statute. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Dependency of Baby Boy B." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Heather, who moved with her three children from Minnesota to Washington to escape domestic violence. After their arrival, the family experienced intermittent homelessness, and the children faced developmental and mental health challenges. Heather also struggled with mental health and substance abuse issues. The children's school reported potential physical abuse to the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF), leading to the children being placed in emergency shelter care.The King County Superior Court ordered the children into emergency shelter care, and the Court of Appeals denied review. Heather sought review of the shelter care order in the Washington Supreme Court. Department II of the Supreme Court reversed the shelter care order due to the State's failure to apply the "active efforts" standard required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). The case was remanded for further fact-finding. On remand, the trial court kept the children in shelter care, finding that returning them to Heather would place them in substantial and immediate danger.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether RCW 13.04.033(3) requires a lawyer to obtain "specific direction" from a client before seeking appellate review in child welfare cases. The court held that the statute does require such specific direction but does not mandate a separate sworn document or client signature. A notice of appeal or discretionary review filed under RAP 5.3 satisfies the requirement. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, which had dismissed the review due to the lack of a sworn, signed statement from Heather. However, as the case was moot, the Supreme Court remanded it to the trial court for any further necessary proceedings. View "In re Dependency of A.H." on Justia Law

Marina Palomarez and Matthew Wilcox were married for over 20 years before separating in 2015 and finalizing their divorce in 2019. During their marriage, they lived a middle-class lifestyle, raising two children and acquiring a family home. Palomarez primarily worked part-time jobs and stayed home to raise their children, while Wilcox managed a business, Premier Power Sports, which he purchased with loans. After their separation, the business grew significantly, and Wilcox's income increased. Palomarez, on the other hand, continued to work in lower-paying jobs.In the initial trial, the Yakima County Superior Court awarded Wilcox the business and Palomarez the family home and other assets. The court also ordered Wilcox to pay $1,000 per month in spousal maintenance for four years. Palomarez appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wilcox's income and the spousal maintenance award. On remand, the trial court awarded Palomarez $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance for 11 years, considering Wilcox's increased income and the disparity in their earning capacities.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that while a requesting spouse's need must be considered, it is not a prerequisite for awarding spousal maintenance. The court emphasized that the trial court must consider all statutory factors under RCW 26.09.090, including the financial resources of the requesting spouse, the standard of living during the marriage, and the ability of the paying spouse to meet their own needs while providing support. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $4,000 per month in spousal maintenance for 11 years, as it had considered all relevant factors and the specific circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed. View "In re the Marriage of Wilcox" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of consumers, filed a class action lawsuit against Amazon.com, Inc., alleging that the company violated Washington's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) by charging grossly inflated prices for essential goods during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs claimed that Amazon's price increases, which they defined as 15% or more on any consumer good or food item after a declared emergency, were unfair. They also alleged negligence and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington reviewed the case and Amazon moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that price gouging is not an unfair trade practice under the CPA. The District Court then certified two questions to the Washington Supreme Court: whether the CPA's prohibition on "unfair" acts or practices includes price gouging as alleged, and if so, whether the court or jury determines what percentage increase in price is "unfair."The Washington Supreme Court held that price gouging, as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, may be considered an unfair act or practice under the CPA. The court applied the substantial injury test from federal law, which requires that the act causes substantial injury to consumers, is not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits. The court found that the plaintiffs adequately alleged substantial injury, lack of reasonable alternatives, and no countervailing benefits.However, the court declined to establish a rigid 15% price increase threshold as a predicate for a price gouging claim, stating that such economic policy decisions are best left to the legislature. Finally, the court determined that whether an act is unfair is generally a mixed question of law and fact for the jury to resolve, unless the facts are undisputed, in which case it is a question of law for the court. View "Greenberg v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Adelina Gabriela Suarez, a nondenominational Christian, was employed by Yakima Valley School, a nursing facility operated by the State of Washington. Suarez requested Saturdays off to observe her Sabbath and additional religious holidays, but her requests were denied due to staffing needs and her probationary status. After refusing to work mandatory overtime shifts and taking an unscheduled leave for a religious event, Suarez was terminated for unreliability.In Yakima County Superior Court, Suarez claimed Yakima Valley failed to accommodate her religious practices and wrongfully terminated her in violation of public policy under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD). The court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, finding that the accommodations sought by Suarez would cause undue hardship and that her termination was not due to religious discrimination. Suarez's motion for reconsideration was denied.The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Yakima Valley provided reasonable accommodations and whether Suarez was terminated due to her religion. The appellate court applied a "significant difficulty or expense" test from WAC 82-56-020, rather than the "undue hardship" analysis from Hardison.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and clarified that the correct analysis for an "undue hardship" defense under the WLAD is the substantial burdens test from Hardison, as clarified by Groff v. DeJoy. The court held that accommodating Suarez's requests would violate seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement, constituting an undue hardship. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the superior court's summary judgment, dismissing Suarez's claims. View "Suarez v. State" on Justia Law

Olajide Adel Fletcher was sentenced based on an offender score that erroneously included two prior juvenile adjudications, resulting in a higher standard sentence range. This miscalculation was evident on the face of the judgment and sentence (J&S). Fletcher filed a postconviction motion for a new sentencing hearing, which the superior court granted despite it being filed after the usual one-year deadline. The court found the J&S invalid on its face due to the critical errors in the offender score.The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court's decision, agreeing that the J&S was facially invalid but ruling that Fletcher's motion violated procedural rules against filing successive postconviction motions. Fletcher then filed a third postconviction motion directly with the Washington Supreme Court, arguing that the J&S's serious errors made it invalid on its face.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts that the J&S was facially invalid due to the miscalculated offender score. The court held that the sentencing court must know the correct standard range to impose an exceptional sentence fairly and in accordance with statutory requirements. The court found that the original sentencing court could not have made a fair decision given the extreme miscalculation of Fletcher's offender score and standard sentence range.The Washington Supreme Court granted Fletcher's personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing using the accurate offender score and standard sentence range. The court emphasized that the errors in the original J&S constituted a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. View "In re the Personal Restraint of Fletcher" on Justia Law