Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Defendant Whatcom County (County) approved three land use applications for development in the Birch Bay urban growth area. Petitioner Whatcom County Fire District No. 21 (the Fire District) filed a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition to challenge the approvals. At issue between the parties was whether the completion of the proposed developments would reduce fire protection services to below an âadequateâ level of service. On review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the County had assigned the responsibility for assessing the adequacy of fire protection services to the Fire District. Because the Fire District determined the services it could provide would fall below an âadequateâ standard, the lower court properly granted its LUPA petition. The Court reversed the Countyâs approval of the land use applications for Birch Bay.

Petitioner Raymond Martinez challenged his conviction for first degree burglary, contending that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was armed with a deadly weapon within the meaning of the applicable statute. At trial, a knife and sheath were admitted into evidence, but none of the witnesses provided a verbal description of the sheath, or indicated whether it was fastened or unfastened when it was found on Petitionerâs person. On appeal, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor misstated the evidence, mislead the jury, and made an inflammatory statement in his closing remarks. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits. The Supreme Court reviewed the record and found that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a first degree burglary conviction. The Court vacated Petitionerâs conviction, and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Glen Nichols was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and with possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana. Following a denial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his arrest, the case proceeded to a bench trial at which Petitioner was found guilty on both charges. After he was sentenced, Petitioner appealed his convictions. Petitioner filed a Personal Restraint Petition (PRP) challenging the police search of the motel registry where he was staying when he was arrested. While his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided State v. Surge where it held that a random, warrantless check of motel registry records was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed Petitionerâs convictions and denied his PRP. On appeal, Petitioner argues that in light of the Supreme Courtâs decision in the âSurgeâ case, evidence stemming from the police search of the motel registry should have been suppressed. The Court was not persuaded by his argument, holding that Petitionerâs case differed from the âSurgeâ case in that police were not doing a random check of the records, rather, they had âindividualized suspicion that drug selling activity had taken place fromâ his room. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Petitioner Maureen Blair was a long-haul trucker. In 2003, she slipped and fell on a gasoline spill at a truck stop operated by Respondent TA-Seattle East No. 176 (also known as Travelcenters of America). Petitioner and her husband brought suit against Travelcenters in 2006. From the onset, there were problems with her case. Her trial counsel had problems at the firm, and as a result, missed several key discovery deadlines, particularly one involving disclosure of Petitioner's proposed witness list. Travelcenters moved to strike the witness list. The trial court did not enter any findings, but it struck the witness list, and sanctioned Petitioner's counsel for subsequent untimely disclosures. Three days before trial, Travelcenters moved to dismiss the case because without witnesses, Petitioner could not prove her case. The trial court granted the motion, and Petitioner appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Petitioner challenged the propriety of the trial court's sanctions and for striking the witnesses, claiming that the court was required to make a finding for the record why it did what it did. The appellate court held that the trial court did not have to enumerate its reasons. But the Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court misread the case law governing this kind of matter, and vacated the sanction orders from the trial court, and reversed the order granting Travelcenter's motion to dismiss.

Kemper Freeman and several other Washington taxpayers appealed directly to the Supreme Court to try to stop the governor and other state officials from "taking any action" on plans to convert high-occupancy lanes on Interstate 90 into light rail lines. Though Petitioners asked the Court to grant a writ of mandamus, the Court found that Petitioners were essentially seeking a declaratory judgment to bar the State Department of Transportation from selling or leasing any portion of the Interstate for light rail use. The Court found that such a request was outside of it's jurisdiction, and refused to issue the writ.