Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Jack and Delaphine Feil appealed the issuance of development permits for the construction of a pedestrian and bike trail by the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission. "Rocky Reach Trail" was scheduled for development entirely on public property. The Feils are orchardists and members of the Right to Farm Association of Baker Flats. Their property abuts the public property on which the proposed trail would be sited. They contended a developed trail would force the removal of mature fruit trees within the right-of-way, and that the trail violated multiple zoning ordinances that governed the area at issue. The Feils brought several unsuccessful appeals through the Commission and state development-management boards before taking their appeal to the superior court. The superior court dismissed their claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the site's comprehensive plan supported the proposed Rocky Reach Trail and affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the orchardists' claims. View "Feil v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner David Oppelt, Jr. was accused by his stepdaughter of sexually abuse. Police investigated, but Petitioner was not charged until six years after the alleged incident. Petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated by the pre-accusatorial delay and that the charges against him should have been dismissed. The trial court disagreed, and Petitioner was convicted of child molestation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial court misapplied the "pre-accusatorial delay test" for determining whether due process was violated by the delay. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court engaged the proper test and found no violation of due process. The Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Oppelt" on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute that arose after the sale of a plot of residential land pursuant to a statutory warranty deed. Specifically, the issue on appeal centered on whether a grantor's duty to defend against another's claim to title was satisfied by that grantor's independent decision to settle the claim and pay the grantee damages for the breach of warranty. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the duty to defend requires that a grantor defend in good faith. The grantor in this case, Csaba Kiss, was ordered by a trial court to pay damages to grantees Ivan and Varvara Popchoi when the court granted summary judgment against them and awarded a portion of their land to their neighbors J.E. and Naomi Edmonson through adverse possession. Mr. Kiss did not dispute that he owed damages, but appealed whether he owed attorney fees to the Popchois to defend against the Edmonsons' claim. The Supreme Court held Mr. Kiss was liable to the Popchois for the breach of the warranty to defend and ordered to pay their attorney fees. View "Edmonson v. Popchoi" on Justia Law

Respondents Harold and Jane Elyea, owners of Frog Mountain Pet Care (Frog Mountain) applied to Jefferson County (County) for a conditional use permit and variance to expand their dog and cat boarding facility. Petitioner Martin Mellish, owner of an adjoining property, opposed the application, arguing that the proposed expansion would increase noise from the facility. A County hearing examiner granted Frog Mountain's application. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but did not notify Frog Mountain that he had filed the motion. The hearing examiner denied Petitioner's motion and mailed notice of that denial to all interested parties including Frog Mountain. Petitioner then filed a land use petition at superior court. This filing occurred twenty days after the County mailed notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and fifty days after entry of the hearing examiner's decision that granted Frog Mountain's application. Frog Mountain moved to dismiss the land use petition as untimely, asserting that the 21-day time limit on filing the petition ran from the date of the hearing examiner's original decision. Petitioner and the County, on opposite sides of the underlying lawsuit, opposed Frog Mountain's motion, contending that the time limit for filing the lawsuit ran from the date of Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The superior court agreed with Petitioner and the County, and denied Frog Mountain's motion to dismiss. The court then reached the merits of Petitioner's land use petition and reversed the County's decision to grant the permit. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the hearing examiner's original decision was the "final determination" that triggered the time limit for filing the land use petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the motion for reconsideration Petitioner filed with the hearing examiner tolled the finality of the hearing examiner's initial decision. View "Mellish v. Frog Mountain Pet Care" on Justia Law

The City of Bothell charged Respondent James Barnhart with stalking within the portion of the City that falls within Snohomish County. The jury, which was composed of two King County and four Snohomish County jurors, ultimately convicted Respondent. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's conviction because it found the impaneling of King County jurors, though valid under state law, violated Article 1 Section 22 of the state constitution. The City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding "the composition of [Respondent's] jury violated his right to an 'impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed.'" The case was remanded for a new trial. View "City of Bothell v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Petitioners Kittitas County and several other parties challenged two final decisions and orders of the Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (Board). The Board found several provisions of the County's revised comprehensive plan (Plan) and development code noncompliant with the Growth Management Act (GMA). Petitioners argued that the Board misinterpreted the law and acted beyond its jurisdiction, without substantial evidence, and arbitrarily and capriciously in making findings related to rural and agricultural densities and uses, zoning techniques, land use near airports and water resources. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the Board did not improperly disregard evidence and appropriately found that the County violated the GMA by failing to: develop the required written record explaining its rural element; include provisions in its Plan that protect rural areas; provide for a variety of rural densities; protect agricultural land; and protect water resources. However, the Court found that the Board improperly found the County's airport overlay zone was noncompliant with the GMA. The Court remanded the case back to the Board for further proceedings with respect to the airport overlay zone. View "Kittitas County v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners Albert Ugas and Daniel Fishburn filed a recall petition against Respondent Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist, charging him with misfeasance and/or malfeasance and breach of his oath of office. Petitioners alleged that Mr. Lindquist failed to investigate alleged corruption and falsification of records by a former county assessor-treasurer. Additionally, Petitioners contended that Mr. Lindquist obstructed justice by deterring law enforcement from investigating the assessor-treasurer. The lower court dismissed Petitioners' affidavit of prejudice and held that the recall petition was legally and factually insufficient. The court awarded Mr. Lindquist $50,000 in attorney fees for Petitioners' intentionally filing a frivolous recall petition in bad faith. Petitioners argued on appeal that their recall petition was legally and factually sufficient and that they should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees. Upon review of the petition and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In re Recall of Lindquist" on Justia Law

Central to this case is the proper interpretation of a 2006 statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to a claim for medical malpractice. Appellant Lisa Unruh filed suit against her orthodontist, Dr. Dino Cacchiotti, alleging that his negligent treatment when she was a minor resulted in her losing her teeth and having to undergo extensive implant surgery. The Doctor successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations had expired. At the Court of Appeals, the Doctor raised an alternative ground for dismissing Appellant's case based on an eight-year statute of repose. After requesting supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case for the Supreme Court's review. After review of the applicable legal authority, the Court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose barred Appellant's claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Unruh v. Cacchiotti" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the removal of a person from the courtroom during trial was a "closure" in violation of the right to a public trial and whether such a "closure" could be considered too trivial as to implicate a defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant Dean Lormor was arrested following a domestic disturbance. During his jail intake, a small bag of methamphetamine was found in his pants pocket. Defendant's daughter, who was four days shy of her fourth birthday, was excluded from the courtroom before trial. The daughter, who was terminally ill, was confined to a wheelchair and required a ventilator to breathe. Before trial, the prosecutor brought the matter up, because Defendant had either talked to or near one of the jurors regarding his daughter. The prosecutor requested that Defendant be precluded from discussing his daughter and her condition. Counsel and and Defendant acquiesced, but Defendant had concerns about eventual sentencing because he hoped to accompany his daughter to Disneyland with the Make-a-Wish Foundation. Defendant was eventually convicted on the possession charge and sentenced to 24 months. He was allowed to go to Disneyland with his daughter before serving his sentence. On appeal Defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his daughter from trial. Additionally, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the exclusion as a cautionary measure. The appellate court determined that the exclusion was a "closure" but that the trial court's actions did not implicate Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of one person is not a closure that violates a Defendant's right to a public trial, but instead is an aspect of the court's power to control the proceedings. Under the facts of this case, the Court found that the trial court's removal of the young daughter was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's conviction. View "Washington v. Lormor" on Justia Law

The issue before the court came from the involuntary commitment of D.F.F. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course under state law. D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing that the mandatory closure of the proceedings violated her rights under the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law was unconstitutional and reversed the commitment order. The Supreme Court held upon review that "a fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceedings falls far short of guaranteeing open justice." The Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the applicable state law (MPR 1.3) is unconstitutional and reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order. The case was remanded for new commitment proceedings. View "In re Detention of D.F.F." on Justia Law