Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the removal of a person from the courtroom during trial was a "closure" in violation of the right to a public trial and whether such a "closure" could be considered too trivial as to implicate a defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant Dean Lormor was arrested following a domestic disturbance. During his jail intake, a small bag of methamphetamine was found in his pants pocket. Defendant's daughter, who was four days shy of her fourth birthday, was excluded from the courtroom before trial. The daughter, who was terminally ill, was confined to a wheelchair and required a ventilator to breathe. Before trial, the prosecutor brought the matter up, because Defendant had either talked to or near one of the jurors regarding his daughter. The prosecutor requested that Defendant be precluded from discussing his daughter and her condition. Counsel and and Defendant acquiesced, but Defendant had concerns about eventual sentencing because he hoped to accompany his daughter to Disneyland with the Make-a-Wish Foundation. Defendant was eventually convicted on the possession charge and sentenced to 24 months. He was allowed to go to Disneyland with his daughter before serving his sentence. On appeal Defendant argued that the trial court violated his right to a public trial by excluding his daughter from trial. Additionally, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to the exclusion as a cautionary measure. The appellate court determined that the exclusion was a "closure" but that the trial court's actions did not implicate Defendant's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of one person is not a closure that violates a Defendant's right to a public trial, but instead is an aspect of the court's power to control the proceedings. Under the facts of this case, the Court found that the trial court's removal of the young daughter was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial court's conviction. View "Washington v. Lormor" on Justia Law

The issue before the court came from the involuntary commitment of D.F.F. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course under state law. D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing that the mandatory closure of the proceedings violated her rights under the Washington Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that the law was unconstitutional and reversed the commitment order. The Supreme Court held upon review that "a fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceedings falls far short of guaranteeing open justice." The Court affirmed the appellate court's holding that the applicable state law (MPR 1.3) is unconstitutional and reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order. The case was remanded for new commitment proceedings. View "In re Detention of D.F.F." on Justia Law

A reporter from the News Tribune newspaper sought access to the deposition of a material witness in a criminal trial. The deposition took place in a courtroom with the judge present. Without engaging in an inquiry into the factors pursuant to "Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa," the trial court closed the courtroom on the ground that depositions are not open to the public. The deposition was not introduced at trial and did not become part of the court's decision making process. The News Tribune sought a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the transcript and videotape of the deposition, arguing that it had the right to attend the deposition under the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the state or federal constitution was violated by the trial court's ruling that the deposition proceeding was not open to the public: "The News Tribune's claim that the location and presence of the judge turned the deposition into a 'hearing' to which the open courts protections apply" was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court denied the News Tribune's application for a writ of mandamus. View "Tacoma News, Inc. v. Cayce" on Justia Law

Washington law provides that the State's decision to revoke a home childcare license should be upheld if it is supported at an evidentiary hearing by a preponderance of the evidence. In a prior holding, the Supreme Court held that due process required the State to support a decision to revoke a nursing assistant's registration under a higher standard of "clear and convincing" evidence. In this case, the principal issue was whether the strictures of due process required the State to support its decision to revoke a home childcare license by the higher standard. Respondent Kathleen Hardee's license was revoked. She requested a hearing, and a review judge reversed the hearing officer's decision, finding that the Department of Early Learning proved its case by a preponderance of the evidence. The superior court and Court of Appeals affirmed the order. Upon review, the Supreme Court overruled its prior decision, and held in this case that due process required not more than a preponderance of the evidence to justify the revocation of a home child care license. View "Hardee v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Cliff Jones challenged the trial court's denial of credit toward his sentence of community custody for the time he spent incarcerated in excess of his amended sentence of incarceration. After affirming the trial court's decision, the appeals court expressly declined to follow a sister division's holding that community custody began at completion of a sentence of confinement; an offender is entitled to credit toward a sentence of community custody for time spent incarcerated. Upon review, the Supreme Court disavowed the lower court's holding regarding credit, and affirmed the appellate division that heard Defendant's case. View "Washington v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Donaghe was convicted of second degree rape. In 1995, when Defendant’s incarceration was set to end, the State filed a petition to have Defendant committed as a “sexually violent predator” (SVP). In 2000 while awaiting his for his SVP commitment trial, Defendant moved to obtain a certificate of discharge for his rape convictions. The State argued against the discharge because Defendant had not fulfilled his community placement sentence, which the State argued tolled while he was confined. The trial court agreed with the State and denied Defendant’s motion. Three years later in 2003, the court found Defendant as an SVP. The Court of Appeals affirmed that determination in 2005. In 2007, Defendant renewed his motion for a certificate of discharge, but the trial court adhered to its 2000 ruling, holding that defendant’s custodial detention tolled the running of the community placement requirement. Defendant moved for reconsideration. The appeals court held that because Defendant had been detained as an SVP, his term of community placement could not “begin” until the State released him to the supervision of the community. Therefore, his sentence was not complete, and he was not entitled to a certificate of discharge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the trial court had the authority to deny Defendant’s certificate of discharge because his community placement was indeed tolled by his confinement as an SVP. View "Washington v. Donaghe" on Justia Law

Defendant James Eserjose appealed his second-degree burglary conviction. In his appeal, Defendant argued that the confession he gave to a deputy sheriff was inadmissible at trial. The trial court determined that although deputies had probable cause to arrest Defendant and consent to enter the home where the arrest was made, they exceeded the scope of the consent when they entered an upstairs hallway and made the arrests. The trial court held that the arrest was unlawful. Nevertheless, the court determined that Defendant's confession was admissible and subsequently found him guilty of burglary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in determining that Defendant's confession was admissible. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Eserjose" on Justia Law

In 2005, Petitioner Robert May violated a domestic violence protection order that prohibited him from contacting his ex-wife. As a result, Petitioner was convicted under a Seattle ordinance. On appeal, Petitioner contended that the order was invalid and that he received no notice that the "no-contact" provision of the order was a criminal offense. The superior court reversed the municipal court's conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court to reinstate the conviction. The Supreme Court in its affirmation of the Court of Appeals concluded: "[Petitioner] made a choice to violate the plain and unambiguous terms of the domestic violence protection order . . . the collateral bar rule precludes [him from challenging] the validity of the domestic violence protection order." The Court found that the protection order itself was notice that he would be prosecuted if he violated its terms. View "City of Seattle v. May" on Justia Law

In 1994, Respondent Sylvia Smith began to experience pain in her wrists and swelling in her arms. She was prescribed splints to wear while working for Petitioner Crown, Cork & Seal as a "bagger." In 1997, Respondent sustained an injury at work when a forklift ran over and fractured her leg. In 2005, the Department of Labor & Industries (L&I) determined that because of the forklift accident Respondent was permanently and totally disabled. L&I ordered Crown to place Respondent on the pension rolls. L&I also issued an order that denied Crown "second injury fund" coverage. On Crown's appeal, the superior court reversed the L&I orders. The court concluded that Respondent's wrist injuries preexisted the forklift injury and as such did not constitute a "previous bodily disability." L&I appealed to the Court of Appeals, who reversed the superior court's ruling. The question before the Supreme Court was what constituted a "previous bodily disability" for second injury fund coverage. The Court responded by holding that a "previous bodily injury" under state law is one that "effectively impacts an employee's performance in the workplace or materially diminishes the employee's functional ability to perform the routine activities associated with daily living." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeal's holding in favor of Respondent. View "Crown, Cork & Seal v. Smith" on Justia Law

Petitioners Lisa Mullen and Kevin Dean were prosecuted for stealing funds from their employer, a Skagit County car dealership. At issue before the Supreme Court was the State's duty to disclose exculpating evidence to defendants. After their convictions, Petitioners obtained a previously sealed deposition of the dealership's accountant taken in a separate civil suit between the owner and the accountant's firm. The deposition took place before the end of the criminal trial. In a motion for a new trial, Petitioners argued that the accountant's deposition testimony supported the defense theory that the owner authorized use of the funds. Petitioners contended that the prosecution's failure to disclose the information from the deposition constituted a due process violation under "Brady v. Maryland," 373 U.S. 83. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding that there was no due process violation. The Supreme Court agreed after careful consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority. The Court found no "Brady" violation, and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not granting Petitioners a new trial. View "Washingotn v. Mullen" on Justia Law