Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Former Pierce County Superior Court Judge Petitioner Michael Hecht was convicted of felony harassment and of patronizing a prostitute. The trial court denied his motion for an order of indigency, and the Court of Appeals denied his motion for discretionary review of that order. Petitioner sought discretionary review with the Supreme Court. The superior court denied indigency status on remand from the appellate court, finding that though he was unemployed (from resigning his post shortly after conviction) and had significant debts, the court reasoned Petitioner had "adequate means" to pay for his legal expenses. On discretionary review by the Supreme Court, Petitioner proffered evidence that he had begun receiving food stamps. The Court found that by statute an indigent person includes anyone who "at any stage of a court proceeding" receives certain types of public assistance, including "food stamps or food stamp benefits transferred electronically." Petitioner was therefore presumptively indigent. The Court granted Petitioner's motion for discretionary review and remanded the case back to the superior court for reconsideration of his motion for order of indigency. View "Washington v. Hecht" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Beadle appealed his convictions for first degree child molestation. At a pretrial child hearsay hearing, the four-year-old alleged victim had a serious emotional breakdown and refused to testify. The court found the child unavailable to testify at trial and admitted her out-of-court statements to family members, mental health providers, child protective services, and law enforcement. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by finding the victim's statements admissible. Upon review, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "Washington v. Beadle" on Justia Law

Petitioner Helen Immelt sounded a car horn at length in front of a neighbor’s house in the early morning hours. She was arrested for violating a Snohomish County noise ordinance that included amongst its prohibited noise disturbances horn honking for a purpose other than public safety, or originating from an officially sanctioned parade or other public event. She challenged the horn ordinance as overbroad and in violation of free speech protections. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance was overbroad, and reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "Washington v. Immelt" on Justia Law

As part of the distribution of property following the dissolution of Kenneth Treiger and J’Amy Lyn Owens’ marriage, a home belonging to them (the Maplewood property) was sold, and, pursuant to a trust agreement, the proceeds were deposited in a trust account. Bank of America NA (the Bank), which had obtained a writ of attachment on the Maplewood property, filed a declaratory judgment action to determine each party’s rights to the proceeds. This presented two issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) to determine whether the “Supplemental Decree of Dissolution” (Supplemental Decree) established a lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger; and (2) to determine whether various documents were valid judgments. Upon review, the Court concluded that the Supplemental Decree established an equitable lien on the Maplewood property in favor of Treiger in the amount of one-half of the proceeds of the court-ordered sale of the property. Furthermore, Documents "1375" and "13761" were valid judgments entitling Treiger to further awards but that Document "1370" was properly not given separate effect. Accordingly, the Court affirm in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Bank of America, NA v. Owens" on Justia Law

Petitioner Gilberto Ibarra-Cisneros and his brother Adrian Ibarra-Raya, were separately prosecuted on drug charges in November 2006. Both moved unsuccessfully to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the warrantless search of Ibarra-Raya's home. Specifically, Ibarra-Cisneros argued to suppress the evidence against him as the fruit of an unlawful use of Ibarra-Raya's cell phone, which was seized during the search. The appellate court determined that the search of the home was unlawful, but that the connection between Ibarra-Raya's cell phone and "the bindle found at Mr. Ibarra-Cisneros's feet [was] too attenuated to affect his cocaine possession conviction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred in relying on the "attenuation doctrine" as the basis to allow the cocaine evidence against Ibarra-Cisneros: "In light of the way this case has developed, the only fair resolution of Ibarra-Cisneros's appeal is to treat is as the Court of Appeals treated Ibarra-Raya's appeal. The State has not met its burden of purging the taint resulting from the unlawful home search." The Court remanded the case to the trial court "with the acknowledgement that, because the warrantless home search was unlawful, all evidence seized as a result must be suppressed." View "Washington v. Ibarra-Cisneros" on Justia Law

The State appealed the reversal of Respondent Ernest Carter's sentence. The Court of Appeals applied the "actual innocence doctrine" to hear Respondent's untimely personal restraint petition (PRP) and held that Respondent was erroneously sentenced as a persistent offender under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981. In 1998, the superior court entered a judgment and sentence convicting Respondent on two counts of robbery in the first degree and sentenced him as a persistent offender to life in prison. Respondent's prior offenses included a 1983 California conviction for assault with a firearm on a police officer and a 1990 Oregon conviction for attempted murder. Respondent timely filed a direct appeal raising nine issues including a claim that his prior California assault conviction was not comparable to a Washington strike offense under the POAA and should not have been counted toward his sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Almost seven years after the mandate, Respondent filed this PRP, arguing that his due process rights were violated during his 1998 trial when he appeared in shackles and that his sentence was unlawful. Respondent argued on appeal that: (1) there had been a significant change in the law (RCW 10.73.100(6)), (2) the sentence imposed was in excess of the court’s jurisdiction (RCW 10.73.100(5)), (3) Respondent's judgment and sentence were facially invalid (RCW 10.73.090), (4) equitable tolling under Washington common law warranted review, and (5) the federal actual innocence doctrine warranted review. The Court of Appeals dismissed Carter’s shackling claim as untimely, applied the actual innocence doctrine to the comparability issue, declined to address his alternative claims for relief, vacated Respondent's persistent offender sentence, and remanded for resentencing on the comparability issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case because the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the actual innocence doctrine to hear Respondent's untimely PRP prior to considering his other claimed exceptions to the time bar in RCW 10.73.090. View "In re Personal Restraint of Carter" on Justia Law

Linda Mohr suffered a trauma-induced stroke and became permanently disabled. She and her husband, Charles, claimed that negligent treatment by her health care providers caused Mrs. Mohr a loss of the chance of a better outcome. In "Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound," the Supreme Court recognized the "lost chance doctrine" in a survival action when the plaintiff died following the alleged failure of his doctor to timely diagnose his lung cancer. The Mohr's case "compel[led]" consideration of whether, in the medical malpractice context, there was a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate result is some serious harm short of death. The Supreme Court held that there was such a cause of action and, accordingly, reversed the order of summary judgment. View "Mohr v. Grantham" on Justia Law

Defendant John Franklin challenged the Court of Appeals decision affirming his convictions and sentences on assault and drug possession charges. The Supreme Court granted review only on the question of whether Defendant was entitled to resentencing for counts I and III as a result of then-new legislation requiring sentencing courts to reduce the term of community custody when the total terms of confinement and community custody exceeded the statutory maximum. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that while the legislation applied retroactively, the legislature charged the Department of Corrections, not the sentencing court, with adjusting the length of community custody for those serving terms of confinement or community custody by modifying the end date for community custody. Thus, the Court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to resentencing by the trial court and it affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Defendant Alberto Perez-Valdez challenged two evidentiary decisions made by a judge of the Walla Walla County Superior Court during a trial that resulted in his conviction for one count of second degree rape of a child and one count of third degree rape of a child. He also challenged the trial court’s denial of his motions for a mistrial based on a statement made by a state witness relating to the credibility of the victims. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions. Therefore, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Perez-Valdez" on Justia Law

Defendant Jay McKague appealed his conviction for second degree assault, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision. Defendant shoplifted a can of smoked oysters from a convenience store. The owner followed Defendant out of the store and confronted him in the parking lot. Defendant punched the owner in the head several times and pushed him to the ground, causing the owner's head to strike the pavement. He was diagnosed with a concussion without loss of consciousness, a scalp contusion and lacerations, and head and neck pain. Defendant was charged with first degree robbery, with third degree theft as an inferior offense, and second degree assault predicated on the infliction of substantial bodily injury. At Defendant's request, the court also instructed the jury on third degree assault as an inferior offense of second degree assault. The jury convicted Defendant of third degree theft and second degree assault. The dissent on the appellate panel took issue with the of the sufficiency of the evidence of “substantial bodily harm.” Specifically, the dissent disagreed with the lead opinion’s citation to a dictionary definition of the term “substantial” as including “something having substance or actual existence.” Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction, but in doing so the Court disapproved of the definition of “substantial bodily harm” applied by the Court of Appeals majority: "[w]e agree … that the majority applied an erroneous definition of 'substantial,' but we nonetheless affirm McKague’s conviction because the evidence was sufficient to show that [the owner's] injuries were 'substantial' under a proper definition." View "Washington v. McKague" on Justia Law