Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A trial court granted Jeremy Dustin Hubbard’s motion to modify a court-imposed community custody condition approximately 15 years after sentencing based on a change in Hubbard’s factual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed. However, the Washington Supreme Court found the current statutory framework did not contain a provision authorizing Hubbard’s requested modification. "Outside a direct appeal or a timely collateral attack, a trial court cannot modify court-imposed community custody conditions after sentencing without express statutory authority to do so." Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court to vacate its order. View "Washington v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

In early 2022, while Washington Governor Jay Inslee’s COVID-19 related mask mandate remained binding throughout the state, three of five Richland School District board (RSDB) members voted to make face coverings optional in Richland schools. This vote conflicted directly with the then effective statewide masking requirement. Two months later, a group of Richland voters filed petitions to recall those three RSDB members. The petitioners alleged that the three RSDB members violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 RCW, and knowingly violated state law in different ways when they voted to lift the mask mandate from the Richland schools. The trial court agreed that many of the counts containing those allegations were factually and legally sufficient to be placed on the ballot for the voters to decide. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with most of the trial court’s decisions. The Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopses 1, 3, and 5: petitioners sufficiently alleged that the RSDB members knowingly violated both the OPMA and the statewide mask mandate. But the Court reversed the trial court’s decision to uphold the counts that the trial court grouped into synopsis 4: the aspirational, nonbinding, RSDB “Code of Ethics” could not form the legal basis for a recall charge. View "In re Recall of Bird, et al." on Justia Law

A child was removed from his mother and placed with his grandparents out of concern that she could not care for him. Years later, the State sought to terminate that mother’s parental rights. On advice of counsel, she declined to answer questions related to her recent drug use. The trial judge chose to draw a negative inference from her assertion of that right. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review centered on whether, under the Fifth Amendment, that was permissible. The Court stressed that such a negative inference could not be the only evidence supporting termination. Here, the Supreme Court concluded the trial coud did not err by drawing a negative inference from the mother’s refusal to answer specific questions about her drug use. View "In re Dependency of A.M.F." on Justia Law

Two groups of plaintiffs, the Quinn and Clayton plaintiffs (Plaintiffs), brought suit to facially invalidate a capital gains tax enacted by the Washington legislature on three independent constitutional grounds. They principally claimed the tax was a property tax on income, in violation of the uniformity and levy limitations on property taxes imposed by article VII, sections 1 and 2 of the Washington Constitution. They also claimed the tax violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution and the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The State argued that it was a valid excise tax not subject to article VII’s uniformity and levy requirements, and that it was consistent with other state and federal constitutional requirements. The trial court concluded the tax was a property tax, and did not address the constitutional questions. But the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding the capital gains tax was appropriately characterized as an excise because it is levied on the sale or exchange of capital assets, not on capital assets or gains themselves. "Because the capital gains tax is an excise tax under Washington law, it is not subject to the uniformity and levy requirements of article VII. We further hold the capital gains tax is consistent with our state constitution’s privileges and immunities clause and the federal dormant commerce clause." View "Quinn, et al. v. Washington" on Justia Law

This case arose from a car accident in which respondenr Miriam Gonzalez Carmona ran a red light and hit petitioner Kylie Hanson’s car. At the time, Carmona was driving home from an out of town work training, driving a car owned by her employer, Southeast Washington Office of Aging and Long Term Care (SEW ALTC). Hanson filed a complaint against Carmona individually and the SEW ALTC Advisory Council (Advisory Council), under a theory of vicarious liability alleging Carmona was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Advisory Council and Carmona moved for summary judgment because Hanson did not comply with RCW 4.96.020(4)’s presuit notice requirement to sue a government entity or its employees for tortious conduct and the statute of limitations had run. Hanson then amended her complaint to remove all references to the Advisory Council and the allegations that Carmona was acting in the scope of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Advisory Council, but it allowed the case to proceed forward against Carmona in her individual capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that RCW 4.96.020(4) applied when an employee is acting within the scope of employment but is sued in their individual capacity. "The plain language of the statute encompasses acts within the scope of employment and the government entity, not the employee, is bound by any judgment, even if not technically sued. Accordingly, the legislature can require presuit notices for employee acts committed within the scope of employment." View "Hanson v. Carmona" on Justia Law

In 2018, Petitioner Zachery Meredith boarded a “Swift Blue Line” bus in Snohomish County. Swift buses used a “barrier-free payment-system[ ].” Snohomish County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Dalton and his partner were also on the Swift Blue Line that day, conducting fare enforcement pursuant to RCW 36.57A.235. In addition to the two deputies, a third officer was “in his patrol car, following [the bus] and acting as the back-up officer.” Meredith was already on the bus when Dalton and his partner boarded the bus; Dalton “never observed [Petitioner] getting on the bus without paying,” either in person or on video. In accordance with his “general practice,” Dalton requested “‘proof of payment or ORCA card’” from each passenger on the bus. On this particular day, Meredith was one of three individuals who “was not able to present proof of fare payment,” so “[u]pon reaching the next stop, Deputy Dalton detained [Meredith] outside at the bus platform.” Meredith “did not possess any identification documents,” but he gave the deputy a name and birth date, which turned out to be false. Rather than issuing a “civil infraction[ ]” for Meredith’s failure to provide proof of payment, the deputy “believed he had probable cause to arrest [Meredith] for theft in the third degree.” The officers ultimately learned he had two outstanding arrest warrants, for which Meredith was arrested and taken to jail. The State charged Meredith with a gross misdemeanor for making “a false or misleading material statement to a public servant.” Meredith unsuccessfully moved to suppress, contending the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion a crime had been committed. The issue presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether Meredith was "disturbed in his private affairs" by the particular method of fare enforcement used here and, if so, whether this disturbance complied with article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Based on the totality of the circumstances presented, a majority of the Court held Meredith was unlawfully seized. Thus, the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Meredith" on Justia Law

This case concerned an untimely personal restraint petition that petitioner Jonathan Pitchlynn alleged was exempt from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(5) because the judgment and sentence was imposed in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court ordered a reference hearing to resolve a material factual dispute. Based on the factual findings, the Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the Court dismissed petitioner’s personal restraint petition as untimely. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pitchlynn" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Hinton was 17 when he was convicted of murder and attempted murder. He received a 37-year standard range adult sentence. In his personal restraint petition (PRP), Hinton argued he was less culpable than an adult when he committed those crimes, so his standard range adult sentence was a disproportionate punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Hinton sought collateral relief in the form of a resentencing hearing so he could prove that his lesser culpability entitled him to a lesser sentence. The State argued RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP under RAP 16.4(d). To this, the Washington Supreme Court agreed: RCW 9.94A.730 was an adequate remedy that precluded Hinton’s PRP because it eliminated the constitutional error that Hinton identified in his original sentence. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Hinton" on Justia Law

This case concerned the adequacy of the Washington early release statute, RCW 9.94A.730, as a remedy to petitioner Erik Carrasco’s alleged unconstitutional sentence for a crime he committed as a juvenile. Carrasco was serving a 93-year sentence imposed without any consideration of his youth. Carrasco was 17 years old and a member of “La Raza,” a Norteño gang in Yakima; he was ultimately convicted of second degree murder, four counts of first degree assault, and second degree unlawful possession of a firearm. He would be eligible to petition for early release under RCW 9.94A.730 after serving 20 years of his sentence. Because Washington v. Scott, 416 P.3d 1182 (2018) was controlling, the Washington Supreme Court concluded Carrasco had an adequate remedy under the statute. The judgment dismissing his personal restraint petition was affirmed. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Carrasco" on Justia Law

CC (mother) and VC (father) were driving through eastern Washington when CC went into premature labor. CC gave birth to AC in a nearby hospital. AC’s umbilical cord tested positive for cannabis. Hospital staff noted that CC was disabled, that CC and VC were homeless, and that they had no baby supplies. The hospital reported its concerns to the State, and the State sent social worker Michelle Woodward to investigate. Woodward contacted CC’s family from whom she heard reports of the couple’s domestic violence, criminal history, and drug use. The State took custody of AC and temporarily placed him with a foster family. The court later found AC dependent at a contested shelter care hearing and ordered CC to participate in random drug testing and an evidence-based parenting program. The court also ordered the State to provide regular, supervised visitation. At about this time, a new social worker, Diana Barnes, was assigned to AC. The court held another dependency hearing where Woodward, Barnes, and parenting therapist Logan Wright testified in support of AC’s dependency. Woodward and Barnes relied extensively on hearsay based largely on secondhand reports and statements rather than their own personal interactions or investigations. None of these reports were submitted into evidence, no records custodian authenticated them, and none of the out-of-court witnesses whose statements were recorded in those reports were called to testify. Counsel for VC made two unsuccessful objections to the hearsay presented through the social workers. The court ultimately found that the parents’ past history with the criminal justice system and Child Protective Services supported dependency, a finding substantially based on hearsay. CC and VC appealed. The Washington Supreme Court held the trial court’s impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s dependency finding for AC as to both parents. View "In re Dependency of A.C." on Justia Law