Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Petitioner Darold Stenson was sentenced to death after he was found guilty of murdering his wife and business partner, Frank Hoerner. In 2009, Petitioner's counsel filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) raising a due process claim based on alleged violations of "Brady v. Maryland,"(373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Petitioner's "Brady" claim pertained to evidence consisting of photographs and an FBI file that the State had access to at the time of trial but did not provide to Petitioner's counsel until 2009. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the State violated Petitioner's rights under the mandates of "Brady" and its progeny. Because the Court held that it did, it reversed Petitioner's aggravated first degree murder conviction and his death sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed Respondent Yussuf Abdulle's first degree theft and forgery convictions based on "Washington v. Davis" (438 P.2d 185 (1968)). The State urged the Court to overrule "Davis", arguing that it is incorrect because it rests on the mistaken view that "Miranda" requires proof of waiver beyond a reasonable doubt and harmful because it keeps relevant evidence from the trier of fact. The Court agreed that "Davis" was incorrect in light of cases that issued from the United States Supreme Court following "Miranda." Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated Respondent's convictions. View "Washington v. Abdulle" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.View "Minnick v. Clearwire US, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the tragic death of a teenager Ashlie Bunch. Ashlie’s adoptive father, Steven Bunch (Bunch) brought an action under RCW 4.24.010, against the treatment center where Ashlie committed suicide, McGraw Residential Center. Ashley’s adoptive mother, Amy Kozel, sought to join the lawsuit as a necessary party under CR 19(a). The superior court denied Kozel’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding that Kozel satisfied statutory standing requirements and CR 19(a), the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Estate of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr." on Justia Law

Police executed a search warrant and arrested Petitioner Patrick Jimi Lyons when they found a marijuana growing operation on his property. Probable cause for the search warrant was based solely on information from a confidential source. The affidavit for search warrant did not establish timely probable cause because it stated when the officer received the tip, not when the informant observed the criminal activity. The trial court convicted him, but the Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner's conviction. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the search warrant did not satisfy the requirements of the Washington State Constitution article I, section 7, and the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained in the search. View "Washington v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court received a certified question from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The issue centered on whether under RCW 82.04.500 a seller may upon disclosure, recoup its business and occupation (B&O) tax by collecting a surcharge to recover gross receipts taxes in addition to its monthly service fee. The matter stems from Plaintiff-Appellant James Bowden's purchase of three cell phones and a monthly service plan for each phone at a kiosk. The phone company's monthly service fee did not include Washington's B&O tax. However, the tax was listed as a "State B and O Surcharge" on Plaintiff's monthly bills, for which he was charged various amounts for each of the phones. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phone company's monthly service fee, the sales price of its service contract, did not include the B&O surcharge. Rather, on the Agreement, the surcharge was listed separately under the "Regulatory Recovery Fee" provision described as a gross receipts surcharge. Further, the company's billing statements listed the surcharge separately like it was a sales tax, and both the sales tax and B&O fee were added on to the service fee. The Court therefore answered "no": even if disclosed under RCW 82.04-500, a seller is prohibited from recouping its B&O taxes by collecting a surcharge in addition to its monthly service fee. View "Peck v. AT&T Mobility" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed Defendant Brian Siers's conviction on one count of second degree assault. That court reversed the conviction because the State did not allege an aggravating factor in the charging document. In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on a Supreme Court decision on the issue of whether aggravating factors must be charged in the information. The Court took the opportunity to revisit that decision and held that an aggravating factor is not the functional equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information. Because the charging document here contained the essential elements of the crimes charged and Defendant was given notice prior to trial of the State’s intent to seek an aggravated sentence, Defendant’s due process rights were not violated. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated Defendant’s conviction. View "Washington v. Siers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in which granted Respondent Mansour Heidari's personal restraint petition and vacated his second degree child molestation conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeals declined the State's request to direct entry of a judgment for the lesser included offense of attempted second degree child molestation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly declined to direct the entry of judgment of the lesser included offense, and accordingly affirmed the appellate court’s decision. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Heidari" on Justia Law

An Auburn city police officer arrested Defendant Dustin Gauntt for possessing marijuana and using drug paraphernalia. An Auburn city prosecutor brought charges against him in Auburn Municipal Court under state law. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant contended that the city did not have the authority to prosecute him for violating statutes the city had not adopted. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirming the Court of Appeals and the superior court, and remanded the case back to the Auburn Municipal Court for dismissal. View "City of Auburn v. Gauntt" on Justia Law

Business Services of America II, Inc. (BSA) sued WaferTech LLC. After the trial court dismissed BSA's claims, BSA appealed. In March 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of all but one claim, which it remanded for trial. After remand, the case lay mostly dormant until June 2009, when BSA noted the case for trial. WaferTech then moved for dismissal. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and BSA appealed. BSA argued that the trial court had no discretion to dismiss the case because CR 41(b)(1) states that if a case is noted for trial before a dismissal hearing, it "shall not" be dismissed. The Court of Appeals agreed with BSA and reversed. WaferTech sought review. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bus. Servs. of Am. II, Inc. v. WaferTech LLC" on Justia Law