Justia Washington Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Robert Breitung was convicted of assaulting Ossie Cook and Richard Stevenson and of unlawfully possessing a firearm. Cook and Stevenson, both auto mechanics, took a client's truck for a test drive. During the drive they stopped for cigarettes. While at the smoke shop, Cook noticed a woman enter a black sports car and leave. When they left, Cook and Stevenson followed the same route as this woman and continued down a nearby gravel road. As they were leaving, Respondent appeared and walked into the middle of the gravel road ahead of the truck. According to Cook and Stevenson, as they approached Respondent, he pulled a handgun from behind his back, walked to the driver's side window, and pointed it at both men, telling them to stop following his girl friend. At trial, the State proposed jury instructions for second degree assault and second degree unlawful possession. Defense counsel proposed no additional instructions, and Respondent was convicted on all three counts. The Court of Appeals reversed Respondent's assault convictions, holding that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request lesser included offense instructions on fourth degree assault. The court also reversed Respondent's conviction for unlawful possession, holding that where as part of a prior conviction the court fails to give notice required by statute, a subsequent conviction for unlawful possession is invalid. Based on the Supreme Court's analysis in "Washington v. Grier," (246 P.3d 1260 (2011)), the Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the ineffectiveness claim. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the appellate court in its decision on the failure to give the statutorily required notice of firearm prohibition as part of a prior conviction, finding Washington law "required" reversal of Respondant's possession conviction. View "Washington v. Breitung" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the authority of the Department of Corrections (Department) to deduct funds from an inmate’s trust account. Defendant Chad Alan Pierce filed a personal restraint petition challenging the Department's collection of costs of incarceration and legal financial obligations (LFOs) from his account. He asserted that his judgment and sentence prohibits the Department from making such deductions. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the Department has statutory authority to deduct costs of incarceration independent of the judgment and sentence. In addition, the Department could deduct LFOs while Defendant was confined, and need not issue a notice of payroll deduction before initiating its collection efforts. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Pierce" on Justia Law

Respondent and Cross-Appellant Easterday Ranches, Inc. sought to operate a large feedlot in Franklin County. At the suggestion of the Department of Ecology (Department), Easterday acquired water rights from a neighboring farm. Appellants Scott Collin, Five Corners Family Farmers, the Center for Environmental Law and Policy (CELP), and the Sierra Club filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of Washington, the Department, and Easterday seeking a declaration that the stockwatering exemption from the permit requirement in RCW 90.44.050 is limited to uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day. Appellants further sought an injunction ordering Easterday to cease groundwater use without a permit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that, under the plain language of the statute, withdrawals of groundwater for stock-watering purposes are not limited to any particular quantity by RCW 90.44.050. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the respondents. View "Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Almgren and Carol Schneider divorced in Nebraska and Schneider moved to Washington with the couple's two children. The decree of dissolution set child support to continue during each child's minority. In Nebraska, the age of majority is 19 years. The Nebraska court modified the decree, approving the mother's move and adjusting certain obligations. Neither modification changed the duration of the father's child support obligation. The mother registered and moved to modify the Nebraska decree in Asotin County under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The Asotin County Superior Court entered an order of child support stating that the obligation would terminate when the children reach 18 or graduate from high school, whichever occurs last, and reserving the right to request postsecondary support. The order was entered without objection by the father regarding the application of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act or a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify the Nebraska child support order. The mother later petitioned for postsecondary educational support for their daughter. The father filed a cross-motion to modify child support due to his recent job loss. The trial court granted the mother's motion for postsecondary educational support and denied the father's motion for a downward modification. The father moved for reconsideration, raising for the first time the issue of the trial court’s authority under the UIFSA to enter orders extending child support for his daughter beyond the age of majority in Nebraska, which was denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by extending the father's child support obligation by granting postsecondary support for the daughter to attend college. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Schneider v. Almgren" on Justia Law

In November 1998, Respondent David Moeller’s 1996 Honda Civic CRX was damaged in a collision. Respondent had an insurance policy through Farmers Insurance Company of Washington (Farmers). Farmers chose to repair Respondent's damaged car, and he authorized the repairs. In May 1999, Respondent brought suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated Farmers policy holders in Washington State asserting a breach of contract claim on the grounds that Farmers failed to restore his vehicle to its "preloss condition through payment of the difference in the value between the vehicle's pre-loss value and its value after it was damaged, properly repaired and returned." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the contract between Farmers and Respondent provided for the diminished value of the post-accident, repaired car. Upon review, the Court affirmed the appellate court which held that the policy language at issue here allowed for recovery for the diminution in value. View "Moeller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

In 2007, five developers filed applications with the city of Yelm (City) for preliminary plat approval of proposed subdivisions. The only developer still party to this action, TTPH 3-8, LLC (Tahoma Terra), sought approval to develop 32 acres into residential lots. After a hearing examiner granted Tahoma Terra preliminary plat approval, Petitioner JZ Knight, a nearby property owner and senior water rights holder, appealed to the Yelm City Council (City Council), arguing the hearing examiner's conditional approval of the plats erroneously allowed the developers and the City to delay showing adequate water provisions for the subdivision until the building permit stage. The City Council affirmed the preliminary approvals, and Petitioner filed suit in superior court under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Petitioner had standing to bring the LUPA action. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioner established that the land use decision was likely to prejudice her water rights and satisfied the statutory standing requirement. View "Knight v. City of Yelm" on Justia Law

Petitioners Louise Lauer and Darrell de Tienne separately owned properties that border a lot owned by Mike and Shima Garrison. Through a Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) petition, Petitioners challenged a fish and wildlife variance granted to the Garrisons by Pierce County (the County) to build a single family residence within the protective buffer zone of a stream that runs across the Garrisons' property. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Garrisons' rights vested in 2004 when they submitted their building application. The Garrisons also raised questions about the standing and timeliness of Petitioners' claim, as well as whether the relevant critical area regulation even applies to the Garrisons' shoreline property. Upon review, the Court held that Petitioners properly petitioned the superior court for review and that, because the Garrisons' building permit application contained misrepresentations of material fact, the Garrisons' rights did not vest in 2004. View "Laurer v. Pierce County" on Justia Law

The primary issue presented by this case was whether the State had jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes who sold unstamped cigarettes without a license at a store that located on trust allotment land outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation. In 2007 and 2008, agents of the Washington State Liquor Control Board purchased cigarettes from the "Indian Country Store" in Puyallup. The cigarette cartons and packs that were purchased did not contain Washington or tribal tax stamps. Consequently, in July 2008 agents went to the store again with a warrant and seized 37,000 cartons of unstamped cigarettes. The owner of the Indian Country Store at the time was Defendant Edward Comenout, an enrolled member of the Quinault Indian Nation. His brother, Robert Comenout Sr., and his nephew, Robert Comenout Jr., were engaged in running the store on a daily basis. Robert Sr. is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes and Robert Jr. is an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. The Indian Country Store, despite its name, was not on an Indian reservation, but on two trust allotments outside the boundary of any reservation. The State charged all three Comenouts in Pierce County Superior Court with (1) engaging in the business of purchasing, selling, consigning, or distributing cigarettes without a license; (2) unlawful possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes; and (3) first degree theft. Edward, who was the alleged principal, moved to dismiss on grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction, joined by Robert Sr. and Robert Jr. The superior court denied the motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Comenouts were not exempt from Washington’s cigarette tax. Because RCW 82.24.110 and .500 criminalize the possession of unstamped cigarettes and the unlicensed sale of cigarettes, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the charges. View "Washington v. Comenout" on Justia Law

"R.P.H." appealed a superior court's denial of his petition to restore his right to possess firearms. In 2000, 13-year-old R.P.H. pled guilty to one count of first degree child rape for sexually assaulting his 11- and 6-year-old sisters. At sentencing, the King County Juvenile Court accepted the State’s recommendation to impose a special sexual offender disposition alternative that included a suspended term of commitment, 12 months of community supervision, sexual deviancy counseling, and various other conditions, including a requirement that R.P.H. "[n]ot possess or use a weapon of any kind." At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court suggested that R.P.H.’s right to possess a firearm could be restored if he successfully completed treatment. Thereafter, R.P.H. successfully completed treatment and fulfilled the other conditions of his alternative disposition. In 2007, R.P.H. petitioned the King County Superior Court to relieve him of the obligation to register as a sex offender and to reinstate his right to possess firearms. The superior court granted R.P.H.'s request to terminate the registration requirement, but denied his motion to restore his right to possess firearms, noting a concern over R.P.H.'s traffic infractions. In ints review, the Supreme Court found it necessary to address only R.P.H.'s assertion that because the requirement he register as a sex offender was terminated by the superior court, his right to possess firearms should be restored. The Court considered the superior court's order discharging R.P.H. from registration as a sex offender to be the equivalent of a certificate of rehabilitation, and therefore, R.P.H. should not be barred from exercising his right to possess firearms. The Court reversed the superior court's decision with respect to R.P.H.'s right to possess firearms. View "Washington v. R.P.H." on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Pannell pled guilty to incest and child molestation. His lengthy sentence was suspended pending satisfactory progress in sexual offender treatment, among other things. Petitioner failed to make satisfactory progress and his suspended sentence was revoked. He contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to credit for the time his sentence was suspended, at least to the extent that his time incarcerated, his time in postconfinement community custody, and his time on the suspended sentence added together exceed the statutory maximum for "class B" felonies. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded Petitioner was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in the community under a special sex offender sentence alternative (SSOSA) before his suspended sentence was revoked. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Washington v. Pannell" on Justia Law